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I. INTRODUCTION
Governance rules pertaining to issuers whose shares are widely traded
(hereinafter "widely traded issuers")' in the United States have been a
subject of much controversy recently, and the controversy continues even
after enactment of changes after opportunity for public participation.2 As
shown in Appendix A, the controversy has been characterized by differing
views of the principal objective of corporate governance regulation and, in
particular, of the primary purpose served by the annual meeting- of
shareholders of publicly-traded corporations.
A principal objective of this article is to examine how peculiarly New
England, or "Yankee," concepts of due process, as discerned by Alexis de
Tocqueville in his famous work, Democracy in America, underlie what this
article contends is the main purpose of United States (hereinafter "U.S.")
regulation of corporate governance - protecting the interest of the citizen
shareholder with investment intent. This shareholder is referred to as a
"citizen capitalist."
The concept of a citizen capitalist in U.S. law is by and large not
explicit and therefore must be regarded as implied. The only actual express
reference to it is a requirement under U.S. federal law that management
needs to include a proposal by a shareholder only on certain conditions in
its proxy statement for an annual meeting. These conditions are that (1) the
shareholder have over a threshold amount of share ownership (currently the
lesser of $2,000 of cost and 1 % of voting power), and (2) this ownership
interest be held for at least a threshold amount of time (currently one year).'
For purposes of this article, a shareholder with such investment intent that
is not otherwise a "financial aristocrat" as discussed below, is a "citizen
capitalist" regardless of nationality. The annual meeting, undergirded by
concepts of Yankee due process, is the main way of protecting the citizen
capitalist's interest and, consequently, of protecting the ability of industry
(whether U.S. or foreign) to raise capital.
The author of Democracy in America was a French aristocrat of the
early 19th Century concerned about the unruliness of the development of
"democracy" in the Europe of his day. He visited the United States over an
1. For U.S. purposes, such issuers are those whose shares are either listed on an SEC-
registered stock exchange or whose shares are registered with the SEC by virtue of having
an extensive trading market. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 781
(1994).
2. Shareholder Communication, Exchange Act Release No. 3-326, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 85,051 (Oct. 22, 1992).
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(b) (1998).
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extended period in the 1830's. His book holds up American democracy as
he found it, after an'exhaustive study, as a useful model for Europeans
concerned with an orderly unfolding of democratic principles in Europe.
Thus, he portrayed American democracy as having been developed in a
relatively calm and safe environment. This form of democracy developed
slowly, from the grassroots, but with European traditions in mind. This
made American political democracy - particularly as exemplified in New
England - a useful model for Europe.4 It is the same for American
corporate democracy as a model for the foreign observer today.
A foreign observer should not necessarily accept the U.S. model as
applicable in every detail to his own country without a careful comparison
of the de Tocqueville concepts (hereinafter "Yankee concepts of due
process") with those concepts of due process that constitute mores of his
own country. For purposes of stimulating debate, this article compares what
the author regards as the approach of a German model vis-a-vis the
governance of widely traded issuers with the U.S. 5 This comparison is in
light of Yankee concepts of due process, with deference to special mores of
this counterpart country.
The heritage that, the author believes, suggests special mores that
pertain to Germany is found in a "living" book. The book is "living"
4. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 18-20, 57 (J.P. Mayer ed.,
George Lawrence trans. 1966) (1969).
5. For purposes of Germany, such issuers are those whose shares have an extensive
trading market. There are several parts to this definition, which takes into account three
laws in Germany: The Law of Stock Corporations, the Stock Exchange Law, and the Co-
Determination Law. The components of an issuer with "an extensive trading market," for
purposes of this article, are as follows: (i) the issuer has more than 2,000 employees under
the Co-Determination Law; (ii) the issuer is a stock corporation under the the Law of Stock
Corporations, that is an "Aktiengesellschaft" in German; and (iii) the stock corporation is
registered for trading on one or more of Germany's eight national stock exchanges under
the Stock Exchange Law.
This three-component definition includes a comparatively small percentage of
companies in Germany. Most companies are either "companies of limited liability" rather
than stock corporations, whose shares are not publicly traded or do not have shares
outstanding that are listed for trading on a national stock exchange if the company is in the
form of a stock corporation. Rather, if publicly-traded at all, the shares of most German
companies are traded either (1) on a national stock exchange as an unlisted stock with
limited trading privileges, or (2) solely in the over-the-counter market. In both of these two
cases, the environment is unregulated compared to the U.S. equivalent and therefore, is not
covered in detail in this article. For an overview of the German capital markets, see Joseph
Blum, The Regulation of Insider Trading in Germany: Who's Afraid of Self-Restraint?, 7
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 507, 507-12 (1986). For a commentary on the small number of
issuers in Germany that have an extensive trading market, see Theodor Baums, Corporate
Governance in Germany: The Role of the Banks, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 503, 503-04 (1992).
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because it (1) is popular while at the same time scholarly, (2) purports to
discuss mores as well as heritages that underlie such mores, (3) is written
in or translated into English, (4) is written by an author who, like
de Tocqueville, has a substantial connection with both the U.S. and the
country he has written about, and (5) is not particularly out of the
mainstream in its approach, given commentaries of other respected
scholars. The author selected is a contemporary one, Gordon A. Craig, a
professor in German history at Princeton and Stanford Universities in the
U.S., as w6ll as in German universities. The "living book" is THE
GERMANS,6 written in 1981. This book seeks to assess the various roots of
the "good" and "bad" aspects of German culture as it stood at the beginning
of World War II. It then assesses the steps taken since the end of the war
in then "West Germany" (as well as in East Germany) that are designed to
counteract the bad aspects.
Craig suggests that German lawmakers perceive that a main source of
volatility in Germany has been a frustrated and stifled middle class. For
various reasons listed in Appendix B, members of this class do not have a
heritage of being free and responsible as a result of the Enlightenment in
Europe during past centuries. This stands in contrast to the middle class in
other European countries. Craig suggests that current governmental efforts
in Germany include keeping the middle class "under wraps" by fostering
various "institutions" as directors of society.7 These institutions, whose
members include those in the middle class, are each deemed to have
charters that evince a cohesive and cooperative spirit. The German model
is a useful one in countries where the middle class is large but perceived to
be too politically immature and volatile to be given responsibility on its
own. In short, Germany is selected in contrast to the U.S. for corporate
governance purposes, as an example of a country whose disadvantage is the
heritage of a politically immature middle class, but whose advantage is a
heritage of strong institutions.
U.S. corporate governance law is discussed critically in this article.
The article suggests ways in which methods of corporate governance in the
U.S. should change, on the basis that the approach should more stringently
discern and apply Yankee concepts of due process in order to protect the
interests of the citizen capitalist. The article then turns to the law pertaining
to widely-traded issuers based on the German model. First, the extent to
which the German model can be said to apply the various Yankee (or "de
Tocqueville") approaches discussed earlier in the article is assessed.
6. GORDON A. CRAIG, THE GERMANS (1983).
7. Id.
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Second, a sequential overview of the approach of the German model is
evaluated.
H. INTRODUCTION TO THE U.S. SYSTEM
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
A. The Primary Purpose of U.S. Regulation
The United States has corporate governance rules that are detailed and
multi-faceted. They represent a combination of the efforts of the federal
government, the various states, and of various essentially private entities.
To restate, it is the thesis of this article, first, that the current scheme of
U.S. regulation of corporate governance as it pertains to the annual meeting
in particular, is designed for the primary purpose of insuring the ability of
industry (U.S. or foreign) to raise capital by favoring the interest of the
citizen capitalist.' Second, the scheme of regulation employed in the U.S.
is justified by a form of deductive reasoning. This entails the use of "first
principles" derived from human experience rather than by inductive
reasoning derived from use by experts of a scientific method. Thus, to a
large extent by unconscious accretion over the years, the scheme of
regulation applies various Yankee concepts of due process that were
apparent in the de Tocqueville era. These concepts would seem largely
beneficent and, as in the arena of political democracy, preferable to
application of a scientific method to see what best enables industry to raise
capital. 9 Third, when and if U.S. corporate governance regulations are
more clearly articulated in terms of Yankee concepts, there will not only be
continued but also a more sophisticated application of them. Certainly such
articulation is preferable to that of subjective predilections on the part of
individual regulators. 0 This part of the article dedicated to the U.S.,
suggests changes to solidify U.S. protection of the citizen capitalist by
means of the application of Yankee concepts.
8. The purpose of the most relevant U.S. statute, the Securities Exchange Act, is, in fact,
to promote "interstate commerce, the national credit, the Federal taxing power, . . . the
national banking system, the Federal Reserve System, and ... fair and honest markets in
[stock] transactions." Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1994).
9. The scientific method approach, which this article does not espouse, has been urged
by various authors in the Winter 1993 edition of the JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE
FINANCE, published by the Continental Bank. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, Zen and the
Art of Securities Regulation, 5 CONTINENTAL BANK J. OF APPLIED CORP. FIN. 4 (1993).
10. See id.
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B. The Annual Meeting as a Centerpiece
In light of the costs of an annual meeting, U.S. corporate governance
rules recognize the availability of alternatives as a means of supervising the
management of an enterprise." However, the scheme of U.S. regulation
favors the annual meeting method of supervision by citizen capitalists for
several reasons.
First, there is a Yankee concept regarding due process of public
adherence to duties minutely-divided among several government officials
in the performance of an overall governmental function. Each official has
a personal responsibility to comply with his or her ("his") own specific
duties. Performance is characterized by formality and publicity. If an
official fails to perform the duties assigned him, he is subject to personal
liability. This reliance on "public performance of minutely divided
ministerial duties" is seen, from the perspective of human experience, as a
deterrence to "despotism" in connection with performance of the overall
function.' 2  If one includes "corporate officials" as a species of
"government officials" responsible for the process that leads to an annual
meeting, the holding of an annual meeting in the U.S takes advantage of the
ministerial duties concept to provide a check and balance in favor of the
citizen capitalist against any "despotism" on the part of management. 3
11. One alternative, even in states that normally require the holding of an annual meeting,
is that a majority of the voting shares consent, in writing, to the taking of the particular
annual meeting action, such as election of directors, without a meeting. See DEL. CODE.
ANN. tit. 8, § 228 (1997). As another alternative, an annual meeting can be dispensed with,
subject to the risk that, on application of a shareholder or director, a court will summarily
UA~jI UI~ U L.. 0L:t L.r.L. .. 1.J11r k.JIL7. )it. t, U / d 1r U L1 1VG,
which exists in Massachusetts and provides for a "business trust," is that the concept of
"trustees," as equivalent to directors who are subject to court supervision, be substituted for
the discipline of an annual meeting. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 182, § 1-14 (Law. Co-
op. 1994). A fourth alternative, in states that provide for the concept of business being
conducted by "limited partnerships," is that the discipline of an annual meeting be
substituted with the self interest of a limited partner and his ability to enforce contractual
provisions against the managing, or "general," partner. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 15501-33
(West 1994). Finally, a fifth alternative, in the case of a federally registered investment
company, is that total reliance be placed on the discipline of independent directors taking
annual meeting-type actions. An example is the selection of management for the upcoming
year, with holding an annual meeting of shareholders dispensed with if that omission is
permitted by the relevant state law. See Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-15(b)(1),(c) (1994).
12. See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 4, at 64-66, 74-78.
13. For the genesis of federal rules providing for adherence to publicized performance
of minutely-divided ministerial duties in the context of solicitation of proxies for voting at
[Vol. 19
USE OF YANKEE CONCEPTS
A second justification for the U.S. annual meeting is that it provides
a focal point for taking advantage of another Yankee concept which is being
able to rely on afact-oriented, rather than an issue-oriented press. This is
characterized by many newspapers circulating in every corner of the land.
This "press" does not have as its primary role that of espousing important
principles unlike its European counterpart at least in de Tocqueville's day.
Rather it attempts to enable citizens to pursue their own financial interests
in accordance with their instincts and informed by full knowledge of the
facts.' 4 The press enables important debate preceding an annual meeting,
reflected in SEC filings,' 5 to be brought to the attention of citizen capitalists
as well as the general public. The same is true of the meeting itself since its
time and place are to be announced in SEC filings open to the press and the
results of the meeting are to be publicized.' 6
A third justification is that the U.S. annual meeting makes use of two
additional useful Yankee concepts of due process. One concept is that when
a government official intervenes in his proper sphere, every citizen is
expected to guide, support, and sustain him rather than regard him as an
enemy in his midst, which is the European approach. 17 In the conduct of an
annual meeting, the citizen capitalists can be regarded as "citizen
sustainers." Thus, the report card of the citizen capitalists at an annual
meeting can have a useful public application. The report card is similar to
the opinion asked of the "independent public accountant" retained by a
corporation for annual reporting purposes.
Thus, the opinion of the public accountant addresses the fairness of
management's presentation of the corporation's publicly disseminated
financial statements for past periods. ' Although, in a sense it is adversarial,
the public accountant is not likely to be unduly hostile to management since
it is management who retains the accountant. Similarly, the report card of
the citizen capitalists addresses the adequacy of the publicly disseminated
performance of management for past periods. These shareholders, as a
group, are also not likely to be unduly hostile to management since the
an annual shareholders meeting, see Shareholder Rights: The Role of the Federal Proxy
Regulatory System Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous.
and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong. 16-24 (1991) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Richard
C. Breeden, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission).
14. See DE TOCQuEVILLE, supra note 4, at 184-88.
15. See infra pp. 20-29.
16. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(c)-101 (1998).
17. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 4, at 95.
18. For guidelines with respect to assuring the fairness of this presentation, see Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. pt. 210 (1998).
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value of their shares depends on the market's perception of the adequacy of
management performance which is influenced by their perception. Similar
to the case of the independent public accountant,19 shareholders in the U.S.
have never been held answerable for damages to members of the public for
their good faith opinion.
The question for the citizen capitalists is the nature of the opinion.2"
Should it be an unqualified one, as indicated by a highly favorable vote that
the performance has been adequate? Should it be a qualified one as
indicated by a favorable majority vote qualified by a significant negative
one? Should the report card signify a crisis of confidence as indicated by
a refusal to re-elect management for the upcoming year? Finally, should this
signification of a crisis of confidence be confirmed by overthrowing those
responsible for operation of the corporation through election of new
management after an election contest?
The second relevant Yankee concept of due process is that of
egalitarianism in compensation for government officials.2 In the New
England of de Tocqueville's day, the gap between compensation paid to
government officials performing higher-level duties and those performing
lower-level ones, was smaller than in Europe. Assuming that the right to
vote is a form of compensation for purchasing shares, and that all
shareholders, not just citizen capitalists, are capable of fulfilling the role of
a "government official" who is a citizen sustainer, all shareholders "of
record" are to participate in the opinion process.
A fourth U.S. justification for an annual meeting is that it enables the
shareholders as a whole to enjoy the satisfaction of providing a "report
card" on the performance of management. The human factor of sensitivity
of management about the nature of the "grade" that it receives, as well as
to other events that transpire at the meeting, give the individual shareholder
a means of registering his concerns by means other than selling his shares.
This safety valve avoids unnecessary transaction costs and undue volatility
in the price of shares.22
19. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hoclifelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
20. Management is of course concerned about the percentage of favorable votes for
election of directors and for other management proposals that are received at shareholder
meetings. See Eugene J. T. Flanagan, Corporate Governance Issue: Shareholder Voting
Rights, N.Y.L.J. (Sept. 16, 1987) at 21.
21. See DE TOCQUEvILLE, supra note 4, at 212-14.
22. See Pegging, Fixing and Stabilizing Security Prices, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
2446, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,512 (Mar. 18, 1940), regarding the perplexing subject
of artificial pegging, fixing and stabilizing securities' prices for a good cause from
management's perspective, even in the face of "natural" market volatility.
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A fifth reason relates to the Yankee concept that sober virtues, such as
thrift (as opposed to speculation), are to be encouraged in a citizenry.23 As
demonstrated below, it is the intent of U.S. law to assure that shareholder
opinion on the performance of management is motivated by considerations
of "thrift." The prqcess leading up to an annual meeting provides an
opportunity for information, bearing on issues of thrift, to be introduced
into the public marketplace. And the date of the annual meeting is a
publicly-announced occasion calling for advance disclosures, not just to
selected securities analysts, but to the public at large.24
A sixth justification relates to the Yankee concept that places reliance
on the degree of education of the ordinary citizen. This concept reflects the
U.S. assumption, prevalent in the New England of de Tocqueville's day,
that every voting citizen has received a basic formal education as well as a
thoroughly practical one. In short, every ordinary citizen in de
Tocqueville's day was assumed to be a man-of-the-world capable of
fulfilling magisterial responsibilities.2 5 Disclosure to such a presumably
educated citizen is prompted by the upcoming event of an annual meeting.
A seventh U.S. reason for favoring the annual meeting relates to the
Yankee concept that the citizen is to remain master in matters that concern
him alone. 26 A protected "citizen-as-master" for purposes of the annual
23. DE TOCQUEViLLE, supra note 4, at 34-6.
24. See infra pp. 13-28.
25. See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 4, at 36. The qualifications for being on the jury
list were electoral rights and good reputation. Id. at 206. Electoral rights during the time of
de Tocqueville, in Massachusetts for instance, were accorded to all men aged 21 and over,
resident in the particular district for a particular length of time ranging from 3 months to 10
years, and having at least a threshold level of annual income, three pounds sterling, or
capital, sixty pounds sterling. Id. at 722. An example of a role for the educated citizen is
a justice of the peace in a New England township, who is halfway between a man of the
world and a magistrate. For such an official, good sense and integrity are more important
than knowledge. Id. at 75.
26. According to de Tocqueville:
[I]n all matters concerning the duties of citizens toward each other [the
citizen] is subordinate. In all matters that concern himself alone he
remains the master; he is free and owes an account of his actions to God
alone. From this derives the maxim that the individual is the best and
only judge of his own interest and that society has no right to direct his
behavior unless it feels harmed by him or unless it needs his
concurrence.
Id. at 66.
[The citizen] has conceived an opinion of himself which is often
exaggerated but almost always salutary. He trusts fearlessly in his own
powers, which seem to him to be sufficient for everything. Suppose that
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meeting may be a three-part "entrepreneurial unit" of the corporation. This
unit is deemed to constitute the corporation's driving force. One part of this
trinity is the deemed provider of capital to the corporation on a "seed-
capital" basis, that is, the citizen capitalist.27 The other two parts of the
trinity are the executive officers and the directors. Together the executive
officers and the directors comprise what is known as "management." As
demonstrated below, the citizen-as-master concept justifies the annual
meeting because it provides an occasion for "representative" citizen
capitalists to provide guidance to management through the medium of a
shareholder proposal.28
An eighth reason is that the U.S. annual meeting provides an occasion
to replace the existing operators of the corporation if such a step is
warranted. A related Yankee concept is that on the one hand, freedom of
association for political ends involves a risk to public order in a democracy
and such freedom of association gives rise to a second, non-elected policy-
making body, a "dissident faction." On the other hand, such a faction, if
publicized, is preferable to the type of "secret society" found in the Europe
of de Tocqueville's day. Such a secret society, officially precluded from
government, acts as a rival government. It therefore necessarily has a sole
purpose of undermining public order rather than providing a "loyal
opposition. "29 The annual meeting provides an opportunity for a dissident
faction, as otherwise loyal opposition, to attain power. However, there is
a requirement that beyond a certain point of "testing the waters," its efforts
to attain power must be made known to all the shareholders.
A ninth justification is that the U.S. annual meeting reflects a Yankee
concept that government procedures that are "judicial" in form characterize
government decision-making that is not judicial in substance.3" A process
is judicial in substance if it pertains to elaboration of established principles
an individual thinks of some enterprise, and that enterprise has a direct
bearing on the welfare of society; it does not come into his head to
appeal to public authority for its help. He publishes his plan, offers to
carry it out, summons other individuals to aid in his efforts, and
personally struggles against all obstacles. No doubt he is often less
successful than the state would have been in his place, but in the long run
the sum of all private undertakings far surpasses anything the government
might have done.
Id. at 95.
27. See infra pp. 17-18.
28. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a)(1) (1998).
29. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 4, at 190-93.
30. See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 4, at 75-77.
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to an individual fact situation. In contrast, a process is "legislative" if it
pertains to establishment of new principles based on new facts and is
"executive" if it pertains to enforcement of established principles.
Reflecting such "judicial-form procedures," the process leading up to an
annual meeting can be said to consist of (1) publicly disseminated disclosure
documents and a form of proxy, as the "pleadings" in a judicial context
(hereinafter "pleading documents"), and (2) the annual meeting itself
including the determination and announcement of results, as the "hearing."
All of this transpires while the substance of the process is not judicial but
a combination of the legislative and the executive.
C. Overview of Subjects Covered as to the U.S. System
Part II of this article evaluates the overlapping statutory schemes
relating to the annual meeting process from the perspective of citizen
capitalists. Part III evaluates the roles of various types of participants,
including the citizen capitalists, in the U.S. annual meeting process. The
disclosure involved in the process that leads up to the annual meeting is
evaluated in Part IV. The disclosure described in this part assumes an
uncontested setting in which there is no formal opposition to management
proposals. Part V evaluates the integrity of the voting process on behalf of
citizen capitalists that culminates in the annual meeting. Part VI evaluates
the U.S. approach towards the added complication to and vindication of the
annual meeting which is a counter-proposal by a dissident faction that seeks
not merely a negative grade for management, but also an overthrow of the
current operators of the corporation, all to the ostensible benefit of the
citizen capitalists.
Parts VII through IX evaluate various threshold assurances of a
foundation for evaluation on behalf of the citizen capitalists. It will be seen
from Part IV that the disclosure that leads up to an annual meeting falls into
three categories: (1) any changes in the overall business, or "enterprise"
objectives of the corporation; (2) long-term corporate operating
performance measured against these objectives, including the subject of
management compensation; and (3) the corporation's short-term share price
performance as measured against enterprise objectives. The foundation for
the first category, the meeting of enterprise objectives, is addressed in Part
IX discussing the prior prevention of clearly misguided management
decisions as to enterprise objectives. As to a foundation to the second
category, long-term performance, Part VIII addresses the prior prevention
of clearly misguided management decisions affecting long-term corporate
operating performance. Lastly, as to a foundation for the third category,
protection as to liquidity, Part VII addresses the prior prevention of clearly
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self-interested management interference, to the detriment of liquidity
objectives, in the market price for the corporation's shares.
1H. USE OF OVERLAPPING STATUTORY SCHEMES
IN THE U.S. FOR EVALUATION OF MANAGEMENT
The right of citizen-capitalists to have management performance of
publicly-traded corporations evaluated annually by some means, not
necessarily an annual meeting, is protected by U.S. law. Although
principles of dispersion of power and flexibility prevent an annual meeting
from being the exclusive means for an evaluation, the annual meeting is
favored in the U.S. as seen below.
A. Limited Intra-Government Competition
A Yankee concept of due process is that the control of an otherwise all-
powerful government unit is to be rendered non-absolute by control of an
overlapping area by one or more other government units independent of the
first. This concept of "limited intra-government competition," present in de
Tocqueville's day, protected against despotism in the performance of an
overall government function.3' In addition, it also provides an opportunity
for experimentation today.
Thus, federal law does not require that an evaluation of management
performance in the case of a widely-traded issuer be made by means of an
annual meeting on behalf of citizen-capitalists. Rather, it is the law of the
issuer's domicile for governance purposes, its "home state," 3 2 that
determines any such need. It is the "citizen-as-master" trinity of the issuer
that determines the identity of this "home state." This right to choose
applies regardless of the nature of the distribution of the issuer's
shareholders among the various states.33 As discussed above,34 a home state
may dispense with an annual meeting requirement for an issuer. It may rely,
for instance, on publicized performance of ministerial duties to assure that
31. See id. at 72. An example of the dispersion of the power of a state is that the
collection of state taxes was a township function. Id. at 73-74, 84, 89-90. For the inherent
weakness of centralized power, see id. at 15, 89-90.
32. See citations supra note 11 and accompanying text, see also Hearings, supra note 13,
at 6-7 (testimony of Richard C. Breeden, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission).
33. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101 (1996).
34. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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management is evaluated. 35 Federal law, however, clearly favors the use
of a corporate annual meeting. As a citizen sustainer of federal efforts, the
New York Stock Exchange requires that such a meeting be held as a
condition of granting an issuer's application to have its shares listed on the
exchange for trading.36 Also favoring the holding of an annual meeting is
the U.S. constitutional principle that even if the home state does not require
it, another state may, if the issuer has substantial contact with the non-home
state in terms of shareholders resident and/or business done.'
Once a U.S. issuer is required to hold corporate annual meetings on
behalf of citizen-capitalists as a means of evaluation, federal rules, for the
professed purpose of protecting the ability of industry to raise capital,3"
mandate that the publicly-disseminated pleading documents have integrity .9
35. Federal rules require that disclosure be made of "voting rights," to prospective
purchasers of securities in a new offering. See Registration Statement Under the Securities
Act of 1933, Item 9, 17 C.F.R. § 232.S-1 (1998); Securities Act of 1933, Reg. S-K, 17
C.F.R. § 229.202(a)(5) (1998); Securities Exchange Act, General Form of Registration of
Securities Form 10, 17 C.F.R. § 2409.210 (1998).
36. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL 301.00, 302.00 and
306.00; see Hearings, supra note 13, at 26-28 (testimony of Richard C. Breeden,
Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission). The New York Stock Exchange
and the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation Systems, are
themselves regulated by the SEC as securities market citizen sustainers. See Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b),(c) (1994). They are also empowered to
enact requirements for the listing of the corporation's shares for trading by federal law. Id.
These requirements can be more rigorous than those insisted upon by the corporation's home
state for its own purposes as well as those required by federal law for its own purposes. Id.
See also The Business Roundtable v. Sec. Exch. Comm'n., 905 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir.
1990). This case involved Rule 19c-4 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which
requires exchanges to enact rules providing for fair corporate suffrage as a condition of the
listing of shares, that is, the rules were to prohibit disparate voting right plans tending to
disenfranchise shareholders. The court overturned the SEC rule on the basis that it
encroached on a role allocated to the states. However, stock exchanges have been able to
span this difference and have voluntarily enacted rules providing for such fair corporate
suffrage. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL 310.00.
37. For example, the State of California requires that if a corporation has more than half
of its shareholders, as well as more than half of business factors bearing on operations, in
California, the law of the latter must be met on certain corporate governance subjects
notwithstanding less stringent requirements of the home state. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115
(West 1994). On the other hand, if the home state requires an annual meeting but a stock
exchange where shares are traded does not, the requirements of the home state, under case
law, prevail over those of the stock exchange. See The Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d 407.
38. See Hearings, supra note 13, at 16 (testimony of Richard C. Breeden, Chairman,
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission).
39. See infra Parts IV, V, and VI. This requirement of adherence to federal rules in the
pleading phase applies whether or not management of the corporation technically chooses
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These include forms of proxy preceding the annual meeting. Regulation of
the annual meeting itself, that is, the "hearing," is left to the home state or,
if applicable, to the foreign country domicile.
B. Suggested Change as to the U.S. Statutory Scheme
It is noteworthy that the federal pleading rules apply to annual meetings
of foreign corporations only to a limited degree . Thus, they apply only to
those whose shares are listed for trading on a U.S. stock exchange. Foreign
"home state" law is to govern the hearing phase for such a foreign
corporation. This is the case even if a substantial number of citizen-
capitalists of the foreign corporation are of U.S. nationality. However,
those foreign corporations whose shares trade "over-the-counter" rather
than on any exchange, are excluded from the need to comply with U.S.
federal pleading phase rules with respect to their annual meetings. This is
true even though the over-the-counter market may represent an important
source of shares that have been purchased in these corporations by citizen-
capitalists. 4' This state of affairs creates a vacuum in which the foreign law
pertaining to the hearing phase of the annual meeting has no intra-
government competition from a separate promulgator of pleading phase
rules.
to "plead" its case in the sense of soliciting proxies for voting at the annual meeting. If it
chooses to plead, it is governed by rules under section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, which regulates the contents of "proxy statements." If it chooses not to plead, it
is subject to the rules under section 14(c) of that Act, which involves the regulation of
"information statements" containing essentially the same information as proxy statements.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78n.
40. There need not be compliance with federal pleading rules even if the securities trade
on the widely-used National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation System
("NASDAQ"), as opposed to such lightly regulated over-the-counter markets as the
Electronic Bulletin Board or the "Pink Sheets." See Franklin R. Edward, Listing of Foreign
Securities on U.S. Exchanges, 5 CONTINENTAL BANK J. OF APPLIED CORP. FIN. 28, 32
(1993). This exemption from federal pleading phase rules is by virtue of a "temporary
exemption." Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Rule 12g3-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2
(1998). By virtue of this temporary exemption, foreign corporations not listed for trading
on a U.S. stock exchange are exempted from the need to register their shares with the SEC
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Thus, they are exempted from the need to
provide annual and other reports on its operations to the SEC and self-regulatory
organizations as well as to comply with federal pleading phase requirements. The exemption
is subject to certain conditions. These, however, do not assure the detail and readability that
is required of domestic U.S. corporations and of foreign corporations listed for trading on
a U.S. stock exchange. Moreover, the relevant information need be furnished only to the
SEC where it is subject to review and reporting by the press, although not directly provided
to security holders.
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Further, the concept that a federal treaty preempts state law might
preclude any state with which such a foreign corporation has substantial
contacts from providing the intra-government competition in the form of
requiring an annual meeting even though foreign law may not. This absence
of competition can be said to detract from the overall U.S. scheme of
regulating corporate governance, in particular that of protecting the citizen
capitalist investing in a foreign corporation. A change would seem
warranted.4'
IV. DIE U.S. ANNUAL MEETING PARTICIPANTS
This part will show that public performance of ministerial duties, keyed
to various participants, including the citizen capitalist, helps insure the
integrity of the U.S. corporate annual meeting process. These duties, in
turn, take advantage of a variety of Yankee concepts of due process. The
key participants, together with applicable concepts, are discussed below.
A. The Participants
The first participant is the citizen capitalist. The parts of the citizen-as-
master trinity of a corporation derive from what transpires when a corporate
enterprise is formed. It is the author's contention that federal "pleading
phase" rules seek to preserve, in a "mature corporation," the same
dynamism that exists in a "young corporation." Under federal rules, the
parts of the trinity, in order of "dynamism" priority, consists of:
- one or more founders of a young corporation, the "men with
the idea," translated into the original enterprise objectives of
the corporation. Federal rules equate the executive officers of
a mature corporation with these "founders."
- For a young corporation, the venture capitalist or the
provider of seed capital. Such a capitalist provides general
guidance to the founders, both directly and through a board
41. A possible solution would be for Congress to grant the President authority to negotiate
a treaty pursuant to a division of authority between the Congress and the President along the
lines of the one approved in the U.S. Supreme Court case of United States v. Curtis-Wright
Export Co., 229 U.S. 304 (1935). In our case, this treaty could eliminate intra-government
competition from the U.S. or its states with respect to exempted non-listed foreign shares
traded in the U.S. In return, the rules of the foreign country that is the home state for the
shares would eliminate intra-government competition from its own regulatory authority with
respect to exempted non-listed U.S. shares traded in that foreign country.
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of directors that he helps elect. 42 In the spirit of the concept
that citizens are presumed to be educated, the federal rules
can be said to equate any shareholder owning over a threshold
amount in a mature corporation with the venture capitalist, if
the shares have been held for a minimum period of one year,
indicative of an investment intent, that is, the citizen
capitalist.43
- Lastly, for a young corporation, the board of directors as
elected by the venture capitalists and, for a mature
corporation, the board of directors as elected by all the citizen
shareholders with a leadership role given to the citizen-
capitalists.
The executive officers, who are perhaps the most dynamic and most
entrepreneurial of the three parts of the trinity, and the directors, perhaps
the least dynamic and most cautious, constitute "management. " Providing
a counterpoint to management is the part of the trinity whose dynamism
ranks in the middle, the citizen capitalist(s).
A second participant is the "plebe shareholder," who is subordinate to
the citizen capitalist. The plebe is a shareholder that either owns less than
the threshold amount of shares required to become a "citizen capitalist" or,
if he satisfies the threshold amount, has achieved this status recently so he
does not to have an established investment intent. The plebe shareholder,
unlike the citizen capitalist, has no right to seek to guide management
through inclusion of a proposal of his in the corporate pleading phase."
Nor has the plebe holder been notified by the corporation of the expected
date of management's dissemination of its next pleading document. Thus,
this announcement having occurred in the pleading phase of the last annual
meeting for which, by definition, the shareholder was not a shareholder of
record, the plebe shareholder is precluded from taking anticipatory action.
A third participant is the "citizen shareholder." This is the
shareholder, whether citizen capitalist or plebe shareholder, who is deemed
to provide thrift-oriented input as opposed to speculative or other "marred"
input to the market price for the corporation's shares. This shareholder
differs from and counterbalances various kinds of shareholders who are
42. A true venture-type citizen capitalist for a mature corporation would be a "leveraged
buy-out association." See Susan Woodward, Shadow SEC Roundtable on the New Disclosure
of Executive Pay, 5 CoNTINENTAL BANK J. OF APPLIED CORP. FIN. 62, 66 (1993).
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more specialized in terms of experience and training or, perhaps for the best
of reasons, are otherwise not primarily motivated by thrift. These
shareholders are called "financial aristocrats," "oversized investors," or
"counter-entrepreneurs" in this article.
The fourth participant is the "financial aristocrat." An applicable
Yankee concept of due process is that the creation of an aristocracy is to be
avoided. In de Tocqueville's day, the target was a landed aristocracy. A
main drawback of such an aristocracy was that its use of the land was not
economically productive, that is, motivated by thrift.45 Remaining
participants in the annual meeting process described below can be said to
be somewhat disfavored "financial aristocrats." These are "oversized
shareholders" and "counter-entrepreneurs." Federal rules can be said to
guide these aristocrats into economic productivity as follows.
One financial aristocrat is the "abdicating oversized shareholder." The
"oversized shareholder"' is defined here as a wealth-controlling
shareholder that often owes a "fiduciary duty" to beneficiaries and, in some
cases, is subject to the discipline of public performance of ministerial
duties. At least until the 1990s,a7the oversized shareholder has not been
disposed to take pains in exercising voting power. 48 Examples of such a
typically passive, and in the U.S. annual meeting sense arguably
unproductive shareholder, have been the investment company such as the
"mutual fund ,,49 the employee benefit plan trust, the large personal trust,
45. For instance, the creation of a landed aristocracy was discouraged by abolishing
"primogeniture" succession by the oldest son to all land, a concept prevalent in England
from which most original U.S. colonists came. This abolition precipitated the break-up of
landed estates. See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 4, at 51-54. On the other hand, de
Tocqueville recognized that an aristocracy has its uses, as a "defender" of the people from
the "excesses of despotism." Id. at 96.
46. For a study arguing that concentrations of share ownership areper se productive as
the only feasible counter-weight to management, see Michael Ryngaert, An Appropriate
Federal Role in the Market for Corporate Control, 5 CONTINENTAL BANK J. OF APPLIED
CORP. FIN. 44 (1993). Commentators note that the institutional shareholder, even if
disfavored, has progressively become a bigger player in U.S. corporate governance. See
Hearings, supra note 13, at 10 (testimony of Richard C. Breeden, Chairman, U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission).
47. See James A. White, Calpers to Halt its Proxy Efforts - Pension Fund to Try Quiet
Approach to Influence Business, S.F. EXAM., Oct. 8, 1991, at D1; but see James A. White,
New York's Regan to Pensions: Hands Off, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 1991, at C1.
48. See Curzan & Pelesh, Revitalizing Corporate Democracy; Control of Investment
Managers' Voting on Social Responsibility Proxy Issues, 93 HARv. L. REV. 670, 686
(1980).
49. For an article on the statutory bases for the passive role of mutual funds in corporate
governance, see Mark J. Roe, Mutual Funds in the Board Room, 5 CONTINENTAL BANK J.
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and any other institutional account as managed by the typical SEC-
registered U.S. investment manager. Typically, for such a shareholder, it
has not been desirable to incur the expense of participating, in a careful
thrift-oriented way in a myriad of annual meeting opinions on performance.
Rather, the typical approach of such an investor if the price of one stock in
the portfolio behaves poorly due to inept management performance, is that
he accepts the ineptitude as an investment risk to be met by the
instrumentality of the purchase or sale transaction."0
An important aspect of the reasoning has been that if the ineptitude is
reflected in a lower stock price, this will tend to attract a tender offer from
another stock market professional displaying a willingness to pay a
premium over the current market price for control.5' In any event, the effect
of the ineptitude on the market price may well be offset by appreciation in
the price of shares that the institution holds in a competitor corporation or
industry.52 Lastly, the reasoning continues, at least if the size of the
holding is relatively small in comparison to the depth of the market for the
shares of the corporation, the institution can sell the investment at low
transactional and other cost to the portfolio. This cost will be lower than the
expense of careful voting. 53 All of these reasons for passivity in the U.S.,
even if justifiable from a portfolio management standpoint, deprive the
citizen-capitalists as a whole, as well as the public, of a source of strength
in the U.S. annual meeting process.
Guiding this passive investment manager into economic productivity
and thus favoring the citizen-capitalists, federal rules governing
management of certain portfolios forbid an investment manager to cause its
passivity to amount to actual relinquishment of the right to vote. A
conscious decision by the institution on issues to be voted on is required
even if that decision is to fail to exercise the power to vote and thereby
threaten the attainment of a quorum. 54 Moreover, should the passive
OF APPLIED CORP. FIN. 56 (1993).
50. See Flanagan, supra note 20, at 21-22.
51. Cf. Alex M. Azar, FIRREA: Controlling Savings and Loan Association Credit Risk
Through Capital Standards and Asset Restrictions, 100 YALE L.J. 149 (1990).
52. See id. For a critique of a common application of this concept of portfolio
diversification, see Bernard Black, Next Steps in Corporate Governance Reform: 13(d) Rules
and Control Personal Liability, 5 CONTINENTAL BANK J. OF APPLIED CORP. FIN. 49-50
(1993).
53. See generally Azar, supra note 51.
54. For instance, an investment company that "lends" portfolio securities, consisting of
voting common stock, to another securities professional, is required to demand return of the
stock in time for the company to be of record for an important shareholder vote. Salomon
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oversized shareholder also have a large interest in the corporation, and seek
to realize speculative profits as a substitute for voting, it will be thwarted
in extreme cases. Thus, the federal "short-swing profits" rule limits the
degree to which such a shareholder can retain profits from "investment"
transactions realized within a particularly short time span of each other.
This rule provides that a shareholder with more than a 10% equity voting
position in a corporation must relinquish to the latter any profits derived
from his purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, of shares that occur
within six months of each other."
Another financial aristocrat participant is the Delegating Oversized
Investor who is a participant. A common approach among oversized
investors that are somewhat more active than the passive shareholders has
been to follow the "Wall Street Rule." This "Rule" is that if a shareholder
does not sell his or her shares, he or she always votes in accordance with
the recommendations of management.56 This approach bears the Yankee due
process justification of a delegation to "management" which, as seen above,
compromises a two-thirds of the citizen-as-master trinity. The disadvantage
of following this Rule is if institutions investing in a large portion of shares
of the corporation disenfranchise themselves by following the Rule, a
substantial portion of shares are removed as a source of strength for the
citizen-capitalists in the voting process.
Certain federal requirements assure that the diligence of the press can
put the shareholders, as a whole, on notice of potential disenfranchisement
of shares held by large concentrations of institutional investors likely to
follow the Wall Street Rule. First, the smallest amount of ownership in a
widely-traded corporation, if held by a sufficiently large institutional
shareholder, becomes a matter for the public record by virtue of a "Form
13F" filing required of the latter by law. This filing must occur within 45
days of the end of each calendar quarter. This serves to give aggregate
information to citizen-capitalists on institutional ownership in advance of
the annual meeting.57 Second, the details of a purchase of five to ten
percent of the publicly-traded shares of a corporation, if by an institutional
shareholder, is made a matter for the public record by virtue of a "Form
13G" filing required of the shareholder. This is the case even if the
Bros., Fed Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,056 (May 23, 1972). With respect to voting by
employee benefit plan trusts, see Morton Klevan, Fiduciary Duty and Proxy Voting,7 ANN.
REv. BANKING L. 229 (1988).
55. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a), (b) (1994).
56. See Curzan & Pelesh, supra note 48, at 686.
57. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f) (1994) and Rule 13f-1,
17 C.F.R. § 240.13f-1 (1998).
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purchase by the shareholder is in the ordinary course of its business with
neither the purpose nor the effect of influencing management. This filing
must occur within 45 days of the end of the calendar year.58 As
demonstrated below, this filing may give less than timely information to
citizen-capitalists of a large individual holding by an institutional investor
in advance of the annual meeting.5 9
Another type of oversized shareholder is the "reactive" oversized
shareholder. An oversized shareholder as managed by a U.S. investment
manager can be rendered economically unproductive insofar as
diversification of the investment manager"s business subjects him to
business pressure from management of a corporation in whose shares the
manager has invested the oversized shareholder's funds. 6° For instance,
management of an issuer that is invested in through the trust department of
a commercial bank may simultaneously retain the commercial department
of the same bank to provide lending services to the issuer. Because of the
trust and commercial departments report to the same senior bank
management there is a special risk to the integrity of the bank's
participation in the annual meeting process on behalf of oversized
shareholders. This risk is that senior management of the bank will seek to
influence the trust department managers to cause the trust department to
vote the shares held by the oversized shareholders in favor of issuer
management at the annual meeting. 6' This may all be to the detriment of
citizen capitalist investors in the issuer.
To avert this special risk, U.S. corporate governance rules, first, make
use of the protocol of public performance of minutely divided ministerial
duties to maintain the independence of the trust department from the
commercial department. 62 As a second deterrent, every effort by
management of a corporation to influence any shareholder, if it amounts to
58. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-l(b), 240.13d-2, 240.13d-3.
59. A shareholder will likely not learn of this ownership interest until it appears in the
corporation's pleading document for the upcoming annual meeting. Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Schedule 14A, Item 6(d), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1998) and
Securities Act of 1933, Regulation S-K, Item 403(a), 17 C.F.R. § 229.301 (1998).
60. That institutional shareholders succumb to management pressure is the conclusion of
a study by the Investor Responsibility Research Center sponsored by the United
Shareholders Association, spearheaded by T. Boone Pickens. See Flanagan, supra note 20,
at 22.
61. See Curzan & Pelesh, supra note 48, at 687.
62. Cf. Broker-Dealer Policies and Procedures Designed to Segment the Flow and
Prevent the Use of Material Non-Public Information [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 84,520 (Mar. 1990).
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an effort to assemble an annual meeting voting "faction" even of one
shareholder, is to be disclosed to the shareholders.63 This is the case
whether the voting by the faction is to be by proxy or in person. 4 Again,
the disclosure amounts to timely publicity if it is of enough interest to the
press, and enables the citizen-capitalists to marshal forces against the
management faction.
The last oversized shareholder is the "pro-active shareholder." There
is a problem to the citizen capitalist even in the case of the oversized
shareholder that takes its responsibilities seriously as a source of strength
in the voting process. The problem is that this oversized investor is still a
"financial aristocrat. "65 The question arises whether, given the large amount
of wealth that it controls' and hence the opportunities it has for
diversification, it has the mind-set to be a fully productive participant in the
annual meeting process. The approach of federal regulation in the U.S. is
that the optimal mind-set for an investor is not that of the oversized
investor, but that of the educated citizen.67 This applies, for instance, to the
entrepreneurial undertaking of electing a board of directors that, in turn,
will select the executive officers.68
Federal rules seek to counter-balance any ill effects of the non-
entrepreneurial mind-set of the active institutional investor. First, through
the vehicle of disclosure, the rules seek to enable the press to publicize to
63. See Securities Exchange Act Rule 14a-2(b)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(2) (1998).
64. The pleading disclosure obligation still exists if management has decided to dispense
with proxy solicitation and to rely on personal attendance of certain investors at the annual
meeting, such as institutional shareholders. Disclosure in this case is in the form of a
"information statement" rather an a proxy statement. A dissident faction can resort to
soliciting proxies for the meeting even if the corporation limits itself to an information
statement. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14c-1-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c-1-240.14c-5
(1998) and 17 C.F.R. § 240. 14c-101.
65. For suggested causes of the emergence of the assertive institutional investor, see
Flanagan, supra note 20, at 22-23.
66. See Curzan & Pelesh, supra note 48, at 683-84.
67. See James A. White, CALPERS to Halt its Proxy Efforts - Pension Fund to Try
Quiet Approach to Influencing Business, S.F. EXAMINER, Oct. 8, 1991, at D1. In this
article, Regan, New York's Comptroller, is quoted as saying he "believes that pension funds
are not qualified to tell companies how much they should pay their executives or how to run
other aspects of their business... we should not be involved." Contrast this approach with
that of Germany where, according to a recent analysis, "capitalism has been built on
relationship with commercial banks rather than on equity capital and ... concentration of
equity rather than dispersion of such ownership is favored." See Learning to Love Equity,
THE ECONOMIST 71 (U.K. July 3, 1991).
68. For a counter-argument in favor of the large institutional shareholder as a "cost-
effective means" for standing up against management, see Black, supra note 52.
1999]
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
citizen-capitalists large holdings in a corporation where any investor, such
as an oversized one, is likely to seek to influence management. Thus, once
the amount of voting power control by an investor exceeds 10% of total
voting power, there must be prompt public disclosure. There must also be
disclosure if voting power is less than that and the investor discloses his
investment intent to seek to influence management. 69 Second, federal rules
have the effect of curtailing an active oversized shareholder's involvement
in the process of nominating directors, thus leaving more room in the
process for the citizen capitalist. Management's pleading statement must
disclose every arrangement or understanding that any shareholder, such as
an oversized one, has with a nominee for director relating to his
candidacy.70 Third, the rules have the effect of requiring disclosure of any
management bias towards the recommendations of oversized shareholders.
Thus, if the board has a nominating committee, management's pleading
document must state that fact and set forth the ministerial duties, on the part
of the committee, to be performed in arriving at its nominees for director,
having the effect of disclosing any preference for the recommendations of
oversized shareholders.7" Fourth, while permitting citizen shareholders to
test the waters, without publicity, for purposes of forming a dissident
faction,72 a U.S. rule requires that wealth-controlling shareholders, such as
oversized investors, publicize their efforts. The rule defines such a
shareholder as one owning over $5 million in market value of the
corporation's shares."
Finally, U.S. federal law curtails the power, vis-a-vis the citizen
capitalist, of the financial aristocrat who is a "counter-entrepreneur." Secret
exercise of significant voting power is denied to the financial aristocrat who
affirmatively seeks to use voting power to influence management for his
own entrepreneurial purposes." A concern is that the mind-set of a counter-
entrepreneur may be opposed to that of the citizen capitalist. This
69. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 13d-l(b)(2), 14 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l(b)(2)
(1998).
70. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Schedule 14A Item 7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101
(1998) and Securities Act of 1933 Regulation S-K, Item 401, 17 C.F.R.§ 229.401 (1998).
71. The pleading document, whether a proxy statement or information statement, must
divulge whether the nominating committee will consider nominees recommended by
shareholders and, if so, the procedures to be followed in submitting recommendations. 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-101.
72. See discussion infra Part VI.A.B.
73. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-6(g), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(g)
(1998).
74. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l(a).
[Vol. 19
USE OF YANKEE CONCEPTS
professional's mind-set, a benefit to secondary markets if adequately
constrained, may be one of speculation for the short-term granted that the
speculation might well be of the controlled, sophisticated variety. Federal
and state rules in the U.S. seek to guide the holdings of counter-
entrepreneur shareholders into economic productivity for several voting
purposes as follows.
First, once any non-institution, whether or not with a motive of
influencing management, acquires five percent or more of a corporation's
shares, he must, under federal law, promptly make public disclosure and
thereafter keep that disclosure current.75 The public disclosure must
describe his background, source of funds and intentions relating to any
change in the enterprise objectives of the corporation in which he has
acquired that interest.76 If he owns ten percent or more of the voting power,
his interest in any current corporate transaction must be disclosed in
management's pleading document. 7  Supplementing the federal
requirements, state laws go beyond disclosure and expressly curtail the
counter-entrepreneur's voting power. Some enable the citizen-capitalists to
amend the corporate charter to provide for a freeze on this counter-
entrepreneur's exercise of voting power.78 Some provide for the granting
of additional offsetting voting power to the citizen-capitalists. 79 Lastly,
75. Once the ownership interest of an investor exceeds ten percent, his purchases and
sales of shares of the corporation in one month become a matter for the public record in the
next month. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-2(a). This provision has been criticized because it
increases the cost of monitoring of management by institutional investors that have assumed
large positions. See Ryngaert, supra note 46, at 46-47.
76. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101.
77. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 at Item 7(b) and Securities Act of 1933, Regulation S-K
Item 404(a), 17 C.F.R. § 229.404(a) (1998).
78. See IND.CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-9 (Michie 1994); BNS Inc. v. Coppers Co. Inc., 683
F. Supp. 58, 463-64 (D. Del. 1988); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69
(1987). See also 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 7.85 (West 1978); NEw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE
LISTED COMPANY MANUAL 312.00 (1983) and AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE GUIDE § 713
(1983) which required that charters of listed companies preclude exercise of the privilege
of converting preferred stock into common stock without shareholder approval if the
resulting acquisition amounts to more than eighteen and one-half and twenty percent of
common stock respectively. See also Financial Accounting Standards Board Interpretation
No. 35, CRrrERIA FOR APPLYING THE EQUITY METHOD OF ACCOUNTING FOR INVESTMENT
IN COMMON STOCK (May 1981).
79. For instance, Delaware law provides that a large shareholder, unless he has acquired
eighty-five percent or more voting power, may not vote in favor of merging the corporation
with an entity controlled by that large shareholder unless the prior board of directors had
approved the transaction, or the other shareholders approve the transaction and there is a
sixty-six and two-thirds percent vote by independent shareholders in favor of the transaction.
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some laws provide that, once an investment by a shareholder exceeds a
certain voting power threshold, he is deemed to have assumed special duties
toward the corporation along the lines of those of management. 80 This
would be without having the benefit of certain protections accorded
management such as liability insurance 81 and the protection of having
adhered to public performance of minutely-divided ministerial duties in the
course of the making of difficult business decisions on the corporation's
behalf.1
2
B. Suggested Changes as to U.S. Regulation
of the Annual Meeting Participants
1. Compromises with Oversized Shareholders
Of particular interest to the citizen capitalist is any "compromise"
agreed to by management with an oversized investor owning a significant
stake in the corporation having the effect of modifying enterprise objectives.
Such a significant compromise may be agreed to by management in order
to gain an oversized shareholder's vote. Any compromise should be
disclosed in management's pleading document if the compromise, first,
amounts to a change in enterprise objectives and, second, is brought about
through the efforts of an oversized investor having over a threshold amount
of ownership, that is, one percent of the corporation's voting securities.
S le ,.EL. ,.,E,. CORp. T ... f, tA/ 4 C lC ,. V . Kopers Co., Inc., 683 F.
Supp. 458.
80. If a shareholder has acquired more than ten percent of a corporation's voting power,
he is personally liable for violation by the corporation of certain of the securities laws unless
he had "no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in, the existence of the facts
[which created the liability] and he acted in good faith in not directly or indirectly inducing
the . . . violation." Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1994). For a
critique of this degree of answerability, see Black, supra note 52, at 49-50.
If the shareholder's acquisition of shares has been such that he has become a majority
shareholder, he may not vote in favor of a corporate reorganization with impunity if, on the
entire record, the reorganization is not fair to the minority shareholders. See Singer v.
Magnovox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (1977) and Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 458 A.2d 701 (1983).
Lastly, federal law precludes a species of investment company, the management investment
company, from owning a concentration of a corporation's voting securities. See Roe, supra
note 49, at 56.
81. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (1994).
82. See id. at § 102(c)(7) and Appendix B.
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2. Disclosure about Institutions and Oversized Shareholder Voting Policies
The information on "Form 13G" as filed by institutions is not
disseminated frequently enough to assure timely disclosure to citizen-
capitalists of a large holding in the hands of an oversized investor.
Divulgence should occur, as in the case of Form 13F, within 45 days after
the end of each calendar quarter rather than calendar year. A rule change
should be made requiring that information on Form 13G set forth, by
category, the policy of the institutional investor as to the exercise of its
right to vote. The categories might be: (1) abstain from voting, which is an
undesirable development from the standpoint of the citizen capitalist;
(2) vote in accordance with the tally of the citizen shareholders as a whole,
that is, engage in "echo voting," which is desirable; (3) observe the Wall
Street Rule, an undesirable change; (4) request voting instructions from the
institution's own beneficiaries, themselves perhaps "citizens," which is
desirable;83 (5) restrict activities solely to voting in the institution's
judgment in the interest of fulfilling the corporation's current enterprise
objectives, a desirable change; (6) seek to influence management without
restraint but only in ways that do not directly affect current enterprise
objectives, which is questionable; and (7) seek to influence management
without restraint and without subject matter limitation, which is
undesirable.
In addition, the definition of a "citizen capitalist" should be changed.
One year is too short a time period to have held shares to be considered a
"citizen capitalist" for shareholder proposal and other purposes. Consistent
with the criteria for investment intent in other contexts,' the rules should
83. Curzan & Pelesh, supra note 48, at 694-98.
84. In one context, a criterion for investment intent on the part of public shareholders of
corporations on the verge on combining with each other is that the corporations have been
independent of each other and autonomous for at least two years before effectuation of the
combination. Without this prior stance of investment intent, the combination cannot be
viewed as a "pooling of interests" for accounting purposes. Further, a criterion of
investment intent for the acquiring corporation is that it not dispose of a significant portion
of the assets of the acquired corporation within two years of the combination. Without, too,
this stance of current investment intent, the combination cannot be viewed as a "pooling of
interests." See Accounting Principles Board. Opinion No. 16 (Aug. 1970).
In another context, a SEC-suggested criterion for lack of investment intent, for
purposes of defining a "greenmailer" intent on short-term profit, has been that he have held
shares for less than two years. The SEC has been in favor of a requirement that, for a
corporation to repurchase shares held by such a short-term shareholder at a premium over
its fair market price, approval of the shareholders of the corporation as a whole have been
obtained first. See Recommendation of the SECAdvisory Committee on Tender Offers, 1984:
Hearings on Tender Offers Before the House Subcom. on Telecomm., Consumer Protection,
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be amended to make the minimum holding period two years.
V. THE DISCLOSURE THAT LEADS UP TO AN
UNCONTESTED U.S. ANNUAL MEETING
A. Catering to the Citizen Capitalist
In its disclosure requirements, U.S. federal law governing the pleading
phase of an annual meeting assumes that the shareholder who receives
disclosure is a "citizen" motivated by thrift and willing to exercise his
instincts of thrift, that is, is an actual or potential citizen capitalist. The law
assumes that the information that such a citizen desires includes several
categories of information.
The first category is business and services. It must be asked: what is
the nature and scope of the corporation's business and services?85 Has the
nature and scope undergone a recent change? "Services" are, in the sense
of industry segments, classes of products and services and foreign and
domestic operations and sales.86
A second category is the enterprise objectives. Although U.S. federal
law does not refer to "enterprise objectives" in so many words, they
consist of three components. The first is the mind-set of the citizen-
capitalists as a group that are deemed to "control" the corporation,
determined by their "average" investment objective. This mind-set is
implemented through representatives of the citizen-capitalists who are able
to insist that their proposals be included in management's pleading
document. The pursuit of enterprise objectives is a requirement of the
corporation's capital structure, that is, the requirements impinging on the
means whereby the average citizen capitalist shares in the success or lack
thereof, of the second component.
The third component is the corporation's overall business plan. The
plan relates to the achievement of market share, the meeting of social and
other long-term economic objectives, and the enhancing of shares of special
cash recoveries for both management, which are bonuses, and the citizen-
capitalists, which are dividends. The citizen capitalist asks whether the
corporation is still pursuing enterprise objectives that coincide reasonably
and Fin., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,511 (April 4, 1984) (statement of John S.R. Shad,
Chairman of the SEC).
85. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-3(b)(6), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b)(6)
(1998).
86. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b)(7).
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well with his own long-term investment objectives and short-term liquidity
needs.87 U.S. federal law assumes that the citizen capitalist intends to hold
onto his shares until his forecasted need for cash. The law therefore
requires that he receive, in advance of the annual meeting, an "annual
report" of the corporation touching on the nature of the enterprise
objectives and the achievement of them. The annual report is to touch on
any change, or proposed change, in objectives.1
8
A further question is: What has the long-term operating performance
been in comparison with enterprise objectives? This performance is the
result of deploying assets, monitoring liabilities, and taking advantage of
opportunities to raise "equity" capital in essentially the same manner as the
citizen capitalist manages his own household affairs. 9 For this purpose, in
explaining operating performance for larger, mature corporations, the
annual report must contain very specific objective information for the near
term, of the past two years. In addition, fairly specific information must be
given for the middle term, the past three years. If the corporation falls into
87. Some commentators, however, believe that disclosure of financial information to the
financial markets is relevant only to the pricing of shares and is superfluous for corporate
governance purposes. See Baumol & Malkiel, Redundant Regulation of Foreign Security
Trading and U.S. Competitiveness, 5 CONTINENTAL BANK J. OF APPLIED CORP. FIN. 19
(1993).
88. Deemed material to this issue are:
- Disposal of a segment of a business. This can be said to suggest early
fruition or abandonment of an aspect of enterprise objectives. See 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b)(3); see also Securities Act of 1933 Regulation
S-K Item 302(a)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 229.302(a)(3) (1998);
- Change in control of the corporation. This suggests modification of the
corporation's enterprise objectives in order to pay off debt and other
obligations incurred by the acquirer of control. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-
101 and 17 C.F.R. § 229.403(c);
- Any proposed modification or exchange of securities of the corporation,
to be presented to the shareholders for their approval. 17 C.F.R. §
240.14a-101 at Item 12. This suggests a substantive change in the
methodology whereby the investor can expect to share in the success or
failure of the corporation in its pursuit of enterprise objectives; and
- Any proposed merger of the corporation into, or consolidation with,
another corporation. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 at Item 14(a)(3). This
suggests both a possible change in enterprise objectives and a change in
the methodology whereby an investor can expect to share in results.
89. The raising of money from family members and neighbors in the conduct of
household affairs, at least in the time of de Tocqueville, can be comparable to raising equity
capital by corporations. The expectation, in each case, is that the investor will receive
reciprocal treatment at the appropriate time, including a fair share of any return derived
from these transfer payments.
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a particularly mature category, general results must be provided over the
longer term of the past five years.' ° For corporations that do not fit the
category of such a mature "larger corporation," the requirement is less
rigorous.9" Only fairly specific results need be given and then only for the
shorter term, of the past two years. Hence, the more mature the
corporation, the less its obvious entrepreneurial dynamism, the more is its
deemed public accountability and the greater the degree of disclosure
required to citizen-capitalists.
Another question is: How effectively has management assured a fair
market price for the shares and deterred undue volatility, as by appropriate
and timely public disclosure? Thus, the citizen capitalist needs knowledge
as to the interim marketability of his shares in the event he must sell them
to meet his household emergencies. Controversially, there are recent,
rigorous U.S. federal requirements to display stock market performance
with apparently little emphasis on measurement of the fairness of that
performance in light of actual long-term operating performance.'
The citizen capitalist is also concerned with what management's
assessment is concerning long-term operating and short-term share price
performances compared with the corporation's enterprise objectives. For
this purpose, the annual report must contain management's "discussion and
analysis" of the corporation's financial condition, "material changes" in
that condition, and "material changes in results of operations. "93 Reflective
of the "citizen," for U.S. purposes, being half-way between a man-of-the-
90. The very specific information consists of a past two-year quarterly analysis focusing
on net operating income. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b)(3); see also 17 C.F.R. § 229.302 at
...... 302(a).
The fairly specific information consists of:
- last two-year balance sheets of the corporation. 17 C.F.R.
§ 20.14a-3(b)(1);
- last three-year statements of changes in financial position;
- last three-year statements of income; and
- past three-year analysis of the impact of inflation and changing prices
on net operating income.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b)(5)(ii); see also 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(iv). The general
infonnation consists of a past five-year summary focused on the relationship of net operating
income to debt and equity capital. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b)(5)(I); see also 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.301.
91. The theory is apparently that in the case of these smaller corporations, the
shareholders are less dependent on the diligence of the press and have more first-hand
knowledge.
92. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b)(9); see also 17 C.F.R. § 229.201.
93. 17 C.F.R. § 240.149-3(b);17 C.F.R. § 229.303.
[Vol. 19
USE OF YANKEE CONCEPTS
world and a magistrate, 94 federal regulations give the citizen capitalist the
right to request that the corporation, at its expense, send him a copy of its
report of relevant performances filed with the SEC. This is its report on
"Form 10K" which is subject to U.S. requirements of detail not found in
the requirements for annual reports to shareholders.95
Another question is: How do the corporation's long-term operating and
short-term share price performances, in light of enterprise objectives,
compare with the results for competitors? Federal rules require that the
annual report contain written assurances that the financial information
conveyed by the report, relative to long-term operating performance, is
consistent with "generally accepted accounting principles," so that
comparisons can be made with competitors. This requirement draws on the
Yankee concept of judicial-form procedures. Thus, "generally accepted
accounting principles," as applied to specific situations, have evolved
through combined efforts of the SEC, employing its own judicial-form
procedures,' and of various citizen sustainers, such as the "Financial
Accounting Standards Board," which employs its own judicial-form
procedures. 97
Lastly, the citizen capitalist asks: What are the corporation's personnel
policies and internal controls? This information, which he is deemed
particularly capable of assessing, relates to the performance of individual
directors and executive officers. An example is a description of significant
contributors to corporate operating performance that are not yet directors
or executive officers. This is indicative of an ability on the part of the
officers to delegate successfully.98
94. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
95. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b)(10).
96. See Securities Act of 1933 Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.4, 210.6 (1998).
97. See Donald E. Kiesco & Jerry J. Weygandt, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 10-12 (4th
ed. 1983).
98. Examples would be production managers, sales managers, and research scientists. 17
C.F.R. § 240.149-101 at Item 7(b); and 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(c). Also, on the subject of
personnel policies and internal controls, the corporation in its annual report must:
1. inform the shareholder if there are any standing audit, nominating, and
compensation committees of the board and, if so, their functions 17
C.F.R. § 240.149-101;
2. disclose any director who, in the past year, has attended fewer than a
threshold number of meetings, Id.; and
3. summarize any disagreements or reservations of a resigning or
dismissed independent accountant or of a resigning director. See infra
note 192 and accompanying text.
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B. Compensation
Most importantly, the citizen capitalist is deemed to ask whether
"compensation" paid to executive officers and directors is warranted by
such factors as the nature of the corporation's overall enterprise objectives,
long-term operating and short-term share price performances, as well as by
the specific duties assigned to these officers and directors. Materials
furnished in advance of U.S. annual meetings must, by federal requirement,
provide detailed information on "compensation." This expense is given far
more attention in the U.S. than other expenses of the corporation. It is an
emphasis that has been heightened by recent amendments to the corporate
governance rules.' 9 The implication is that compensation is regarded by the
SEC as a lynch-pin determinant, for citizen-capitalists to consider regarding
the "grade" to be given in the annual meeting opinion."0 This subject of
"compensation," which was a favorite topic for the U.S. citizen in
de Tocqueville's day as well as our own, is therefore covered below in
some detail. Applying various Yankee concepts of due process, three
separate components of compensation and two overriding principles of
compensation apply to corporate officials in the U.S.
1. The "Wage" Element
One element of compensation for disclosure purposes is a wage, which
is an objectively determined amount. A "wage" could encompass not only
cash as a method of compensation but also deferred compensation accrued
as retirement benefits. A relevant Yankee concept is that government
officials are to be paid a wage on a piecework basis, that is, measured and
paid after work has actually been performed.' 0' Assuming that a corporate
executive officer or director is the equivalent of a "government" official,
he would logically be paid only after proof that work has actually been
performed, thereby warranting a wage. In some cases, the value of the work
could be in terms of the intrinsic value of the individual's performance of
ministerial duties. This is the case with the corporate treasurer or secretary.
In other cases, such as that of the chief executive officer, it could be in
terms of the value of the individual's performance of executive duties. The
99. See Executive Compensation Disclosure; Securityholder List and Mailing Requests,
Exchange Act Release No. 34,32723, [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
85,051 (Aug. 6, 1993).
100. For a discussion on compensation as such a lynch-pin determinant, see Woodward,
supra note 42, at 66.
101. See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 4, at 66.
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valuation of this performance requires measurement of actual added value
to long-term operating performance and short-term share price performance
of the corporation brought about by the work performed by the executive
officer. Under U.S. federal requirements regarding pleading documents:
a. Note must be taken not only of the wages paid in the last
year to executive officers and directors, but also of what this
article regards as potential wages to be derived from
contingencies occurring in that year that might, in the future,
give rise to the equivalent of a wage paid. An example would
be an executive officer's or director's financial interest in an
annual meeting proposal"° or in a pending corporate
transaction. 103
b. The corporation's long-term operating performance over a
three-year period must be set forth. 1" However, there is no
requirement that the corporation's enterprise objectives be
disclosed to the citizen-capitalists in any degree. Therefore the
operating performance can barely be compared to those
objectives in ascertaining any value added by the work of the
chief executive officer.
c. The work that contributed to the added value above, in the
case of "highly compensated" executive officers, is suggested,
without more, by a requirement that the five-year business
histories of all executive officers be shown. "I This is in
addition to the five-year business histories of individuals to
whom work has been delegated by these executive officers.
These individuals are considered "significant contributors" to
the business."
102. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Schedule 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240-14a-101
(1998).
103. Id.; see also 17 C.F.R. § 229.404(a).
104. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b)(1).
105. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101; see also 17 C.F.R.§ 229.401(e). Under recent
amendments, a compensation committee must provide a justification of the level of
compensation. For the practical issues involved in complying with this and other newly
enacted requirements bearing on disclosure of compensation, see Executive Compensation
Disclosure; Security Holder List and Mailing Request, Exchange Act Release No. 34,32723
[1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,209 (Aug. 6, 1993).
106. Id; see also 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(c).
1999]
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
2. The "Job Security" Element of Compensation
A second element of compensation in the U.S. is to be determined
largely by the demands of the recipient. This element is derived from a
combination of the Yankee concept of thrift and two other concepts. One
of these other concepts views a citizen as "drafted" into government
service. Thus, he is not regarded as contending for the privilege of
providing that service but as being drafted into it on the basis that he is not
being forced to work for free."°7 A citizen is drafted into service as a
corporate director by his fellow citizens when elected to that position by the
citizen-capitalists. He must be compensated for this "compulsory service."
Technically, there need not be substantive formal proof that he actually
performed the requisite services. This is because a failure to serve warrants
a sanction which is an in terrorem assurance that performance will
substantiate the compensation. 108 In short, a director can be regarded as not
receiving a wage but rather only "job security" related compensation.
A second observation concerns the board of directors' primary
function, which is the designation and compensation of executive officers.
A relevant Yankee concept is that a special species of elected officials have
the unfettered discretion to designate and compensate certain subordinate
officials. In de Tocqueville's day, the elected officials were the
"selectmen" of a township and the subordinate officials were those selected
for the grand and petit jury lists."0 Under U.S. corporate governance law,
the equivalent to "selectmen" are the directors of a corporation. The
equivalent to grand and petit jurors are the corporate executive officers." l0
The power of the directors to designate carries the "discretion to terminate
107. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 4, at 66.
108. Management's pleading document must set forth indices of due diligence on the part
of the board as a whole. This is, (a) number of meetings held by the board over the past
year, (b) existence or non-existence of audit, nominating, and/or compensation committees,
and (c) if the particular committee exists, its specific functions and number of meetings held
over the past year. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101.
Management's pleading document need only suggest the individual director
involvements in these activities such as each committee membership and whether or not the
director has attended at least seventy-five percent of meetings over the past year. Id.
Disclosure of the quality of a director's involvement is only intimated at by his "business
experience" over the past five years. Id. There is no requirement of disclosure as to whether
or not the nominating committee has performed a peer review of director performance.
109. See DE TOCQUEvILLE, supra note 4, at 64-65.
110. Thus, the grand jury managed the affairs of a township in much the same way as
executive officers manage the affairs of a corporation. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 4, at
80, 206.
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at will." An executive officer motivated by thrift is deemed to insist that a
portion of his compensation is for assuming the risk that his employment
may be terminated at the will of the board. This can be regarded as "job
security compensation", determined largely by the demands of the executive
officer. U.S. federal pleading rules require disclosure of job security
compensation under the category "all other compensation."' Again, no
formal proof of performance is required to receive this compensation.
One form of job security compensation, called a "golden parachute,"
is typically triggered by a takeover of the corporation by another
corporation likely to result in a decision by a new board to terminate the
current executive officers. Another form of job security compensation
consists of deferred payments contingent on the executive remaining with
the company. The arrangement for this compensation is called a "golden
handcuff." Federal disclosure rules currently do not require that
management discuss, for the benefit of citizen-capitalists, the amount of
compensation that falls into the "job security" category. This compensation
is measured by the extent to which total compensation exceeds the sum of
"wages" and "bonuses." Compensation that is, in reality, "job-security
compensation" has been a controversial subject in the U.S.
3. The "Bonus" Element of Compensation
A third element of compensation in the U.S. is largely at the discretion
of the corporation. This element deals with the Yankee concept of due
process that permits government officials to share in special cash recoveries
that they have brought about for the benefit of the government." 2 As
applied to a corporation, federal law recognizes that directors and
executive officers may "share in special cash recoveries" that they have
brought about for the benefit of the corporation. Federal law requires
disclosure to the citizen-capitalists of such a "bonus." 3 The bonus is
comparable to what a shareholder receives in the form of a dividend. In
both cases, the sharing occurs not only when long-term operating and short-
term share price performances satisfy enterprise objectives, but, also, when
interim cash flow goals are exceeded. Federal rules require disclosure to the
citizen capitalist of "bonuses" to directors and executive officers, but do not
111. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101; see also 17 C.F.R. § 229-402(b).
112. For instance, in the form of a share of a fine assessed against a private citizen. See
DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 4, at 80.
113. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101; see also 17 C.F.R. § 229-402(b).
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require discussion as to the circumstances justifying the payment of
bonuses. 114
4. The Overall Amount of Compensation
Two Yankee concepts of due process are relevant to the overall amount
of compensation in the U.S. These concepts are "no work for free" and
"egalitarianism." The "no work for free" concept serves to require that the
compensation be reasonably generous, so there are no ulterior motives. 115
114. A typical bonus would either be a cash bonus or what this article will call "an equity
participation bonus."
No explanation is needed for a "cash bonus" since the points of awarding the bonus
and sharing of cash recoveries will have occurred at the same time. An "equity participation
bonus" can be explained in terms of the de Tocqueville "bonus" concept as follows. An
"equity participation bonus" would involve the awarding of a stock option by the
corporation to an executive officer, or the equivalent of a stock option. This would create
only an expectancy of a payment of a bonus in the mind of the executive officer. No bonus
is realized as of the time of awarding of the option. The bonus will be received, that is, the
expectancy will materialize, only after two conditions are satisfied.
First, interim cash flow goals of the corporation would have to be exceeded. This
would only occur when (1) the market price of the stock exceeds the exercise price of the
stock, signifying that a cash flow goal of the corporation has been subjectively exceeded in
terms of the price at which the corporation could raise equity capital, and (2) the executive
officer objectively acknowledges this favorable performance by exercising the option.
However, the expectancy of the bonus will not yet have beenfully materialized, since long-
term operating and short-term share price performances must also be exceeded both
subjectively and objectively.
Second, therefore, the corporate performances will have been exceeded. A subjective
determination would be involved in determining whether this has occurred. Such an
occurrence would be at the point when the executive officer has held the shares for two
years after grant of the option. This would signify his subjective determination, starting
from the end of the two-year period, that the long-term operating performance and short-
term share price performances of the corporation, have in fact, satisfied enterprise objectives
since the point that he was awarded the stock option. An objective determination will have
occurred when the executive officer sells the stock so that he can realize the bonus.
If this sale occurs within two years of the exercise of the option, the exercise is
deemed to have constituted compensation in the form of an equity participation bonus. If the
stock is held for more than two years after exercise, then no bonus would need to be
disclosed; an investment intent rather than an intent to realize cash, that is to realize a
bonus, would be presumed. Between exercise of the option and sale of the stock, only an
appropriate notation as to the executive officer having a confluence of interest with the
corporation by virtue of his holding the stock would need to be disclosed. This holding of
stock would serve as an explanation only if the reader should regard the executive officer's
level of compensation as comparatively low under the circumstances. Otherwise, the
notation would be gratuitous and emphasis on such disclosure would not seem warranted.
115. See DE TOCQUEvILLE, supra note 4, at 66.
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Federal rules, as the result of recent changes, require extensive disclosure
that are pertinent to this concept of due process. The citizen capitalist is
entitled to know whether or not compensation of at least a minimum
amount, now $100,000 per year, is being paid to the chief executive
officer. I6 The regulations require that outside agendas of executive officers
and directors be brought into the open so that ulterior motives may be
considered along with the level of compensation that is possibly too low. 17
New requirements require extensive disclosure of arrangements that provide
directors and officers with an entrepreneurial stake (identities of interest),
serving to show the absence of ulterior motives assuming compensation is
on the low side. "I These arrangements include stock options, performance
shares, and restricted stock awarded to executive officers. " 9 However, these
arrangements, although accrued to the recipient as a gift from the
corporation, are typically not realizable by the recipient in terms of a cash
payment until attainment of enterprise objectives. 120
A second Yankee concept of due process relevant to the overall amount
of compensation is that of egalitarianism. U.S. federal rules reflect this
concept by omitting any need for disclosure of compensation that is shared
equally with lower level officers or other employees of the corporation to
citizen-capitalists.'"' This egalitarianism finds expression in the recent
extreme detail and precision required of disclosure of arrangements that
116. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101; see also 17 C.F.R. § 229-402.
117. Pleading documents must disclose as to each director, or nominee for director, and
as to each executive officer:
1. any holding of the position of both executive officer and director of the
corporation, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101; see also 17 C.F.R. § 229-402(a);
2. any special arrangement or understanding between him and any other
individual or entity if the arrangement or understanding is to be
implemented by his being a director or executive officer; and
3. any material indebtedness to the corporation of a director, executive
officer, or immediate family member.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101; see also 17 C.F.R. § 229-402(c).
118. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101; see also 17 C.F.R. § 229-402(b).
119. The NYSE Listed Company Manual, recognizes a "widespread endorsement of
director share ownership." NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL
309.00.
120. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
121. See DE TOCQUEViLLE, supra note 4, at 212-14; 17 C.F.R. § 240 14a-101; and 17
C.F.R. § 229.401(d). The New York Stock Exchange states in its manual for listed
companies that it specially encourages those stock options and employee stock purchase
plans that include all or a large portion of the company's employees. Listing of new shares
for "key officer"-only plans requires the approval of shareholders. NEW YORK STOCK
EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL 309.00, 312.03.
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provide higher level employees with entrepreneurial stakes. This detail
persists even though the main purpose of disclosure would seem to only
justify lower cash compensation than would otherwise be expected.'22
C. Suggested Changes as to Disclosure in the U.S.
The disclosure to citizen-capitalists required in a non-contested annual
meeting basically fulfills the main opinion-related purposes of an annual
meeting. However, changes should be made.
The first change is in long-term corporate operating performance. In
various other contexts, the SEC has concluded that the performance of any
"long-term" investment is to be gauged by shareholders over a full
"business cycle" of ten years. 123 Yet, as seen above, the objective results of
the performance of management in terms of "long-term" operating
performance need be disclosed only over a period of five years at the
longest. A ten-year discussion would seem warranted.
The second change is to make disclosure understandable to the citizen.
The operating results are required in the U.S. to be given in accordance
with a technical format 124 in terms of accounting principles "generally
accepted" by accountants. However, generally accepted accounting
principles take time to formulate because of the need to adhere to judicial-
form procedures. 12 As a result, varying interpretations of accounting
principles are permitted until "generally accepted" ones are formulated. 
2 6
There is no U.S. requirement that a "management discussion and analysis"
give an overview of performance in terms of long-term operating and short-
term share price performances in light of enterprise objectives. 127 Such an
analysis would seem warranted. This analysis should be in terms that a
"man-of-the-world" experienced in managing his own household affairs can
understand. This includes the deployment of assets, control of liabilities,
122. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101; and 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(d). See also Woodward,
supra note 42.
123. For instance, investment company performance advertising. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.482(e)(3).
124. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b)(1). See generally Securities Act of 1933, Regulation S-X,
17 C.F.R. § 210.01(1998). According to one commentator, the format is so technical that
foreign corporations are reluctant to list their shares for trading in the U.S. because of the
requirement that their financial statements be reconciled to U.S. generally-accepted
accounting principles. See Edward, supra note 40, at 28.
125. See Kieso & Weygandt, supra note 97.
126. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 210.01.
127. See, e.g.,17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-3(a)(5)(ii); and 17 C.F.R.§ 229-303.
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raising of equity capital, and selection of, and delegation to, duly-
compensated personnel.
A third change is in enterprise objectives. There is currently no
requirement in the U.S. that management discussion and analysis describe
the corporation's enterprise objectives. The objectives serve as a bogey
against which the citizen capitalist can measure long-term operating, and
short-term, share price performances. In addition, with a statement of
enterprise objectives in mind, the citizen capitalist is assured that they are
consistent with his own long-term investment objectives.128 A firmer
indication of enterprise objectives would seem warranted, granted that
world-wide agreement on the detail of disclosure of enterprise objectives
would seem desirable so corporations subject to U.S. requirements are not
placed at an undue competitive disadvantage.' 29
The fourth change is in short-term share price performance. As seen
above, there is a recent requirement that share price performance over past
periods be disclosed to citizen-capitalists. 30 However, there is no
requirement that management discuss and analyze material developments
relevant to "fair share price performance," that is, avoidance of undue
volatility in the price of shares. This should be the focus in recognition that
exercise of thrift, rather than speculation, is the first concern of the citizen
capitalist. The U.S. requires extreme detail on the subject of compensation,
in particular of executive officers. "I However, there is no requirement to
128. It has been held that disclosure of "long-term corporate operating objectives" is not
actionable. Krim v. BancTexas Group, Inc., 989 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir. 1993).
129. It is noteworthy that the recent Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
specifically provides protection for "forward-looking statements" against litigation instituted
by private parties, as a species of disclosure of enterprise objectives. These statements
would be in prospectuses and registration statements for new issues regulated under the
Securities Act of 1933. The protected statements would be by issuers whose shares are
widely-traded enough to be regulated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The
protected statements would include both (1) "a statement of the plans and objectives of
management for future operations, including plans or objectives relating to the products or
services of the issuer" and (2) "a statement of future performance, including any such
statement contained in a discussion and analysis of financial condition by the management
or in the results of operations included pursuant to the rules and regulations of the SEC."
Specified cautionary language would have to be used in either of these statements in order
for there to be protection. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 27A(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-
l(c)(1994).
130. For discussion of this requirementsee Executive Compensation Disclosure; Security
Holder List and Mailing Request, Exchange Act Release No. 34,32723 [1993 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,209 (Aug. 6, 1993).
131. See Woodward, supra note 42, for a critique of the detail from the standpoint of
costs associated with disclosure.
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discuss, for the benefit of the citizen capitalist, the factors upon which each
of the three basic elements of compensation are based: wages, job security
payments, and bonuses. If Yankee concepts of due process are to be
honored, such a breakdown would seem warranted. 1
32
Extreme detail and precision is required regarding the provision of
entrepreneurial stakes, as well as other management prerequisites, as if
these elements equaled cash compensation in all respects. As suggested
above, in fact, they do not. Rather, their disclosure is not only to measure
factors that may counterbalance a level of compensation that is possibly too
low and a conflict of interest, but also to suggest a degree of participation
in the entrepreneurial unit serving to give the corporation a citizen-as-
master dynamism that is a confluence of interest. 1'3 There should be a
relaxation of the detail on disclosure of entrepreneurial stakes.
Other changes to be made involve "wage" and "bonus" triggering
events. It is yet to be made clear, in the scheme of U.S. regulation, that
certain amounts are to be considered an element of "wage," requiring
disclosure and justification as triggering events. Thus, any profit that an
executive officer is permitted to retain that is derived from materialization
of apotential conflict-of-interest situation disclosed to the citizen-capitalists
should be considered an element of wage to be justified as such. Further,
any profit derived from a non-thrift motivated conversion of a stock option
into cash by an executive officer, should be considered as an element of
"wage. "134 For instance, the rules might be modified to require that an
element of wage occurs if the executive officer realizes a profit within two
years of the grant of a stock option.
It also is unclear whether an executive officer who realizes a profit by
selling stock more than two years after grant of a stock option but within
132. See id. at 68-69 for a critique as to the current system of discussion of compensation
by a compensation committee, which is without any such breakdown.
133. See Securities Exchange Actof 1934 Schedule 14A Item 8, 17 C.F.R.§ 240.14a-101
(1998); and Securities Act of 1933 Regulation S-K Item 402(b), 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.401(d) (1998).
134. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. Compare this recommendation on the
part of the author with Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(a),(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78p(a),(b) (1994). As to the avoidance of wage-triggering events that may amount to
insider trading, see generally NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LIsTED COMPANY MANUAL.
Woodward discusses the current system of regarding all options, on date of award, as
compensation. See Woodward, supra note 42, at 25. See also Ross L. Watts, Accounting
for Executive Compensation, 5 CONINEN'rrAL BANK J. OF APPLIED CORP. FIN. 83 (1993).
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two years of exercise of the option, should be retroactively deemed to have
been paid a bonus as of the date of exercise of the option. This element of
bonus should have to be justified in accordance with "bonus" criteria. 
3 5
The periods covered by performances, performers, and wages paid to
performers are not comparable under the current rules, making it difficult
for citizen-capitalists to make an assessment. '36 For instance, all measuring
elements described above, long-term operating performance, short-term
share price performance, enterprise objectives, work done by the respective
executive officers, and value added by these executive officers, for the
same measurement period are not set forth. To make understanding of the
adequacy of compensation easier for the citizen capitalist, such an ease of
comparison should be required. 37 Finally, a requirement of at least an
average compensation figure would seem warranted for all executive
officers, as well as for highly-compensated executive officers.
VI. INTEGRITY OF THE U.S. EVALUATION-THE "GRADE"
The integrity of the mechanics of the annual meeting process becomes
a U.S. issue once the objectives of assuring a willing and able electorate,
as well as full disclosure, have been achieved for the benefit of the citizen
capitalist.
As suggested above, 3 ' integrity is assured by the due process concept
of judicial-form procedures. The meeting has a "pleading" phase and a
"hearing" phase. Management and the shareholders are parties to these
procedures. The latter comprise every variety of shareholder, 3 9 but the
leader is the citizen capitalist. " The right of shareholders to be involved
in these procedures, once vested, cannot be diminished. Thus it is
impermissible for stock exchanges to provide for the listing of new shares
that have stronger voting rights than those of existing shareholders. 141 The
judicial-form procedures to which we refer have three facets that protect the
135. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
136. See Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
137. For an argument in favor of facilitating comparisons of performances, performers,
and wages, see Woodward, supra note 42, at 66.
138. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
139. Citizen capitalist, plebe shareholder, citizen shareholder, oversized shareholder, and
counter-entrepreneur. See supra notes 42-82 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 42-82 and accompanying text.
141. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 19c-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4 (1998).
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interests of the citizen capitalist. The first seeks to protect a citizen-as-
master dynamism, the second a participatory democracy vigor, and third a
public-performance-of-ministerial-duties dependability.
A. The Seeking of Citizen-as-Master Dynamism
The annual meeting in the U.S. has the important core role of providing
a forum whereby management and the shareholders draft a board of
directors in addition to the opinion-seeking role. The shareholders have the
important selectman role, out of a legally unlimited universe of potential
draftees. The choice of directors is unconstrained by mandatory
qualifications. 42 Protections against excess are provided to the federal and
state governments by modification of the "draft" concept by certain
concessions to human nature, 143 disclosures to the citizen-capitalists as
"men-of-the-world,"' 4 and by a standard of conduct expected of the
directors 45 once they are elected. This dynamic independent second purpose
of the annual meeting, the draft out of an unlimited universe, requiring
alertness on the part of the "drafters," gives integrity to the entirety of the
annual meeting process, including the grade process.
142. The U.S. does not require that a director have an identity of interest with the
corporation. He need not be a U.S. citizen. No educational or professional attainments are
prescribed and they need not even be disclosed. Conflicts of interest are not a basis for
automatic disqualification.
143. A nominee must have consented to being named in the pleading document
representing his willingness to serve if drafted. He is presumed to have consented if a
majority of the directors mentioned in the pleading document are part of the board that he
had in mind when indicating his willingness to be drafted. See Securities Exchange Act
Rule 14a-4(d); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(d)(4) (1998); Sch. 14A, Item 7(b), 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-101, and Securities Act of 1933, Reg. S-K, Item 401(a), 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(d)
(1998).
144. The pleading document proposing the nominee must give the number of shares of
the corporation that he owns "beneficially." 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101; and 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.403(b). Also, conflicts of interest must be disclosed. The pleading document is to set
forth any material relationship that the director or officer has with a business or professional
entity that conducted over a threshold amount of business with the corporation. See 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-101; and 17 C.F.R. § 229.404(b)(1)-(6). The pleading document is to
indicate any family relationship between an existing and/or proposed director and another
existing/proposed member of management. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-101; and 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(d).
145. A nominee will be precluded from realizing "short-swing profits" while he is a
director. He will be required to return to the corporation profits that he has derived from
opening and closing transactions in the corporation's stock for his own account that occur
within six months of each other. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78p(b) (1994).
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B. The Seeking of Participatory Democracy Vigor
A relevant Yankee concept is that strongly-held varying viewpoints be
reconciled in township-type meetings conducted in accordance with
principles of a participatory democracy." This participatory democracy
session, monitored by the press even if it occurs after the vote has been
announced at the physical aspect of a corporate annual meeting, gives vigor
to the annual meeting and protects the integrity of the grade process
conducted before the vote is announced. For example, the shareholder who
attends the meeting is given the right by U.S. law to hear first-hand,
management's assessment of the vote, as well as of its performances and
objectives. Management hears, first-hand, the shareholders' assessment of
the vote in light of their investment objectives.
U.S. law takes pains to protect the integrity of this participatory
democracy session. Management is required to involve all shareholders in
the physical meeting. Thus, by law, it has access not only to shareholders
"of record" on the corporate register of shareowners, but also the potential
access to "beneficial", not of record or not "street-name," shareowners who
have power to direct how the record owners vote. Management's access is
derived from the right to be informed by the street name holder of the
name, address, and number of shares of each beneficial owner. An
exception to deemed access exists only if the beneficial owner has expressly
objected to disclosure of this information.1 47  Having this access,
management must inform both record owners and non-objecting beneficial
owners of the date, time and place of the meeting 4 and important
attendees. 149 Armed with information derived from SEC filings,' 50 citizen-
146. See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 4, at 44, 64-65.
147. 17 C.F.R.§ 240.14b-2.
148. Management's pleading document must also contain the complete mailing address
of the corporation's principal executive office. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101; see 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-13.
149. Attendees of importance would include the independent accountant(s) for the current
year as well as those for the last year if they are different. If they will be present, the
pleading document must say whether they will be able to make a statement and/or be on
hand to answer questions. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101.
150. The relevant SEC filings include: (1) an annual report to the SEC on the
performance of the corporation; see 17 C.F.R. § 249.310; (2) an annual report to
shareholders; see 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3; (3) initial and follow-up pleading documents, see
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2, and 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a- 11; (4) filings by "institutional investors"
as to their ownership of shares in the corporation, see supra note 57 and accompanying
text; (5) filings by investors acquiring holdings in the corporation including subsequent
purchases and sales, see supra notes 58, 69 and 76; and (6) filings by members of
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capitalists are given, by state law, a limited right in which to meet and
confer among themselves in advance of the meeting. 5'
C. The Seeking of Ministerial Duties Dependability
Taking into account the size and untested nature of the shareholder
component of the electorate, the voting process adds to the integrity of the
annual meeting grade process through applying the concept of public
performance of minutely-divided ministerial duties. Those officials
involved in administering the voting process have a duty to see that a
shareholder is permitted to change his voting instructions to any proxy
holder. Election inspectors have a duty to assure that a shareholder's wishes
are recorded with accuracy and precision. 52 The shareholder has a "duty,"
management relative to their personal transactions in the corporation's stock. See Securities
Exchange Act § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1994).
151. Under state law, a corporation must make a complete list of the record shareholders
as of the record date available for inspection by any other shareholder. This must be done
a short-time before the meeting, typically ten days. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 291 (1994).
152. A shareholder is to be given a wide range of options reflective perhaps of what
public opinion would require in the participatory democracy of a township meeting. These
options are:
(1) The right to vote for directors individually and with particularity, that
is, "approve," "withhold," or, if state law permits, "against";
(2) Absent special circumstances, the shareholder retains discretion over
how his proxy is to be voted. Only on his instructions can his proxy not
be voted once it is given. 17 C.F.R.§ 240-14a-4;
(3) The proxy holder has authority to vote on issues not reasonably
foreseen a the tim-.e of the proxy solicitation. This is only if the
shareholder is made aware of that possibility when his proxy is solicited.
The proxy holder cannot vote for a nominee not named in the pleading
document unless a bona fide named nominee is unable to serve or will
not serve for good cause. Id.;
(4) The proxy holder can vote, without instruction, on "routine" matters
not included in the pleading document even if the stand taken is opposed
by management;
(5) He can vote on proposals of shareholders that have been excluded
from the corporation's pleading document. Id.;
(6) A proxy holder is permitted to attend annual meetings on behalf of
the beneficial owner of the shares that he is voting. The holder need not
be a shareholder himself. Therefore, the beneficial shareholder, by
choosing his proxy holder carefully, can assure that his vote is counted
on unforeseeable matters in accordance with the judgment of a carefully-
chosen representative. See 17 C.F.R.§ 240.14a-4(c); and
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if his vote is to be counted, to contribute "man-of-the-world" sophistication
to the voting process. 53 Management has the duty to protect the
shareholders as a whole from more unconstrained fellow shareholders. 154
Management also has the duty to protect shareholders from the emergence
of corporate uncertainty which may occur in the event the shareholders
decline to ratify the proposed slate of directors and also fail to elect a board
of directors. 
155
Vii. INTEGRITY OF THE U.S. EVALUATION-THE ELECTION CONTEST
A feature of the U.S. annual meeting process is that citizen-capitalists
have the ability to replace management. Such a replacement could lead to
a possible restructuring of the corporation or termination of enterprise
objectives if warranted by poor performances. Reflecting the Yankee
concept of the "dissident faction," U.S. corporate governance rules
encourage the emergence, on a controlled basis, of the self-financed
corporate dissident faction whether or not a counter-entrepreneur156 to
contest the election of directors. This is on a "controlled basis" because of
the perils posed by the "secret society". There is to be full publicity to the
citizen-capitalists as soon as a faction constitutes a "rival legislature." This
legislature comes into existence as soon as (1) the faction reaches a
(7) Reflecting perhaps the Yankee protocol that in a participatory
democracy each citizen is willing to take a public stand, there is typically
no requirement that the shareholder vote be conducted by secret ballot.
153. Thus, according to one court decision, if a shareholder gives facially conflicting
proxies and these are irreconcilable from the books and records of the corporation, the
proxies are not to be reconciled by "extrinsic evidence" and are not to be counted. An
investor is required to use "reasonable care" in exercising his right to vote by proxy. See
Concord Financial Corp. v. Tri-State Motor Transit Co., 567 A.2d 1, 5 (Del. Ch. 1989).
154. Thus management determines the time and place of each meeting, when the polls are
to be opened and closed, and whether any shareholder proposals made for the first time in
the actual hearing phase are in order. Lastly, management, as a holder of proxies given it
by shareholders, has discretion to vote on shareholder proposals made for the first time at
the hearing phase of the meeting.
155. Even though the law of a home state may require that an annual meeting agenda item
be the election of directors for the upcoming year, the law of such a state typically does not
necessarily limit directors to one-year terms. Charter documents of corporations usually
make it clear that the term of a director does not end "until his successor is elected and
qualifies."
156. Under federal securities rules, anyone who furnishes a communication to
shareholders "under circumstances reasonably calculated to result in the procurement,
withholding, or revocation of a proxy," is deemed in this article an organizer of a faction.
See 17 C.F.R.§ 240.14(a)(1).
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threshold size and (2) the organizer seeks either an immediate or eventual
instruction, that is, proxy, from the members. 157 After this point is reached,
publicity must be given as to the membership, financing, and intentions of
the organizer of the rival legislature. 5 8 To permit initial testing of the
waters in a private manner before a "legislature" is publicly announced, any
proponent of a faction is allowed to contact up to ten other shareholders'5 9
"independent" of himself"W without publicizing' his efforts even if seeking
an immediate proxy.
A. "Citizen" Shareholder Organizers
After this threshold is reached, the citizen shareholder organizer,
whether citizen capitalist or plebe shareholder, is given greater scope to act
without publicity than shareholders comprising financial aristocrats, such
as oversized shareholders and counter-entrepreneurs. Once a citizen
shareholder organizer has contacted ten persons, he is permitted to seek to
have a free-ranging discussion with an unlimited number of shareholders
without announcing a rival legislature so long as he is not seeking an
immediate proxy. This is despite the fact that his efforts are calculated to
win eventual proxy support for his position in the form of a proxy naming
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. This latitude is not permitted to management as a prospective faction organizer.
Unless it gives publicity to its efforts, it cannot "furnish a communication" to any
shareholder under circumstances reasonably calculated to lead to a proxy decision by the
shareholder. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(1). An interesting question relates to the
ciut;iustajices under which taking the initiative to meet and confer with a shareholder
constitutes "furnishing a communication" to a shareholder. See supra notes 63-64 and
accompanying text.
160. If the faction organizer is contacting other shareholders that are "dependent" on him
because of a preexisting relationship, the ten-person limit does not apply. For instance, an
investment adviser already being paid by his clients for disinterested corporate governance
advice is allowed to contact an unlimited number of his clients that are shareholders. 17
C.F.R.§ 240.14a(b)(2). A trustee shareholder with voting power is allowed, using channels
permitted in the trust instrument, to contact an unlimited number of the trust's beneficial
shareowners. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a(b)(2). Finally, provided there is full disclosure
afterwards, shared readership of a newspaper having an unlimited number of subscribers,
enables an organizer to place a "tombstone advertisement" announcing his desire to organize
a faction and inviting indications of interest. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(a)(6).
161. Publicity would include the filing with the SEC of (1) a proxy statement, (2) a form
of proxy, (3) written follow-up efforts to obtain proxies, (4) the corporation's annual report
to shareholders and, (5) if a proxy statement is not supplied, the corporation's information
statement.
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himself as holder. 62 There is ample time for a "citizen shareholder" who
happens to be a "citizen capitalist" to secretly test the waters in this
manner. Thus, for the previous annual meeting, the SEC required that the
corporation announce the likely date of commencement of the current year's
pleading process in its disclosure pleading.' 63
Any would-be organizer of a faction in the U.S. can enlist the help of
the corporation to assist him in his efforts to have a free-ranging discussion
with other shareholders before forming a rival "legislature." If he can
demonstrate a proper corporate purpose, and the corporation itself is in the
process of soliciting proxies, the corporation must, at the would-be
organizer's expense, either mail materials that he furnishes to both record
owners and non-objecting beneficial owners, or provide names and
addresses of these owners to the would-be organizer so that he himself can
do the mailing at the option of the corporation. 164 Once the applicable
alternative-legislature threshold is reached, the faction organizer is subject
to requirements of publicity and pleading disclosures to citizen-capitalists.
These are similar to those to which management is subject in "pleading" its
case for the annual meeting. 165
Until recent changes were made, federal rules assured a collegial
atmosphere in the course of the exchange of rival election contest disclosure
documents. Thus, the SEC, as a neutral party, reviewed preliminary copies
of the disclosure documents of both sides in secret. Thus, the SEC served
to tone down the more contentious parts, by commenting on the disclosure
documents.166  However, the timeliness of debating rejoinders was
hampered in this process. Recent rule changes have therefore lessened the
SEC's role as preserver of the "bon homme" deemed inherent in a
participatory democracy session.
162. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(1).
163. This date is 120 days in advance of the anniversary date of the mailing of the first
pleading document for the last meeting. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a)(3)(I), 5(e).
The typical state law provides for a record date and notice no more than sixty days,
and no less than ten days, before the meeting. Therefore, if a shareholder wishes to organize
a faction, he has at least a sixty day head-start, that is 120 days minus sixty days, and could
conceivably have as many as 110 days (120 days minus ten days) to test the waters before
giving publicity.
164. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7(a). However, for some reason, corporate assistance is
not required for would-be organizers wishing to form a rival legislature, if management is
seeking not proxies but rather the favorable vote of shareholders planning to attend the
meeting in person. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2.
165. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-3,240.14a-4, 240.14a-101.
166. 17 C.F.R.§ 240.14a-8(a)(10).
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B. The Organizer that Is a Counter-Entrepreneur
If the organizer is a counter-entrepreneur and intent on affecting
enterprise objectives, U.S. corporate governance rules require full publicity
as to the faction's existence. Thus, there is an announcement of the
legislature, (1) as soon as the ten-person threshold is exceeded and (2) if the
organizer's efforts are calculated to win eventual support for his own
position in the form of a proxy to himself. 16 7  A secret free-ranging
discussion among faction members, if initiated by a counter-entrepreneur,
is not permitted if it is beyond a ten-person threshold. A problem, of
course, is that any purportedly free-ranging discussion will have had its
vigor dampened because it is encumbered by the indirect presence of third
parties and the public, if a rival "legislature" is announced.
Moreover, federal rules assure that a dissident faction organized by a
counter-entrepreneur incurs expense and other costs before it acts as a rival
legislature and seeks to prevail in an election contest. All capital-
contributing "sponsors" in the faction must be disclosed on the
announcement of the rival legislature, as well as the identity and
compensation of service providers like proxy solicitors.16 1 All of this has the
benefit of assuring that such an enterprising-objective-changing faction has
entrepreneurial dynamism. However, no such disclosure on announcement
of the legislature is required of special consultants such as legal counsel and
financial experts unless they are "financing" the solicitation of proxies. 1
69
C. Oversized Investor Organizers
Publicity by filing with the SEC must be given to certain written
organizing efforts of any shareholder whose voting share ownership of the
corporation exceeds $5 million in market value. 170 Thus, publicity as to the
167. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2. This rule defines a counter-entrepreneur, as referred to in
this article, as (a) any nominee for director proposing his own election, (b) anyone intending
to propose an alternative to a management proposal to change the corporation's enterprise
objectives, (c) any person who has acquired five percent or more of the corporation's
common shares with an intent to exert control, and (d) anyone else with a substantial
financial interest in the success of his own organizing efforts.
168. There is one exception. This is when the session is to address a publicized proposal
by a rival counter-entrepreneur in an election contest. 17 C.F.R.§ 240.14a-11.
169. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-101, 240.14a-11.
170. Such an organizer must make a filing with the SEC disclosing his identity,
background, and intentions. He must otherwise publicize his efforts but need not provide a
written disclosure statement to each shareholder that he seeks to win over. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-6(g).
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existence of a rival "legislature" must occur as soon as the ten-person
threshold is exceeded if the written efforts, even though not seeking an
immediate proxy, are reasonably calculated to result in a proxy decision in
favor of the position of the faction organizer. In this case, the personal
furnishing of a prescribed disclosure statement to shareholders who are
urged in person to join the faction is not necessary. This is as long as any
eventual proxy decision in favor of the cause advocated by the organizer
does not result in receiving a proxy himself. 7' This last condition of non-
receipt of a proxy assures that a "sales meeting" does not occur, but rather
a truly free-ranging discussion.
D. Suggested Changes as to Election Contests
First, the rules should be changed to provide greater latitude to the
counter-entrepreneur organizer of a dissident faction in an election contest
to have a free-ranging discussion with other shareholders. This should be
done without the dampening effect of full publicity of the existence of a
legislature. Recognition should be given that it is this organizer who may
be the vehicle for a change in the corporation's enterprise objectives, that
is, it is he who provides the means whereby shareholders can act on a poor
"grade." The change could be a change in management, a restructuring, or
a termination of enterprise objectives. 72 Similarly, "oversized investors"
and other shareholders that have achieved a voting share ownership of the
corporation exceeding $5 million should be given a circumscribed right to
have a free-ranging discussion with other shareholders without full publicity
of the rival existence of a legislature, if these shareholders have held their
shares for over a threshold amount of time.
In both of these cases, the rules could be made to reflect the rules that
apply to small offerings of securities. Thus, these two types of would-be
organizer, the counter-entrepreneur and the oversized investor, could be
enabled to have a free-ranging discussion without full publicity with no
more than 35 other shareholders representing a maximum of $5 million in
market value of the corporation's shares. '" The would-be organizer of such
a dissident faction should not be permitted to seek an immediate proxy.
However, his efforts should be able to be calculated to win eventual support
171. See 17 C.F.R.§ 240.14a-2(b)(1).
172. However, management should not be required to cooperate with a not-yet-publicized
counter-entrepreneur trying to make initial contact with other shareholders before mailing
of the corporation's own pleading documents, unless the counter-entrepreneur has held
shares for at least two years.
173. See Securities Exchange Act Rule 505, 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (1998).
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for his position in the form of a proxy. To assure that the purportedly free-
ranging discussion is not merely a sales meeting, the would-be organizer
should be required to disclose to contacted shareholders his address, his
telephone and fax numbers, and his "e-mail" address. 1
74
The second suggested change concerns contingent compensation to
consultant experts. As seen above, a faction is required to disclose the
identity of, and compensation paid to, tactical participants such as proxy
solicitors, even if the latter are not "financing" the solicitation. However,
current rules do not require that a faction organizer disclose the identity of,
and compensation paid to, consultants regarding the viability of a proposed
change in enterprise objectives if the consultants are not disclosed as
experts. Disclosure is only required if they are financing the solicitation.
This non-disclosure exists even though the consultant advises on the tactics
to be followed in achieving the pre-condition of the change in enterprise
objectives, a victory in the election contest for a substantial fee. A
reconsideration is warranted. Any change would be in light of the important
role of the legal and other advice, as well as the large amount of
compensation paid. This was particularly true over the course of the
1980's. This change should also reflect the Yankee concepts of emphasis
on the importance of compensation and of reliance on the citizen.
Part IV has discussed disclosure with respect to annual meeting issues
in the U.S. Parts V and VI have discussed the integrity of the holding of the
meeting, at which issues are resolved and the opportunity for alternatives
to existing management as one method of resolution are presented. Parts
VII through IX will show ways in which the issues voted on at a U.S.
annual meeting have been made concrete and manageable for the citizen
capitalist. This narrowing of issues serves to assure that the opinion of the
citizen-capitalists can be relied on by the public in furtherance of the policy
to encourage capital raising efforts by industry.
VIM. AN UNDERPINNING-ASSURING A THRESHOLD LEVEL OF
SHORT-TERM (SHARING PRICE) PERFORMANCE IN THE U.S.
As the annual meeting approaches, the U.S. citizen capitalist can have
confidence that patently self-interested interference with the market price
of shares by insiders has been limited. 175 This interference creates undue
174. Compare 17 C.F.R. §240.14a-8(b)(2) with 17 C.F.R. § 230.505, which applies to
identification of the maker of a shareholder proposal.
175. Typically, the insider, in causing such interference, will have either purchased
shares at a price that is lower or sold shares at a price that is higher than would be the case
if insider information that he has were to have been disclosed to the public first. His goal,
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volatility affecting short-term, share price, performance. First, U.S.
federal law requires that significant information be accurately disseminated
in a timely manner to the public market.'76 Second, insiders are subject to
federal sanction insofar as they take advantage of a temporary lack of
accuracy or timeliness by achieving short-term profits in their corporation's
shares on the basis of "insider information."' 77 The following will explain
typically, would not be long-term investment return but rather short-term profits to be
realized after disclosure of the information to the public. He would typically realize these
profits by means of an off-setting transaction within a short period of time of the original
transaction, that is, a sale after the purchase or a repurchase after the sale.
One undesirable effect of such insider trading is "undue volatility" in the price of the
shares held by citizen-capitalists. This is in the sense of prices, while shares are being held
pending consummation of investment objectives, that are not fixed primarily by available
public information but rather are fixed primarily by the speculation of the insiders. The
undesirability of such interference with fair pricing of shares is or particular concern to
stock exchanges. See NEW STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL 303.00.
176. The requirements include: (1) that the shareholders receive annual reports and that
these be filed for information purposes with the SEC so as to be available for public
inspection; (2) that the SEC receive annual reports, up-dating quarterly reports, and ad hoc
reports of significant developments, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(a), 15 U.S.C. §
781(a); and (3) that, if management is to avoid sanction for facilitating insider trading,
significant developments be disseminated to the public in a timely manner. See infra note
180 and accompanying text.
As to this last item, the de Tocqueville concept of separate ministerial duties is
employed to protect management and the corporation from inadvertent inaccuracies on
hindsight, in forward-looking statements, including those pertaining to enterprise objectives
and a comparison of long-term performance with enterprise objectives. See infra note 180
and accompanying text.
177. This is only a main protection against undue stock market volatility. Three other
protections against volatility likewise involve a sanction in the form of civil penalty exacted
by the SEC and, in certain cases, exposure to a civil lawsuit brought by a private party. The
first protection involves the failure of management to follow internal control rules regarding
the measurement of long-term performance. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2). The second protection
involves failure of management to meet certain safe-harbors, a form of performance of
ministerial duties, in publicizing forward-looking statements. 15 U.S.C. § 78au-1(A)(c).
The third protection involves failure of management to establish internal controls to prevent
trading on material inside information. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(g). These three protections
supplement the one covered above, the protection against actual trading by insiders on the
basis of inside information.
The existing citizen shareholder, embarked on giving an evaluation at an upcoming
annual meeting, has a particular need for assurance that each of the above four violations
of law are protected against. First, if the violation involves inappropriate lowering, for a
time, of the value of his shares via false propagation of bearish information which is later
corrected, the shareholder is potentially deprived of a good price at which to sell his shares
if a household emergency arises during the "lowering" period. Second, if the violation
involves inappropriate raising of the value of his shares in the same manner as the first
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these protections.
A. Dissemination of Accurate Information
A relevant Yankee concept of due process is that a governing body
employing judicial-form procedures guides the activities of even elected
government officials. In de Tocqueville's day, an example of the governing
body is a court of general sessions. An example of elected government
officials subject to guidance would be selectmen. The guidance for the
governing body was by means of the issuance of broad "writs" rather than
continual supervision similiar to an employer supervising an employee. 
7 8
Writs were issued after judicial-form procedures.
The SEC employs this concept of "writs" in governing the activities of
the elected board of directors of corporations, as well as officers indirectly
appointed by the directors. By legislative writ of mandamus, commanding
an act not otherwise contemplated by an elected official, the SEC
commands the elected board of directors to assure that the corporation has
a system of internal controls in place. These must meet specific
congressionally-mandated objectives to further accurate and prompt public
disclosure. 179 In response to this writ, corporate boards of directors, in
turn, appoint a variety of administrative officials of a publicly disclosed
nature to assure compliance with the writ. Each official is to adhere to
public performance of minutely-divided ministerial duties to assure that the
writ is obeyed. '8 0 The officials, answerable to the elected governing body
and the SEC, by virtue of the writ of the SEC, typically include a corporate
secretary,18' a compliance official,"S a corporate treasurer,183 a principal
violation, there are two problems. For one thing, the shareholder is potentially deprived,
during the "raising" period, of a good price at which to cover any short sale, against the
box, that he may have made for "household emergency" tax reasons. This is to achieve a
gain in an advantageous taxable year during the period before the raising period. For another
thing, an individual, buying in the market at the inappropriately high price on the basis of
unduly bullish projections, might sue the corporation for one or more of the violations. This
lawsuit might itself cause the value of the corporation's shares to drop unduly.
178. See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 4, at 78-79.
179. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2). These directives are elaborated by citizen-sustainer
stock exchanges. See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 2.
180. For a comprehensive description of the duties placed upon officials involved in
corporate governance, see James Hamilton, James Motley and Andrew Turner,
Responsibilities of Corporate Officers and Directors under Federal Securities Laws, Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH), Feb. 12, 1997.
181. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 142, 103(a)(2), 158 (1994).
182. This individual is responsible for assuring the adequacy of administrative controls,
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accounting officer,"8 an internal auditor,8 5 a current independent public
accountant,1 6 any former independent public accountant,' 87 the directors of
the corporation and, by federal regulation, members of the SEC staff. 88
With the exception of SEC staff members, the sanctions against an official
who fails to fulfill his duties includes personal liability for damages caused
to the corporation subject to the writ.'8 9
To illustrate how the performance of ministerial duties operates, we
will consider the preparation of management disclosure documents
preparatory to the annual meeting. In the process, the independent public
accountant, elected by the corporation's "entrepreneurial unit"consisting of
management and the citizen-capitalists, audits the books and records of the
corporation kept by the corporate treasurer. The independent public
accountant performs these ministerial duties in accordance with generally
accepted auditing standards. The treasurer, for his part, has performed his
duties in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. 190 In
performing his audit, the independent public accountant tests the
corporation's internal accounting controls as monitored by the internal
auditor. The latter relies on internal controls in performing his duties. The
financial statements are approved by the corporation's principal accounting
officer. He performs his duties in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles. The independent public accountant, as one of his
duties, offers comments on these statements to the audit committee of the
that is, internal controls other than accounting controls. He is either a compliance officer
employed by the corporation itself or a compliance professional employed by an investment
banker retained by the corporation for capital-raising purposes. To assure management
integrity, federal law spells out in detail the nature of administrative and accounting controls
that are the responsibility of a compliance official. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2).
183. The home state typically requires that the corporation have a corporate treasurer or
controller who is personally responsible for supervising safe custody of assets. See
CORPORATE CONTROLLER'S MANUAL, Part I (Paul J. Wendell ed. 1981).
184. See 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a).
185. See CORPORATE CONTROLLER'S MANUAL, supra note 183, at 1-3, 19.2-10, 20.1-2.
186. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-3(b)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b)(1)
(1998).
187. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
188. See "Informal and Other Procedures" specified in Regulation 202.3 of the Rules of
Practice of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("Processing of Filings"), 17 C.F.R.
§ 202.3.
189. See 15 U.S.C. § 78r.
190. For a commentary in favor of eliminating the touchstone of generally-accepted
accounting principles if accurate information has been disseminated with respect to foreign
corporations trading in the U.S., see Baumol & Malkiel, supra note 87.
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board of directors. 91 The views of the audit committee are forwarded by
the corporate secretary in a formal, recorded manner, to the full board of
directors. If the financial statements are approved, the corporate secretary
has the duty of assuring that ministerial duties of other officials leading up
to the annual meeting are performed. Members of the SEC staff have
minutely-divided ministerial duties to assist in the timely dissemination of
information as the annual meeting approaches.
If a former independent accountant has recently been relieved of his
duties by management, SEC rules require the use of a formal, recorded
process to bring any disagreement between this accountant and management
to the attention of the citizen-capitalists." 9 If a director has recently
resigned, the SEC rules provide that the director has the option of bringing
to the attention of the citizen-capitalists any financial statement-related
disagreements he has with the rest of management. 193
B. Dissemination of Timely Information
By legislative writ of mandamus, the SEC commands the board of
directors to disseminate material information to the marketplace in a timely
manner before insiders can illegally act on it prior to dissemination. At the
same time, SEC rules, by virtue of a legislative writ of prohibition on
elected directors, constrain insiders from interfering with that writ by
trading on inside information that is material. 194
Another Yankee concept of due process is that a court of general
sessions, the SEC, be advised by a grand jury as to whether or not it should
191. Citizen sustainer stock exchanges such as the New York Stock Exchange require that
there be an audit committee composed solely of directors independent of "management".
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL 303.00.
192. If the former independent public accountant believes that management has interfered
with his ability to perform his duties and has caused him to be terminated, the accountant
can require the corporate secretary to publicize the reasons for his termination. Thus, the
accountant can request the secretary to disclose in the corporation's disclosure pleading: (a)
in connection with his. audits going back two years, a summary of any specified
disagreement or expressed concern on the part of the accountant; (b) if the accountant
believes the secretary's summary is inaccurate or incomplete, a brief statement of his own
views; and (c) a brief statement as to the likelihood that the accountant will be able to be
present at the annual meeting and to make a statement and answer questions. 17 C.F.R.§
240.14a-101 at Item 9d.
193. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 at Item 7(g).
194. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. See Sec. Exch. Comm. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 978 (1968), 404 U.S. 1005 (1971),petition
for reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 1064 (1972).
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issue an executive writ in order to enforce a legislative writ in a particular
case. In the case of an executive writ, the "grand jury's" main resource is
a public prosecutor. The latter would have access only to the general public
rather than a public prosecutor with an investigative staff especially
assigned to him.'95 For purposes of SEC enforcement in the form of an
executive writ, the "grand jury" functions as a hearing officer. The "public
prosecutor" assigned to the grand jury is from the division of enforcement
of the SEC.'96 The division of enforcement has no investigative staff. The
general public receives encouragement to assist this public prosecutor in the
form of a possible bounty, a share of any "civil penalty" realized by the
SEC. 19'
Another Yankee concept relevant to applying sanctions, by virtue of
interference with an executive or legislative writ, is that political rather than
judicial agencies are relied on to impose executive writ remedies. These
remedies include "impeachment," that is, removal of a public official from
195. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 4, at 79.
196. SEC procedures can be described as follows in terms of the "writ," "grand jury,"
and "judicial procedure" Yankee concepts of due process:
The investor provides information to the hearing examiner, the "grand jury,"
concerning an alleged failure of disclosure in violation of a legislative writ issued by the
SEC. The information includes the role of the corporate official in that failure. If the hearing
examiner decides to conduct an inquiry, he publishes information concerning the possible
violation in order to obtain further information from the public. See Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 § 21(a)(1), 15 U.S.C.§ 78u(a)(1) (1994). He subpoenas witnesses, compels their
attendance, takes evidence, and requires the production of records. 15 U.S.C.§ 78u(b) and
17 C.F.R. § 201.14.
If he concludes that the corporate official has violated legal requirements of full
disclosure contrary to the legislative writ, he issues an "initial decision." See 17 C.F.R. §
201.17(a). The initial decision may recommend that the commissioners of the SEC issue an
executive writ ordering that the board cause the offending corporate official to pay a civil
penalty, that is, avoiding undue formality, itself issue an executive writ ordering the
offending official to pay the penalty. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(b).
The initial decision will automatically be adopted by the commissioners of the SEC
as their own, unless there is a petition for review on proper grounds. If there is a petition,
a similar judicial procedure before the commissioners will be held in order to reach a
definitive finding on whether or not a writ should be issued. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.17.
197. There is an interplay of two Yankee concepts here. First, under that of "private
litigants in the public interest" discussed below, private citizens, by receiving a share of any
fine as a "bonus" discussed above, are encouraged to stand up and act as accusers of those
public entities and officials that fail to fulfill administrative duties. See DE TOCQUEVILLE,
supra note 4, at 79-80. Conversely, public officials, by receiving a share of any fine, are
encouraged to stand up and prosecute private citizens that shirk public duties. See id. at 80,
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office for interference with a writ. 118 The political process to issue an
executive writ of impeachment is to be bifurcated. One political agency
decides whether or not to issue a bill of impeachment as a form of executive
writ and another decides whether or not to impeach."9
The SEC, having issued a legislative writ to the elected board of
directors that has been interfered with by the offending corporate official
insider, is empowered to issue an executive bill of impeachment. This bill
is issued on behalf of the citizen-capitalists and the public. However,
contrary to Yankee concepts of due process, the entity in a position to
impose the executive writ of impeachment under the current rules is not
another political agency but rather a court applying disqualification from
holding office as a criminal sanction rather than an administrative remedy
such as an executive writ.2" In its mildest form, the criminal sanction
imposed by court order is merely a finding that the insider is guilty of a
"violation of the securities laws."2"' This merely requires disclosures to
citizen-capitalists and the public for subsequent annual meetings. 2" This
sanction is therefore consistent with the above Yankee concept. In its most
drastic form, a court-imposed criminal sanction can prohibit the insider
from serving as an officer or director of any publicly-traded corporation
ever again. 20 3 This would appear inconsistent with the above Yankee
concept of administrative impeachment.
198. See id. at 106-10. According to the author, such dismissal, so easy to pronounce
because in a sense so mild, makes U.S. law particularly formidable. For ordinary men,
dismissal from office "destroys their status, stains their honor, and condemns them to a
disgraceful leisure worse than death." Id. at 110.
199. The process is brought into play, for one thing, when a government official is
suspected of "high crimes and mi~demeannr "see u. M. n.T. art A( 7) art
1I, § 4. A mild form of executive writ is found in the case of a director or executive officer
of the corporation, or a large holder of shares, who is found to have failed in his duty as an
"insider" to publicly announce, through a filing with the SEC, any purchase or sale he has
made of shares in the corporation. This finding is made on a "bill of impeachment" issued
by the corporate secretary. The omission automatically brings into play an executive writ
requiring announcement of the omission in the next pleading document relating to an annual
meeting and thus provides an opportunity for a sort of public impeachment by the
shareholders. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Schedule 14A Item 7(b), 17 C.F.R. §
240.14a-101 (1998), and Securities Act of 1933 Regulation S-K Item 405, 17 C.F.R. §
229.405 (1998).
200. This concept was employed in the Europe of de Tocqueville's day where one body
could impose both criminal and administrative sanctions in the event of malfeasance of
office. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 4, at 106-10.
201. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d)(1), 15 U.S.C.§ 78u(d)(1) (1994).
202. See 17 C.F.R. § 240-14a-101 and 17 C.F.R. § 229.401.
203. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2) (1994).
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Further deterring insiders from trading on inside information to the
detriment of citizen-capitalists is another Yankee concept which allots a
"private-litigant in the public interest" a share of the monetary penalty
exacted againstpublic officials that violate a legislative writ.2"4 This concept
also regards the attorney representing the private litigant as a co-private
litigant in the public interest.2 5 To elaborate, the procedural rules of the
U.S. courts allow a shareholder to assert the rights of all similarly situated
shareholders, and thus the public, by bringing a "class action" in court
against an offending insider who is a corporate official. A class action is
a suit brought by plaintiffs who are similarly situated. The fee of the
attorney representing the class is permitted to consist of an agreed-to
portion of any recovery. The private litigant and his attorney, if acting in
good faith, are not required to pay legal expenses of the corporate-official
insider in defending against the suit if they lose. 20 Also, if the private
litigant-in-the-public-interest wins, he is to have the opportunity to recover
not only compensatory, but also punitive damages. He also has the right to
have both forms of damage set by a jury of citizen peers, as "educated
citizens," rather than by a court.2°7
C. Suggested U.S. Changes as to Short-Term, Share Price, Performance
First, as seen above, the SEC staff is to adhere to public performance
of ministerial duties as part of the controls assuring accuracy of publicly-
disclosed financial information to the benefit of citizen-capitalists.
Performance of these duties is a personal responsibility of staff members.
A failure to perform the duties is an offense for which there is a remedy
enforceable by members of the public.208 However, of possible detriment
to the interests of citizen-capitalists, there is no remedy in the form of
personal liability for money damages caused to the corporation by failure
to fulfill ministerial duties. If the current SEC were not such a praiseworthy
government agency, this "oversight" would be questionable in light of the
current debate on how to improve the performance of government
bureaucracy. In any event, serious consideration regarding the question
whether members of the SEC staff who are not fulfilling their ministerial
204. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 4, at 80.
205. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5e (West 1994).
206. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE §§102.1, 128.5 (West 1994).
207. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 16 (1991).
208. See 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1994).
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duties should be made liable in damages for any such non-fulfillment, is
warranted.2°
Second, the private-litigant-in-the-public-interest concept would not
seem to apply against private citizens but rather only public officials. For
purposes of the annual meeting opinion, the concept accords private
citizens, that is, the citizen-capitalists, the privilege of achieving monetary
recoveries against quasi-public officials, the corporate insiders. However,
the statutory bounty concept is inconsistent with this private litigant concept
insofar as it enables citizens to earn a share of a civil penalty exacted by
government against a purely private citizen. In contrast, the special cash
recovery concept, is properly only available to public officials in the
performance of their duties vis-a-vis private citizens. Receipt of a statutory
bounty by a private citizen for informing on another private citizen,
therefore, can be justified only as an extreme application of citizen
sustainership.21° This extreme application has been misused in Europe and
even in the U.S. The statutory bounty should be retained as a means of
avoiding the need for large prosecutorial investigative staffs. But this
retention should be limited only to the case of SEC recovery against
"public," or quasi-public, officials.
Third, the SEC and a court can bar an offending corporate official
insider from serving as a director or officer of any publicly-traded
corporation ever again. As seen above, this is inconsistent with the Yankee
concept of impeachment as an executive writ, that is, as an administrative
remedy. The use of a court, rather than a second political agency, to
complete the impeachment process involves the formality and expense of
court proceedings. This means the use, on the one hand, of a jury of
citizens to decide questions of "fact" and, on the other hand, of a judge to
decide questions of "law." Avoiding this expensive formality is a main goal
of accused corporate official insiders who agree to consent decrees. This
result may not be in the best interest of the citizen capitalist, particularly in
the case of an overall exemplary corporate official.2 1' Therefore a second
political agency should complete the executive writ of removal from office.
The second political agency could be the principal stock exchange on which
209. See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 4, at 66, 77-78.
210. In de Tocqueville's day, it was considered appropriate for citizen committees to be
formed to catch suspected criminals and hand them over to the police. See DE
TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 4, at 96.
211. For articles critical of exacting by the SEC of consent decrees resulting in stepping
down from office, see George Gilder, The Victim of His Virtues, WALL ST. J., Apr. 18,
1989, at A24; cf. View & Outlook, The Milken Indictment, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 1989, at
A12.
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shares of the corporation are listed for trading. The principal stock
exchange would function as a citizen-sustainer in the process.212
Fourth, in spite of recent federal legislation, it is certainly arguable that
the scales in class action suits for violation of the prohibition against insider
training are weighted too heavily in favor of the private litigant in the public
interest in the U.S. There is concern that the burden of the expense and
delay of engaging in technically-oriented proceedings in over-worked
courts tends to fall too heavily on defendants that are natural persons. Also
of concern is the risk that a particular jury might not reflect the wisdom
expected of citizens. This is particularly the case insofar as a jury is
randomly selected from voters' registers rather than at the discretion of an
elected "selectman," which was the case in de Tocqueville's day. The U.S.
judicial system might inquire into re-inventing the elected "selectman" to
assure that jurors qualify as worldly "citizens" in the context of complex
cases like insider trading. Arbitration is currently widely advocated as a less
expensive substitute for court proceedings in securities cases.213 However,
there is uncertainty in some states as to whether or not arbitrators can award
punitive damages if plaintiffs have previously waived the right to claim
punitive damages.214 As a means of curtailing the risk and delay of court
proceedings in the future, arbitrators might uniformly be regarded as having
the power to award punitive damages to plaintiffs irrespective of a prior
waiver. The private litigants in the public interest would share in a
monetary benefit to the public. Arbitrators should have the ability to permit
this sharing.
212. Using the impeachment of the U.S. President as an analogy, the SEC could be
regarded as the equivalent of the U.S. House of Representatives, as the entity that would
issue any bill of impeachment against a sitting U.S. President. Thus the SEC, like the
House, would be acting as the representative of the people as a whole, with that wholeness's
diverse interests.
The relevant stock exchange could be regarded as the equivalent of the U.S. Senate,
as the entity that would act on the House's bill of impeachment and, if warranted, impeach
the President and thus remove him from office. Just as the Senate represents the interests
of the states in particular, as well as, the public as a whole, the relevant stock exchange
would represent the interests of the investing public and the companies listed for trading on
the exchange in particular, as well as the public as a whole. This public-as-a-whole facet of
the role of the relevant stock exchange will have been assured by SEC general oversight of
the stock exchange.
213. There is even a publication covering significant issues and events in securities and
commodities arbitration-'l ESEcUarrEsARBrrRAT1ON COMMENTATOR (Richard P. Ryder,
ed.).
214. See Post-Awars Proceedings: "It's Not Over 'til It's Over", 4 SEC. ARB.
COMMENTATOR 12, 1 (1992).
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IX. AN UNDERPINNING-ASSURING A THRESHOLD LEVEL OF
LONG-TERM OPERATING PERFORMANCE IN THE U.S.
As the annual meeting approaches, the U.S. citizen capitalist can have
confidence that patently misguided decisions bearing on long-term operating
performance have been limited by a creative tension that provides
dynamism in decision making. This tension is given by a provision for
participatory democracy sessions (hereinafter "free-ranging discussions")
at upper levels of corporate deliberations.
A. Examples of Participatory Democracy Sessions
First, although it is a subject of controversy, 2 5 U.S. corporate
governance law currently allows 21 6 more than one executive officer to be a
member of the corporation's board of directors. This allowance has
beneficial effects from the standpoint of the citizen-capitalists because it
serves to prevent one executive officer who is given board member status
to the exclusion of others from having only his viewpoint presented at board
meetings even if other executive officers strongly disagree with him.
Allowing more than one director to be an executive officer enhances
collegiality in the form of a free-ranging discussion among executive
officers in advance of the formal proposal at a board meeting.
Second, the board of directors constitutes a body of elected citizens
with the primary role of hiring, firing and compensating executive officers
on the basis of relevant facts presented by the executive officers. The
executive officers have an obligation to respond to a request for information
regarding the issues. 217 The board meeting provides a forum in which the
executive officers and board of directors can have wide-ranging discussions
before the board takes formal action affecting the hiring, firing or
compensating of executive officers. Only after the parties have satisfied
their obligations to discuss and to act in good faith, is the resulting
215. See Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participation in the Corporate
Electoral Process and Corporate Governance Generally, Sec. Exch. Act, Release No.
34,15384, 43 Fed. Reg. 58522 (1978).
216. See id.
217. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984); Moran v. Household, 500 A.2d
1346 (Del. 1985); In Re J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. Shareholder Litigation, 542 A.2d 770
(Del. Ch. 1988); Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); City Capital Assoc.
Ltd. Partnership v. Interca, Inc., 551 A. 2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988); Robert M. Bass Group
v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227 (Del. Ch. 1988). Cf. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 15(c),
15 U.S.C. § 80-15 (1994).
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"management" decision protected from lawsuit by a "business judgment"
rule. This rule gives management broad latitude to pursue business plans in
order to fulfill enterprise objectives, notwithstanding the objections of
shareholders who, unlike the citizen capitalist, have a short-term orientation
with respect to operating performance.218
Third, as a matter of form, board decisions must be reached at meetings
where a majority of director members are present and a majority of those
present vote in favor of the decision in order to be valid!' 9 As a matter of
substance, stock exchanges seek to assure a true free-ranging discussion at
board meetings of their listed companies by requiring that at least two
directors be "independent."22 The presence of independent directors not
only serves to take advantage of the broad universe of candidates for
director permissible under the concept of the "draft," but also of any special
qualifications that the independent director might have, giving him the
property of a "catalyst" to discussion. This catalytic quality helps assure
that formal, substantive action is taken by the board only after a true free-
ranging discussion in which the special qualifications of the independent
directors, including those bearing on the general community's interests, are
taken into account.22 1 If a director has disagreed with a decision, he has the
option of having his disagreement recorded in disclosure to the citizen-
218. It is permissible for the pursuit of enterprise objectives to be inconsistent with short-
term returns to shareholders in the form of dividends or in the form of short-term stock
market performance. Thus, management is entitled to follow a social policy objective so
long as consistent with enterprise objectives. See City Capital Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, 551
A.2d 787. Further, under a federal requirement, enacted in 1977, a corporation is required
to adhere to internal controls to assure management integrity irrespective of lack of
immediate effect on financial statements. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(b)(2), 15
U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (1994). Similarly, SEC rules permit management to omit from the
corporation's disclosure statement any citizen capitalist proposal calling for the corporation
to violate a statute. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14a-8(c)(2), 17 C.F.R. §
240.14a-8(c)(2) (1998).
219. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1994).
220. The New York Stock Exchange requires that there be a committee "composed solely
of directors independent of management and that the board itself have at least two
independent directors." NEw YORK STOCK EXCHANGELISTEDCOMPANYMANUAL 303.00.
221. Many state laws permit a director or executive officer to be protected from liability
for actions taken, even if he may, on hindsight, have failed to display man-of-the-world
sophistication. This potential protection would apply so long as he has acted in good faith.
Many state laws permit the board to cause the corporation to purchase insurance as to any
such obligation to indemnify a director or officer. In a few states, the corporation itself,
including the shareholders, is permitted to agree in advance to absolve the director or
executive officer from any personal liability on condition that he shall have acted in good
faith. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1994).
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capitalists before an annual meeting which further assures a true
participatory democracy session.
Fourth, the U.S. gives immense power to the "citizen-as-master trinity"
of a corporation consisting of management, the executive officers and the
board of directors, and the citizen-capitalists. It is this element that has
determined how work of the corporation is divided,222 the state in which the
corporation is to be "domiciled,"223 the stock exchange on which its shares
are to be traded, and procedures that it is to use in governing itself and its
enterprise objectives as set forth in articles and bylaws.
U.S. regulations pertaining to the wielding of this power require that
the management side have free-ranging discussions with qualified
representatives of the citizen capitalist side. The applicable Yankee concept
of due process is that the township meeting provide a forum for the exercise
of political ambition by any citizen who has achieved a modest level of
eminence in the community.224 By virtue of SEC rules, "opportunity to
exercise ambition" is accorded to the shareholder who qualifies as a citizen
capitalist and has gone though the effort of formulating a relevant225
222. The division of duties among executive officers is largely a matter of unfettered
board discretion. Executive officers typically are required to include a president who is
senior executive officer in charge of operations, at least one vice president, and a principal
accounting officer whose primary policy-making function is to assure that the corporation's
financial statements are consistent with enterprise objectives. State law typically permits the
corporate charter to provide for the selection of a chairman of the board or the senior
executive officer presiding at board meetings. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142,103(a)(2),158
(1994). It is federal law that requires that a publicly-traded corporation have a principal
accounting officer. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a).
223. The only requirement is that the chosen state accept the designation of home state.
Usually a state accepts even where the corporation has only a minimal contact with it. At
least one commentator has criticized this ability of the citizen-as-master trinity unit to choose
the domicile of the corporation. The criticism is that management thereby dominates the
corporation. See Ryngaert, supra note 46, at 44, 47-48.
The home state determines principles that govern the rights of shareholders as a
whole, as compared to those of executive officers and directors. The home state provides
for any super majority vote on transactions involving a change in the corporation's
enterprise objectives. See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 203 (1994). The home state permits any
staggering of terms for directors. See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 141(d).
224. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 4, at 69.
225. Management may exclude proposals by citizen-capitalists that it finds, after a meet-
and-confer with the SEC staff, to have as their thrust "irrelevant" objectives. These are:
(1) conduct of ordinary business operations of the corporation, See Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 Rules 14a-8(c)(7), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(7) (1998); (2) a shareholder's personal
claim or grievance, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(4); (3) specific amounts of cash or stock
dividends, 17 C.F.R. § 14a-8240.(c)(13); (4) moot proposals, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(10);
(5) proposals duplicative of other proposals, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(11); (6) proposals
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"shareholder" proposal that he proposes to include in the corporation's
pleading documents.226 The shareholder must have demonstrated staying
power through his conduct if a prior proposal of his was included in a
management document.22 Further, the shareholder's ambition must be
disciplined so the discussion will be relevant. 228 Management is given the
opportunity to oppose the "ambitious" citizen capitalist's proposal in the
pleading document, thus encouraging a discussion with the capitalist in
advance of publication. On the other hand, no ambitious citizen capitalist
has the right to have a discussion with management in respect to a planned
management proposal that the citizen capitalist will conceivably oppose.
Thus, there is no ability on the part of an ambitious citizen capitalist to
publicly register opposition to a published management proposal at
corporate expense.229
Fifth, free-ranging discussions among citizen-capitalists as a prelude to
formal action of presenting a shareholder proposal to management is
enhanced by a requirement that share ownership of directors, and nominees
for director, be disclosed to shareholders in advance of the annual meeting.
Insofar as any of these directors satisfy the qualifications of a citizen
capitalist, they are in an ideal position to have a free-ranging discussion
with each other as representatives of the citizen capitalist community before
the taking of formal action by the board or by a committee thereof. One
ideal opportunity for such a discussion is a committee of the board of
directors charged with nominating directors.23° In addition, by virtue of a
that the shareholders have, previously and decisively voted down, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-
8(c)(12); (7) matters not significantly related to the corporation's business, 17 C.F.R. §
240.14a-8(c)(5) or (8) matters that the corporation is powerless to have an influence over,
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(6).
226. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a).
227. The representative of the citizen capitalist side is expected to be present at the annual
meeting, as still a shareholder, to defend his proposal. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a)(2).
228. Thus, management need include in a corporation pleading document only one
proposal from a particular representative of the citizen capitalist side. The length of the
proposal, together with any argument in favor of it, cannot exceed 500 words. Inclusion of
the proposal is subject to the right of management to include a statement in opposition. 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-8.
229. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(e).
230. Another alternative which has so far been defeated in the courts as impermissibly
detracting from the role assigned by state law to the board of directors is that of a
shareholder-elected "shareholder advisory committee" consisting solely of citizen capitalist
members. See Charles F. Richards and Anne C. Foster, Exxon Revisited: The SEC Allows
Penzoil to Exclude both Mandatory and Precatory Proposals Seeking to Create a
Shareholder Advisory Committee in Accordance with the Usual Convention, 48 Bus. LAW.
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particular SEC disclosure rule, shareholders who qualify as citizen-
capitalists but are not directors, have a special window of opportunity to
have a free-ranging discussion with the nominating committee before it
takes formal action.23
B. Suggested Changes as to Long-Term Performance
The requirements that management have a free-ranging discussion with
representative citizen-capitalists should be strengthened. One possibility is
that "ambitious" citizen-capitalists be given an opportunity to provide a
statement in opposition to a management proposal. For instance,
management could invite ambitious citizen-capitalists to convey a subject
of interest to them with the purpose of allowing management to have a free-
ranging discussion with them in advance of publishing a proposal on the
subject.
Currently a corporation's disclosure statements need not disclose
whether or not a director qualifies as a "citizen capitalist." This should be
changed. The length of time that a director has held his shares should be
disclosed, as well as the value of his investment. Management's discussion
and analysis should disclose the opportunities for the citizen capitalist
directors to have free-ranging discussions with other directors as well as
each other. A possibility would be a discussion between citizen capitalist
directors as members of the compensation committee, which has an
important role in the continued retention of executive officers. Another
possibility would be a discussion between citizen capitalist directors as
members of the nominating committee.
Assurances that citizen-capitalists with different viewpoints will have
an opportunity to have a free-ranging discussion before publication of an
ambitious citizen capitalist's proposal in the corporation pleading documents
should be tightened. This will serve to temper the exercise of ambition by
one individual and assure input from his "peers." Management's
"discussion and analysis" should disclose whether any special opportunities
for exercise of ambition are to be given to citizen-capitalists to have free-
ranging discussions with other citizen-capitalists. The citizen-capitalists to
be given such an opportunity might be those that elect to be available for
1509 (1993).
231. The corporation's pleading document is to say whether or not there is a nominating
committee and, if so, whether or not the committee will consider nominees for director
recommended by shareholders. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7(e). At the time this document is
disseminated, the reading shareholder may not yet be a citizen capitalist, but by the time of
the next annual meeting he will be.
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that purpose. The elected availability should be limited to situations where
a free-ranging discussion is warranted. One example is when input
regarding a shareholder proposal which is, or is likely to be, opposed by
management is sought. Another example is when input concerning
opposition to a management proposal that is either on the table or is in the
offing is sought.232
Management currently has the right, under U.S. regulation, to exclude
any proposal of a ambitious citizen capitalist that bears on the "conduct of
ordinary business operations" from the corporation's disclosure
statements."' This principle should be modified to make clear that any
proposal peculiarly within the expertise of the citizen capitalist, as "venture
capitalist" equivalent, will not be excluded. Thus, any proposal that seeks
to provide advisory guidance as to the definition of the corporation's
enterprise objectives, should be permitted. Advisory guidance regarding
criteria for the earning of a particular element of compensation should be
permitted.
The current threshold of share ownership to demonstrate "eminence"
in the shareholder community is the lesser of $2000 in market value or one
percent of voting power. This is too low. A better monetary threshold
would be the lesser of $5000 of value and one percent of voting power.
Additionally, as seen above, it is proposed that the definition of "citizen-
capitalists" be amended to require at least a two-year investment period.
232. The program for a meet-and-confer among citizen-capitalists could be as follows.
Currently, a citizen capitalist has only limited information to enable him to meet and confer
with other citizen-capitalists. Thus, he has available to him, for proper corporate purposes,
the listing of shareholders that were of record for the last annual meeting. Under state law,
a list of record shareholders would have been required by law, to be open to all shareholders
at least ten days in advance of the previous annual meeting. DEEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 219
(1994). He therefore has a tentative and very approximate listing of shareholders that may
qualify as citizen-capitalists for the upcoming annual meeting. However, the listing is
incomplete. This is because, while it included the record ownership of various broker-
dealers and banks that hold shares in nominee name, it did not include a listing of the
beneficial owners of those shares. Management had that information. Management should
be required to disclose the information to a citizen capitalist for meet and confer purposes
if the latter wishes that to be the case.
In any event, in the absence of a strong citizen capitalist representation on the board,
management, in its "discussion and analysis," should be required to specify whether or not
it will make available to any citizen capitalist wishing to meet and confer with other citizen-
capitalists on proper subjects, a listing of record and non-objecting beneficial owners of
shares. A precedent exists in Rule 14a-7(b) under the Securities and Exchange Act. This rule
makes such a process mandatory if the requester is faced with a "going private" transaction
proposed by management. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(5).
233. 17 C.F.R.§ 240.14a-8(c)(5).
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There is a requirement that the corporation's pleading phase documents
include a "management discussion and analysis." This should explain any
unusual proportion as between independent directors and "dependent"
directors to the citizen-capitalists. Further, although the size of the pool
from which independent directors can be drawn is theoretically unlimited,
in practice it is difficult to identify candidates that have qualifications for
serving as a catalyst to free-ranging discussions. This is particularly in the
case of larger corporations. The same stock exchanges that require a board
to have independent directors, could be required to list citizens with special
qualifications. This list would serve not only to take advantage of the broad
universe of candidates available but also to provide an expectation that the
director will assume a catalytic function in promoting free-ranging
discussions at board meetings.234
X. AN UNDERPINNING-ASSURING A THRESHOLD ATTENTION TO
ENTERPRISE OBJECTIVES IN THE U.S.
As the annual meeting approaches, the citizen capitalist can have
confidence that management's freedom to make patently misguided
decisions bearing on enterprise objectives have been limited,
notwithstanding provocations.235 This, too, will help make the citizen
capitalist's vote at the ensuing annual meeting meaningful. Such decisions
bearing on enterprise objectives will have been deterred by adherence to the
Yankee concept of publicized performance of ministerial duties.
234. Precedent exists in the sense that citizen sustainer self-regulatory organizations, like
the New York Stock Exchange and the National Association of Securities Dealers, maintain
pools of arbitrators to resolve disputes involving the operations of members of those self-
regulatory organizations. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURrIES DEALERS, MANUAL
§ 3 (reprint 1988), N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) § 4.
The presence of professionally qualified independent directors to stimulate
discussion may be particularly important in the context of the addressing of enterprise
objectives. Such professionally qualified independent directors could be those "deliberately
chosen from the ranks of businessmen, bankers and lawyers, because of their expertise in
evaluating the merits of corporate enterprise proposals." Panter v. Marshall Field and Co.,
646 F.2d 271, 294 (7th Cir. 1981).
235. For an article espousing the view that the activities of third-party outsiders, covered
in this Part, constitute a needed source of oversight of management, see Ryngaert, supra
note 46.
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A. Perspective of the Citizen-capitalists
As seen above, it is contended that enterprise objectives for U.S.
purposes, encompass the business plan and capital structure that
accommodate the composition of the controlling group of citizen-capitalists.
This is indicated by the average investment objective of the current citizen-
capitalists. If the enterprise objectives are still susceptible to further
fulfillment, the obvious remedy for any discovered shortfalls in long-term
corporate operating performance, or in short-term, share price, performance
lies either in (1) a change in management, (2) a change in business plans,
or (3) a change in the capital structure. This would be without a change in
the composition of the controlling group. A change involving all three
remedies, constituting a "restructuring" of the corporation without a
termination of enterprise objectives, would still accommodate the average
investment objectives of the citizen-capitalists whose "control" of the
corporation would continue.
If enterprise objectives are susceptible to further fulfillment, can the
citizen-capitalists depend on management to apply the obvious
"restructuring" remedy for shortfalls? And what are the remedies to be
applied if the enterprise objectives are found not so susceptible? This latter
condition could also be evidenced by an excess of undeployed cash with
respect to long-term operating performance. It could also be evidenced with
respect to short-term, share-price, performance by an on-going
undervaluation of the corporation's shares in the market. The obvious
remedy for non-susceptibility to further fulfillment of enterprise objectives
lies in termination of the enterprise objectives. This would be accomplished
by "cashing out" the citizen-capitalists and, under principles of
egalitarianism, cashing out the other shareholders at the same price. The
term "cashing out," as used in this article includes the receipt of a cash
equivalent, such as marketable debt instruments. Can the citizen-capitalists
depend on management to apply this obvious remedy of ending the
"control" of the current group of citizen-capitalists in the case of non-
susceptibility of the corporation to further fulfillment of enterprise
objectives?
In a cashing out, the citizen-capitalists are entitled to receive a premium
above the fair market value of their shares. This premium compensates
them for the added value to corporate performances, long-term operating
and short-term share price, that their "stewardship" has brought about. The
premium is also a form of sharing in a special cash recovery derived by the
corporation, thanks to their stewardship, that is, is a form of "bonus."
Again, the question for the citizen-capitalists, as the annual meeting
approaches, is whether management has accurately gauged its opportunities
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advantageously to restructure the corporation or to terminate the enterprise
objectives. Of particular relevance is the case of a coercive proposal by a
counter-entrepreneur confronting management with the need to decide
whether to (a) preserve the corporate structure and enterprise objectives
unchanged, (b) restructure the corporation, or (c) terminate the enterprise
objectives and cash out the citizen-capitalists.
B. Possible Opportunities for the Citizen-capitalists
A coercive proposal for cashing out the citizen-capitalists could come
from the executive officers themselves as counter-entrepreneurs. They could
propose to the board of directors that the corporation "go private" as a
means of terminating enterprise objectives. Alternatively, the executive
officers, as counter-entrepreneurs, may coercively propose a restructuring
of the corporation. One such proposal is replacing some of the citizen-
capitalists' equity with debt while enabling the citizen-capitalists to retain
voting control. This enables some of the surrendered equity to be
transferred to the executive officers and give them an enhanced equity stake
to justify a comparatively low compensation for their services. The purpose
is to enhance corporate performances to benefit the citizen-capitalists.
If the executive officers, with board approval, have not placed a
proposal for terminating the enterprise objectives or restructuring the
corporation on the agenda for the upcoming annual meeting, the citizen-
capitalists want assurance that management has acted correctly and in their
best interest. This assurance is desired if management in fact has deterred
outsiders that have suggested to management that it terminate or restructure
since the last annual meeting. A justification used by management to deter
an outsider is that the outsider is seeking to coercively wrest control from
the citizen-capitalists in a termination. The proposal would be "coercive"
in the sense that a citizen capitalist has no true individual choice. However,
a special threat that the citizen-capitalists face is that the board of directors
might improperly take it upon itself to deter a coercive but beneficial
counter-entrepreneur proposal to terminate or restructure.
C. Possible Justifications for Management Opposition to Tender Offers
A management effort in the U.S. to deter may be in order, which
complicates life for the citizen-capitalists. Temporary undue volatility in the
market place of the corporation's shares may create a low price of the
shares in relation to the "book" value of corporate assets. A counter-
entrepreneur might seek an opportunity to derive a short-term profit from
this volatility by threatening to acquire control of the corporation through
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coercive means. Thus, the counter-entrepreneur will likely have acquired
shares cheaply in order to obtain a threshold ownership from which to make
a proposal. The counter-entrepreneur's coercive proposal typically is as
follows. He would offer to cash out the citizen-capitalists with money that
he, or an entity he controls, has borrowed. He would propose that, once the
cash-out is accomplished, he will cause the corporation to be "busted up"
at a short-term profit to himself. This bust-up would be accomplished by
sale of some or all of the corporation's assets and by application of some,
but not all, of the proceeds to pay off his debt.
The proposed termination of enterprise objectives and cashing out of
the citizen-capitalists is typically coercive in one of the following manners.
One alternative is that the counter-entrepreneur could make an offer calling
for the tender of all shares of the corporation in return for two sets of
prices. The coercive proviso is that later tenderers would receive a less
advantageous set price than earlier ones. Second, the counter-entrepreneur
could make an offer for tender of enough of the shares of the corporation
at a set price to give him a majority. The coercive aspect is that a "back-
end" merger of the corporation with the counter-entrepreneur would follow,
where shareholders who have not tendered may not receive a price as high
as the price contained in the tender offer.
Only management is in a position to thwart a coercive proposal to
terminate enterprise objectives. This is particularly the case if the remedy
employed by the corporation is more effective than the destruction of
corporate assets occasioned by the corporation's payment of "greenmail"
to the counter-entrepreneur so that the corporation might buy back the
counter-entrepreneur's shares at his sought-for premium. Further,
"management", as an entrepreneurial concept, would be ideally suited to
make a judgment whether to support or oppose a termination or
restructuring. Thus, the executive officers are deemed to be expert in
assessing entrepreneurial issues. The board of directors is deemed to be
comprised of "citizens" who are expert in discerning the strengths and
weaknesses of entrepreneurs."'
D. Management's Conflict of Interest
The difficulty in placing reliance on management to make the correct
decision in the face of a counter-entrepreneur proposal, is that the proposal,
even if coercive, may in fact present an opportunity for the citizen-
236. See In Re J.P. Stevens and Co., Inc., Shareholder Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 780 (Del.
Ch. 1988); see also Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858, 893-98 (Del. 1985)(McNeilly,
J., dissenting).
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capitalists. The opportunity should clearly be availed of if the enterprise
objectives are no longer capable of further fulfillment in terms of long-term
operating performance or on-going short-term, share price, performance.
In this case, the citizen-capitalists have an opportunity to be cashed out at
fair market value plus an appropriate control premium.
However, management faces an important conflict of interest when
confronted with such a possible opportunity for the citizen-capitalists.
Courts in the U.S. have taken pains to address the conflict that if the
proposal is implemented, it is likely that the counter-entrepreneur will
unseat management, both the board of directors and the executive
officers.237 The scheme of U.S. corporate governance regulation is not
opposed to this unseating. Executive officers are to be subject to being "de-
selected" by the board at its will and the board is subject to being de-
"drafted" by the shareholders at their will. Threatening to defeat this
scheme, human tendency favors continuation of one's employment in
making the above rather subjective judgments with respect to enterprise
objectives.
Various U.S. court decisions and state laws, mostly over the course of
the 1980's, have established the components of a "business judgment rule"
to protect the interests of the citizen-capitalists, 238 as well as the selectman
and draft processes, in the face of a coercive offer to terminate enterprise
objectives or restructure the corporation.239 This rule protects the citizen-
capitalists by using the Yankee concept of public performance of minutely-
divided ministerial duties. Under the court decisions and laws, the business
judgment rule protects management from answerability to the citizen-
capitalists if the required minutely-divided duties are performed. An
affirmative showing of bad faith is required to overcome the presumption
of validity in the decision that is reached. 240 If the duties are not performed,
an affirmative showing of "entire fairness" 24' to the citizen-capitalists is
required to overcome a presumption of gross negligence .242 A listing of the
principal ministerial duties based on precedent and statutes is found in
237. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Corp., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. Ch. 1985).
238. City Capital Assoc. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988).
239. See In Re J.P. Stevens Co., Inc. Shareholders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, and Smith, 488
A.2d 858, 893-98 (McNeilly, J. dissenting).
240. See In Re J.P. Stevens Co., Inc. Shareholders Litig., 551 A.2d 770; Moran v.
Household, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); City Capital Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, 551 A.2d
787; Robert M. Bass Group v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227 (Del. Clh. 1988).
241. City Capital Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, 551 A.2d. 787; Robert M. Bass Group, 552
A.2d 1227.
242. Smith, 488 A.2d 858; City Capital Assoc. Ltd. Partnership, 551 A.2d. 787.
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Appendix C.
E. Suggested U.S. Change as to Enterprise Objectives
1. Enterprise Objectives
In the pleading documents preceeding an annual meeting, there should
be management discussion and analysis as to any perceived threat by a
counter-entrepreneur that has arisen during the past year. This threat can
either a proposed coercive termination of enterprise objectives or a
proposed coercive restructuring of the corporation. The discussion should
include management's response to the perceived threat, including any
expenditure of corporate assets involved. Disclosure should include
payment of "greenmail" to the counter-entrepreneur or payment of
contingent compensation to experts used in considering how to thwart the
threat. There should be analysis on how management has sought to protect
the interests of the citizen-capitalists.
2. Conclusion as to the U.S.
Yankee concepts of due process as enunciated in de Tocqueville's
Democracy in America provide a useful "lens" to discern the validity of the
U.S. monitoring of management's performance through an annual meeting
of shareholders where the citizen capitalist has a primary role. A criticism
of the U.S. annual meeting process is that it is superfluous. In contrast to
the citizen of a political entity, a citizen capitalist has a means of egress by
selling his shares. However, it can be countered that the annual meeting
opinion provides a second opinion, a form of intra-government competition
to the judgment of the stock market.
Further, the stock market judgment has its well-known limitations. The
U.S. annual meeting, dominated under the law by the citizen motivated by
thrift, lends a stabilizing element. "Financial aristocrats," oversized
investors and counter-entrepreneurs, have a dominant role in the U.S. stock
market. They tend to have a short-term orientation. These aristocrats, on
the one hand, contribute to the marketability of shares and thus protect
against undue share price volatility. On the other hand, their short-term
orientation can contribute to volatility.
Assuming that renewed attention is given in the U.S. to the Yankee
concepts discussed above, this article suggests certain changes. These
changes, summarized in Appendix D, are to assure that there is an optimal
balance in the U.S. between the citizen capitalist, on the one hand, and the
oversized investor and counter-entrepreneur, on the other. The suggested
1999]
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changes fall into three general categories: assurances that the citizen
capitalist has meaningful information bearing on the corporation, assurances
that he has a meaningful governance role, and assurances that there are
outside underpinnings to this corporate governance role.
XI. GERMAN MODEL'S EMPLOYMENT OF DE TOCQUEVILLE
CONCEPTS OF DUE PROCESS
There is an overriding difference in the German model from the U.S.
approach. The German model includes a scheme of protection of
fundamental rights of the German citizen. These rights are enunciated in
Germany's "Basic Law," which is an equivalent of the U.S. Constitution.
2 43
A. Background
The basic law, unlike the U.S. Constitution, provides for "reactive"
fundamental rights of individuals and entities against direct action of
government and also "pro-active" fundamental rights of individuals and
entities2 against indirect, or even the inaction, of government.245 Arguably,
this concept of reactive and proactive rights is broader than rights of
individuals and entities under the U.S. Constitution, including the "due
243. See Juergen Christoph Goedan, The Influence of the West German Constitution on
the Legal System of the Country, 17 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO., 111 (1989). See also Dieter
Lorenz, The Constitutional Supervision of the Administrative Agencies in the Federal
Republic of Germany, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 543 (1979). An important drawback of the basic
law as compared to the U.S. Constitution may be an inadvertently easy amendability. See
Christoph J. Partsch, Constitutions and Revolutions: The Impact of Unification and the
Constitution of the Five New German States on the Amendment of the Constitution of the
Federal Republic of Germany, 21 DENV J. INT'L L. POL'Y 1, 7 (1992).
244. Reflective of the fundamental right of the German nation as an entity to "self-
determination," fundamental rights of non-German citizens are somewhat less than those of
German citizens. See Partsch, supra note 243, at 6-7, 23-26; see also Who is a German?,
THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 5-11, 1997, at 45.
245. Pro-active rights can be enforced in civil lawsuits even though the government is not
a party. See Goedan, supra note 243, at 121-22 (refers to pro-active rights as relating to "an
objective order of value"). See also Lorenz, supra note 243, at 558-59, 562-65. In common
with the U.S. approach, the German model permits states to enact pro-active fundamental
rights that go beyond federal ones. See Partsch, supra note 243, at 11-13. As we shall see,
these pro-active fundamental rights are "private." A German citizen does not have the
fundamental right to enforce the personal rights of others as well as his own, as is arguably
the case in the U.S. with the class action. See Edward J. Eberle, The West German
Administrative Procedure Act: A Study in Administrative Decision Making, DICK. J. INT'L
L., 67, 85-88 (1984).
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process" and "equal protection" clauses.2' A main effort of the German
model is the reconciling of conflicting basic law rights by "national"
entities,247 whether government or private enterprise. The process of
reconciliation has been referred to as "structured interaction." 1 48  The
reconciler of first choice is the legislative branch of the government. The
legislature is expected to be quite detailed in the wording of statutes that
reconcile basic law rights. 249 The judicial branch is not expected to give
broad reasoned elaboration of the intent of the legislature as it is in the
U.S. 5 0 If this were otherwise, the sole promuigator of government rules
that control society would be agencies in the German executive branch. 5'
The German model provides for no "independent" regulatory agencies with
rule-making power like the SEC in the U.S. 52  In the course of
246. See Goedan, supra note 243, at 113-14, 118-19. As a point of contrast with the
U.S., pro-active fundamental rights under the German model include a right to life on the
part of an unborn child. See id. at 115-16. Pro-active fundamental rights, however, do not
include social values or political aims, even though named in the basic law, that are
dependent on economic growth and "the availability of appropriate finances." See id. at 119;
see also Partsch, supra note 243, at 11, 20-23.
247. The German model relies on the concept of "the nation," or "the state," as distinct
from either "government" or "society." See Hans A. Linde, The Constitutional Supervision
ofthe Administrative Agencies in the Federal Republic of Germany, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 601,
605 (1980).
248. See Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan and
the U.S., 102 YALE L. J. 1927, 1941-46 (1993)
249. See Lorenz, supra note 243, at 555-57. See also Linde, supra note 247, at 602-03.
Focus is not to be had to the U.S. practice of reviewing legislative history to determine the
meaning of a statute. Rather, the "general politics" behind the wording of a statute is to be
"inferred." See Lorenz, supra note 243, at 555-56.
250. See Lorenz, supra note 243. On the other hand, the judiciary is expected to assure
that the legislative branch does not violate the basic law. The assurer is the federal
Constitutional Court. See Goedan, supra note 243, at 121-22 and Lorenz, supra note 243,
at 572.
251. See Lorenz, supra note 243, at 543-45. The majority party exercises control of
agencies in the executive branch through "ministries" that the executive agencies are
ultimately answerable to. See Linde, supra note 247, at 603.
252. It is worthwhile to set forth in detail the author's understanding of the sense in which
the German law does not provide for "independent" regulatory agencies in the U.S. sense.
The U.S. independent regulatory agency scheme accords a legislative, judicial and executive
role to an agency, each element approximately equal in importance. The German model
emphasizes the executive to a greater degree than the U.S. approach and de-emphasizes the
legislative and judicial.
As to the legislative, the U.S. approach gives independent regulatory agencies broad
legislative discretion in recognition of the lack of expertise of Congress on a particular
subject. See Eberle, supra note 245, at 71 n. 17 and accompanying text. As to thejudicial,
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implementing legislation that affects fundamental rights, the executive
branch, in accordance with a "leadership principle," is expected to adhere
scrupulously to the wording of the legislature used in its balancing of
fundamental rights.
25 3
If it is believed that an executive branch agency has incorrectly
implemented legislative intent regarding the reconciling of fundamental
rights, the resort is to the German administrative courts. 2 4 These courts
need give little, if any, deference to executive branch agencies'
interpretation of legislative intent in balancing fundamental rights.255 To
assure a correct balancing of fundamental rights even if government is not
actively involved, the German model relies on "institutions" to provide
guidance to various entities in German commercial life. 256 The institutions
are referred to as "institutions of public law" if the guidance is given to
executive branch agencies. These institutions are created by legislation, but
do not fall under any German ministry and therefore, are not part of the
scheme of executive agencies. They are, in fact, socially-trusted in service
of the nation to provide a counterbalance to executive branch government
agencies.257
the U.S. approach, as seen earlier in this article, is to employ judicial-form procedures both
for "rule-making" or legislative writs and for "adjudications" or executive writs. The
German model prohibits employment of judicial-form procedures as a matter of a routine
that does not examine whether or not private fundamental rights are at issue, unless such a
procedure is specifically authorized by statute as a signal that "general societal interests,"
that is a fundamental right of the nation, are involved. See id. at 74-75.
As to the executive, the U.S. approach is for the legislature to approve senior
management of an independent regulatory agency. In contrast, the German model is to give
the Ieklan ire no roi in the selection of -ercnn-l hol-ii the level Of Chancllor in the
executive branch of the government. This is because selection is regarded as the province
of the majority party. Thus, control of personnel is achieved not through consent of the
legislature as a whole but through criticism of the minority party in the legislature. See
Linde, supra note 247, at 602-03.
253. See Lorenz, supra note 243, at 545, 548-49, 553-56, 562. See also Linde, supra
note 247, at 604-05 and Eberle, supra note 245, at 72-73. The federal legislature has a right
of veto over implementation of regulations that it determines not to conform to legislative
enactments. See Lorenz, supra note 243, at 563-64.
254. A fundamental right is to have access to the courts, including the administrative
courts. See Eberle, supra note 245, at 77.
255. See Lorenz, supra note 243, at 573-76. For the procedures involved in judicial
review of decisions of executive branch agencies, see Eberle, supra note 245, at 102-06.
Significantly, executive branch administrative agencies have no fundamental rights under
the basic law. See id. at 90.
256. See Lorenz, supra note 243, at 545.
257. See id. at 550-52, 564-65, 567-70; see also Linde, supra note 247, at 602-03.
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When the guidance is given to private or quasi-private entities, such as
publicly-traded stock corporations, the institutions are referred to as
"institutions of private law." These institutions are created by
legislation.258 To become such an institution, an entity must fall within an
area of public need and agree to observe an internal code of conduct
pursuant to an "honor code" principle.25 9 If the entity fails and cannot
Examples of institutions of public law are the German Federal Bank, Goedan, supra note
243, at 602-03, the opposition party, id. at 565-66, the "Petitions Committee" of the federal
legislature, id. at 567, the "Military Commissioner" of that legislature, id. at 567-68, and
the Auditor's Office. Id. at 569-70. For institutions of public law relevant to stock
corporations and to the stock markets, see Ursula C. Pfeil, Finanz-Deutschland: Germany
Enacts Insider Trading Legislation, 11 AM. U. J. OFINT'LL. &POL'Y, 137, 172 (1996). For
a critique of institutions of public law as possible thwarters of decision-making, see Partsch,
supra note 243, 26-27.
258. An example of an institution of private law is the universal bank. See DROSTE, ET
AL., BUSINESS LAW GUIDE To GERMANY, 206-07, 213-14 (3d ed. 1991), and Roe, supra
note 248, at 1971, 1984-85. For an extreme application of the concept of "institutions of
private law," see A German Eye on Scientology, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 1-7, 1997, at 50
(referring to "constitutional protection agencies").
259. The honor code principle is reflected in the employment by even criminal statutes
of subjective adjectives characterizing a proscribed standard of conduct. One example is
"orderly." See Martin Peltzer, The Criminal Responsibility and the Personal Liability of the
Director in the Bankruptcy of His Company - Germany, 9 INT'L Bus. LAW. 3. Another
example is " true." See text accompanying note 555. Others are "conscientious" and
"impartial." See infra text accompanying note 560.
The honor code principle as applied to various situations by an institution of private
law may or may not be determined by internal codes of conduct drawn up by the institution.
Internal codes of conduct are regarded as particularly important in the case of executive
agencies of the German government. See Eberle, supra note 245, at 73 n.25 and
accompanying text. At least for such agencies, the honor code principle, as implemented by
internal codes of conduct, is the subject of a separate branch of law described as the
"organizational law of executive agencies." Id.
The underlying philosophy of the "honor code" principle was once revealed by an
author of a voluntary code against insider trading. This was extant until 1994, at which
point the voluntary code was supplanted by an insider trading law making insider trading a
crime. The author of the voluntary code was justifying the lack of sanctions under that code.
He said that the code would be "recognized voluntarily and approved by the professional
community" (emphasis added). He said that regulation by a "distant state authority cannot
be as effective as a rule by which the behavior of the affected individual is observed by
professional colleagues." He said that, moreover, "it is practicably not possible to supervise
carefully individuals for all violations (of regulations)." See Blum, supra note 5, at 517.
Contrasted with the German honor code principle, is what a German commentator
describes as the U.S. approach. The commentator described this approach, in the context
of product liability of directors of a corporation, as "catering for the latest standards of
technology and security margins" (emphasis added). Dieter Schwanke, A Broker's Point of
View of Directors and Officers Insurance, 9 INT'L Bus. LAW. 13 (1981). Also descriptive
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demonstrate that it fulfilled the quality of performance that it volunteered
to supply, it is subject to liability. 260 As an inducement to become an
institution of private law, a volunteering entity is given tax incentives and
permitted to hold itself out as an institution of private law to attract
proprietary business.16' Institutions of private law are socially trusted to
provide a counterbalance to purely private business entities.262
One of the fundamental rights under the basic law is the right of
individuals and entities to choose their professions. This is to the extent
feasible to receive a continuing cash flow from their current employments
or businesses. 263 For this reason, rights of contract, and rights to
of the honor code principle is a quoted statement of the head of an institute of public law that
had studied medium-sized companies which are in a sense, institutions of private law insofar
as stock corporations, under the German model. As to why, under that model, management
is not comfortable taking risks, he stated that "it's a question of honor. If you go bankrupt,
you are out forever." Small Beginnings, THE EcONOMIST, Nov. 23-29, 1996, at 14.
This statement, and the existence of an honor code principle, is borne out by the
rather ruthless way in which bankrupt entities, including stock corporations, can be said to
be treated under the German model as compared with the U.S. See Axel Flessner, German
Report, 5 CONN. J. OF INT'L LAW 121, 123, 137-38 (1989).
260. See Peltzer, supra note 259, at 33, 35.
261. An example of an institution of private law that is given inducements in return for
its obedience to the "nation" as such an institution, is the universal bank. See Friedrich K.
Kubler, Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: as a German Dilemma, 57 BROOK.
L. REv. 97, 108 (1991); for discussion of the role of such a bank, see Roe, supra note 248,
at 1971.
Another example, is the "accredited investment company" as a structure for the
management of investment funds. The advantages of being at accredited investment
company are that, unlike other collective investment vehicles, it will be permitted to use the
word "investment" in its name and will be given significant tax advantages including pass-
through tax treatment in respect of interest and dividends. The German model does not
prohibit other collective investment vehicles, but they cannot use the word "investment" to
describe their activities and are not given these tax advantages. In return for these
proprietary incentives, the accredited investment company must undertake to do such things
such as maintain assets for the benefit of unitholders in a trust account with a bank, limit its
investments to securities and real estate, diversify its portfolio, and comply with various
disclosure requirements. Failure as to this last is a basis for civil liability if the failure
cannot be justified on the basis of reasonable exercise of care. See Hans-Michael Kraus,
Securities Regulation in Germany? Investors' Remedies for Misleading Statements by
Issuers, 18 INT'L BUS. LAW. 109, 113-16 (1984).
262. See Roe, supra note 248, at 1971, 1984-85.
263. See Goedan, supra note 243, at 119, 120-22; see also Lorenz, supra note 243, at
562. Buttressing the right to receive a cash flow from a business is the right to form an
association or coalition for that purpose. See id.
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confidentiality are paramount. The latter encompass an individual's
compensation and a business entity's trade secrets and other businessplans. 264
Another of the relevant basic rights is that of individuals and entities to
own property which includes the rights relative to receipt of dividends. 
26
Arguably, the right of shareholders of a corporation to "own" their shares
includes rights to information that are as strong as those that exist in the
U.S. 2" However, the German model applies the rights of privity of
contract and business confidentiality as conflicting basic rights. The result
is that disclosure is largely limited only to that which is required by privity
of contract and various "fundamental rights"of government. One such right
is the right to an internationally-respected stock market.267 Other relevant
fundamental rights include (1) the right of the individual and entity to
"equal and fair treatment" from executive branch administrative agencies,268
(2) the right of the press to investigate and publish,2 69 (3) the right to
associate with others, 27° and (4) the right of labor and management to
bargain collectively on an "autonomous" basis. 71
264. See LAW OFSTOCKCORPORATIONS, COMMERCIAL LAWS OFTHE WORLD-GERMANY
§§ 93, 116, 117, 131 (Foreign Tax Law Publishers ed., revised October 1995). A possible
source of diminution to the right of privacy in the case of compensation and business plans
is the countervailing right of the German citizen to inspect documents and records in so far
as necessary to protect his own fundamental rights. See Eberle, supra note 245, at 79.
265. See Christian J. Meier-Schatz, Disclosure Rules in the U.S., Germany and
Switzerland, 34 AM. J. COMp. LAW 271, 289 n. 111 and accompanying text (1986). See also
Walter Kolvenbach, Co-determination in Germany History and Practical Experience, 9
INT'L Bus. LAW. 163, 166 (1981).
266. In addition to the fundamental right to own property, the shareholders have the
fundamental right to "inspect" books and records of the corporation insofar as appropriate
to protect that right. See Eberle, supra note 245, at 79.
267. See Pfeil, supra note 257, at 262. Other fundamental rights of the "German nation"
are (1) "self-determination," see Partsch, supra note 243, at 6-7, 9; (2) observation of
"social norms," see Eberle, supra note 245, at 94; and (3) one individual not causing
damage to another "in a manner contrary to public morals" or through lack of "good faith,"
see Goedan, supra note 243, at 113-14.
268. See Eberle, supra note 245, at 73 n.24.
269. A particularly important fundamental right under the basic law is freedom of speech.
The emphasis is on "public discussion of questions of social importance." See Goedan,
supra note 243, at 114. To protect this right to publish, the press has a fundamental right
to "inspect" records and documents. See Eberle, supra note 245, at 79; see also Goedan,
supra note 243, at 119, 118-22;, and Lorenz, supra note 243, at 558-59, 561-62.
270. See Goedan, supra note 243, at 119, 118-22, and Lorenz, supra note 243, at
558-59, 561-62.
271. See Kolvenbach, supra note 265, at 166.
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B. The Goals
1. Encouraging the Exercise of Thrift and the Use of Education
As argued above, a de Tocqueville concept is the promotion of sober
virtues in a citizenry, such as the affirmative exercise of thrift, to assure
that savings are available.272 One illustration is the requirement that there
be detailed disclosure of corporate performance to the citizen capitalist in
connection with corporate governance by a widely-traded corporation. This
is so he can be induced to investigate and use his intelligence in the course
of implementing his own self-invented investment objectives.273 We have
seen that another de Tocqueville concept is that every citizen is presumed
to have had a basic formal education and a thorough practical grounding.
He is presumed to be a man-of-the-world. He is considered capable of
fulfilling magisterial responsibilities, that is responsibilities along the lines
of a "justice of the peace. "274 An application of this concept to corporate
governance in the U.S. is regulatory insistence on thorough disclosure, even
on the most technical of subjects. Similiar to a justice of the peace, a U.S.
citizen capitalist has the right to demand "additional information" from a
corporation, that is, the corporation's rather technical document filed with
the SEC for regulatory purposes.275 In contrast, the German model places
little emphasis on creative thrift on the part of any citizen capitalist investor
in a widely-traded corporation.276 Reflecting a balancing of property
ownership rights against rights to engage in a profession, a thrust of the
German model is to foster acceptance of governmental and institutional
272. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
273. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
274. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
275. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
276. See Kubler, supra note 261, at 100. This lack of emphasis is evidenced by (1) the
small number of German companies whose stock is widely distributed, id. at 101 and Blum,
supra note 5, at 509; (2) the decision to tax transfers of stock ownership, see Roe, supra
note 248, at 1971; (3) a government-countenanced high level of brokerage commissions, see
Pfeil, supra note 257, at 184-93 and Blum, supra note 5, at 509; (4) a government-
countenanced need to pay more to brokers, usually universal banks, to obtain stock
certificates, see Baums, supra note 5, at 506; (5) government-countenancing of brokers
charging fees for securities custodial services, see id. at 507 and see Pfeil, supra note 257,
at 184-93; (6) the decision to require tax-withholding on dividend payments, see Blum,
supra note 5, at 509; (7) national stock exchange policies that favor oversized investors, see
Pfeil, supra note 257, at 184-93; and (8) government countenancing of high stock prices via
the device of requiring high par values, see id. at 184-88.
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measures to assure that savings are available to citizens.2 77 Also reflecting
a similar counterbalancing, the German model's approach to thrift is that
there must be privity of contract for a shareholder to be entitled information
above and beyond the level of what an average prudent shareholder would
find material. This is particularly true if a corporation's right to
confidentiality is involved.278
Another point of contrast is that, notwithstanding a vaunted educational
system, the German model does not regard the citizen shareholder as a
knowledgeable entrepreneur.2 79 Stock market issues, including corporate
governance, are from the standpoint of purely the "public weal," not a
277. As to governmental measures, the German model does not encourage U.S.-type
private employment-based pension plans in which the risk borne by the employee relates to
the performance of investments. Rather, it encourages pension commitments given by
employers to employees in which case the risk borne by the employee relates to the
performance of his company. See Kubler, supra note 261, 100-01.
As to institutional measures to assure that savings are available to citizens, an
individual citizen, as a general rule, needs to contact a universal bank, an institution of
private law, as a broker in order to purchase shares of a stock corporation. See Bodo
Haggeney, Private Agreementsfor Takeovers of Public Companies: West Germany, 12 INT'L
Bus. LAW. 211 (1984). Shares are for the most part issued by stock corporations in bearer
form. See DROSTE ET AL., supra note 258, at 223. Therefore, for safety and avoidance-of-
transfer-tax purposes, it makes sense for an individual citizen to leave the shares in the
custody of the broker, that is, the universal bank. See Roe, supra note 248, at 1971.
Additionally, as to corporate governance in the course of this custodianship, governmentally
encouraged is the assumption of an active role on the part of the universal bank and a
passive one on the part of the shareowner. Thus the shareowner must give his universal bank
special instructions if the recommendation of the universal bank, as to voting of shares, is
not to be followed. See Baums, supra note 5, at 506; see also infra Part XI.
278. See Blum, supra note 5, at 514. Thus, unlike the case in the U.S., there is as a lack
of provision for updating of information for purposes of trading in the "secondary market,"
that is, the market in which transactions are not in essence between an issuer and an investor
as is the case in the "primary" market, but rather, between investors. See Baums, supra note
5, at 515.
One commentator espouses a theory that disclosure under the German model has a
primary purpose of controlling the behavior of the corporation in the interest of the nation,
creditors and targets of fraudulent activity in particular, and only a secondary purpose of
informing the individual citizen investor. Therefore, once the price of a share of stock has
been set rationally and creditors placated, there is no need to make further information
readily available to the individual shareholder. See Meier-Schatz, supra note 265, at 282-83,
287, 290-91. This is particularly the case if the corporation has an interest in not having the
information disclosed to the markets. Id.; see LAW OF STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note
264, at §§ 93, 116, 117.
279. For expressions of this attitude, see Meier-Schatz, supra note 265, at 293-94 and
Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, Corporate Governance and Commercial
Banking: A Comparative Examination of Germany, Japan and the United States, 48 STAN.
L. REV. 73, 89 (1995).
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proper subject for "laymen," that is, the ordinary citizen. Rather they are
only a subject for "professionals."280 An example of such professionals is
the universal banks as institutions of private law.28' In short, the German
model assumes that the most educated layman is incapable of
comprehending full disclosure of corporate performance issues.282
Therefore in the interest of protecting the public weal, he is not provided
with full information about corporate performance. The theory is that
corporate performance issues, unless of obvious significance, cannot be
adequately expressed in a way that is understandable to even the educated
layman.283 The citizen, that is, layman, shareowner holding shares through
universal banks is, in fact, encouraged to adopt an attitude of "rational
apathy. -28
2. Encouraging the Citizen as Master
This article has argued that a de Tocqueville concept promoted in U.S.
corporate governance, is that of the substantially unconstrained drive of the
citizen in pursuing ends "that concern him alone" 285 Further this article
argued that application of this concept is seen in the recognition of a citizen-
as-master trinity in the case of a widely-traded issuer that is a corporation.
This U.S. trinity consists of (1) the executive officers as the equivalent of
entrepreneurs for a start-up corporation, (2) the "citizen capitalist"
shareholders as the equivalent of venture capitalists for a start-up
corporation and (3) the board of directors elected by the citizen capitalist as
the equivalent of the initial board of directors selected by venture
capitalists. The executive officers and board of directors comprise
"management" of U.S. corporations for various purposes, including day-to-
day operation of the corporation and the logistics of holding annual
meetings of shareholders. We have seen how the U.S. citizen capitalist has
a variety of opportunities for input into the citizen-as-master trinity. These
include (1) the ability to submit shareholder proposals that are cleared for
inclusion in management pleading documents for the annual meeting
280. See Blum, supra note 5, at 513.
281. See Roe, supra note 248, at 1971.
282. This viewpoint is, indeed, arguably borne out by the German experience with public
participation in the stock market in the mid-1960s. See Blum, supra note 5 and
accompanying text.
283. See Meier-Schatz, supra note 265, at 293-94 and Macey, supra note 279, at 89.
284. See Roe, supra note 248, at 1942.
285. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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through management and (2) the ability to institute election contests at his
own expense. We have seen how the scope of the relatively unfettered
discretion of this trinity, including the citizen-capitalists, encompasses,
among other subjects, the choice of the "home state" law that will govern
the operation of the corporation.286 In contrast, the approach of the German
model, for a corporation as a widely traded issuer, can be characterized as
a one of "nation as a master" rather than citizen as a master. 287 This
approach, consisting of a balancing of fundamental rights referred to as "co-
determination," involves an interplay of "citizens-as a-master" and
institutions of private law that are present within the corporate structure.
Thus, using the U.S. trinity as a model, the "entrepreneurs" under the
German model are the executive officers. In a special balancing of
fundamental rights, special and specific legislative requirements will have
placed constraints on the entrepreneurs as a founders of a stock corporation
in a start-up phase. This will assure that the corporation will not be
declared bankrupt in the foreseeable future.2 8 These anti-bankruptcy
constraints continue once the corporation becomes widely-traded as a stock
corporation. At this point, the constraints take the form of guidance, mostly
from various institutions of private law.2 9
As for the "citizen-capitalists" (using U.S. words), this second part of
the trinity under the German model will have also been a "venture"capitalist
of sorts. As such for a "start-up" corporation, he will have been subject to
anti-bankruptcy constraints. A "discipline" will have been that he is
effectively tied to the corporation by inability to sell his shares. 29o Once
286. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
287. With respect to the concept of "nation," see supra note 247 and accompanying text.
288. See LAW OF STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note 264, at § 36 (provision for
application to court in the corporation's home state for registration of corporation in the
"Commercial Register"), § 32 (report to court with which corporation registered as to the
circumstances of the founding), § 33 (provision for appointment of "founding auditors" by
court), § 46 (description of responsibilities of "founders"), § 48 (requisite standard of care
in the founding), § 50 (provision for corporate removal of claims against founders). See also
Kubler, supra note 261, at 98.
289. See infra Part XI.H.
290. Special personal disclosure obligations are placed on the German model
entrepreneur/venture capitalist ("founder") if an attempt is made to "trade" shares of the
corporation during the first two years after its registration with a court. See LAW OF STOCK
CORPORATIONS, supra note 264, at § 47. This is the case even though shares of the
corporation may have commenced trading within these first two years, by means of a public
offering.
Even though the public offering is without disclosure at least in the U.S. sense, such
commencement of trading is permitted under the German model so long as the trading is
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this "venture capitalist" (now a citizen capitalist of sorts) becomes a
shareholder of a stock corporation, he must pay a price for the raising of the
constraints on his ability to sell his shares. This "price" is that his role in
corporate governance is constrained in a number of ways if he does not
choose to become subservient to the will of a particular institution of private
law, the universal bank.
29'
The board of director for a "start-up" corporation will, under the
German model, have been subject to legislative requirements of
answerability to assure against eventual bankruptcy of the corporation.2 2
Once the entity becomes a publicly-traded stock corporation, additional
constraints in the form of requisite guidances from institutions of private
law, are placed on the German equivalent of the U.S. board of directors
called the "supervisory board."293 As for the "citizen master" trinity's scope
of discretion, the trinity, reflecting the anti-bankruptcy thrust of the German
model, has no choice of law discretion as a to "home state" law or other
law, such as a law pertaining to trading of shares.29
3. Encouraging Exercise of Political Ambition
We have seen that a de Tocqueville concept is that of the exercise of
modest "political" ambition, at a township meeting, by any educated citizen
who has achieved a modest level of eminence in the community. This article
argues that this concept is reflected in the U.S. encouragement to a
shareholder of very modest standing but less modest ambition who desires
that a proposal on his part, even if opposed by management, be included in
management's pleading document for the annual meeting. This
encouragement applies to proposals that have a heavy social policy content
other than that of a corporation whose shares are listed for trading on a national stock
exchange, that is, so long as the shares are traded pursuant to trading privileges for unlisted
shares on such an exchange or are traded in the over-the-counter market. It is only when the
corporation seeks to be listed on a national stock exchange in advance of public trading that
registration, and a prospectus, in the U.S. sense, are required by law. See Blum, supra note
5, at 511-12.
291. See infra Part XI.C.1.
292. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
293. See infra Part XII.H.
294. See infra Part XII.B.
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so long as various legal requirements are satisfied. 295 The concept is also
reflected in the favored status of a citizen capitalist in the institution of an
election contest through his own pleading document.
296
The German model does not favor exercise of unfettered political
ambition by the citizen shareholder. Consistent with the model's preference
for institutions, the citizen shareholder can make shareholder proposals or
institute election contests only if he is in the tax-disadvantageous position
of being in privity of contract with the corporation.2" On the other hand,
the universal bank, as an institution of private law, is expected to be
sensitive to the "social" demands of the concept of socially-obligated
property before it exercises "political ambition."298
4. Constraining the "Financial Aristocrat"
A de Tocqueville concept is avoidance of a landed aristocracy because
such an aristocracy is inherently unproductive. This article urges that an
analogous concept of "financial aristocracy" is present in the U.S.
regulation of corporate governance. A financial aristocrat is generally any
shareholder whose holdings in a corporation are too great for exercise of
voting rights to fit within the ambit of household management. Financial
aristocrats, in short, are either "oversized shareholders" or "counter-
entrepreneurs." We have seen that one of the problems with oversized
investors is that, for reasons of saving costs, they tend to abdicate with
respect to their right to vote . To overcome this tendency, U.S. law requires
that oversized shareholders that are regulated entities, in fact not abdicate. 29
In contrast, rather than seek to control the influence of the "financial
aristocrat," the German model enhances the power of such an aristocrat if
he undertakes to assume a role of institution of private law. If any oversized
investor indicates its willingness to submit himself to guidance from
government and institutions of public law and thus become an institution of
private law, the German model provides its rewards.3°°
We also have seen that the U.S. system requires disclosure to citizen-
capitalists of acquisitions of stock of any size, by oversized investors that
qualify as "institutional investors." This requirement counterbalances a
295. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 163-164 and accompanying text.
297. See infra Part XII.E.
298. See infra Part XII.A.
299. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
300. See infra Part XII.C.
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typical oversized investor preference towards observing the "Wall Street
Rule" of "delegating" to management. Additionally, this is in order to alert
citizen-capitalists of the probable presence of the "regulated entity" attitude
in the overall electorate. 301 In contrast, under the German model, the
universal banks, consistent with the principle of confidentiality, need not
disclose the full extent of its control of stock voting rights.
Further, this article demonstrates that U.S. law makes a special effort
to overcome any tendency of an oversized shareholder managed by a
regulated entity to react to business pressure from management of the
corporation in which the oversized investor holds shares. One measure is
by public disclosure of an attempt by management to place business
pressure on the regulated entity. This disclosure must be made by the
management of the corporation. Another effort is a wall of separation,
involving observance of divided ministerial duties within a commercial
bank, of which the regulated entity is part, to deter business pressure of this
nature. 303
We shall see that, in contrast, the German model addresses the problem
of reaction to business pressure only if a fundamental right is affected. For
this purpose, the model recognizes that the fundamental right of pursuing
an occupation exists in the case of an investment fund that the universal
fund manages for the benefit of shareholders. To protect such a right, the
German model does not resort to publicity or divided ministerial duties.
Rather it resorts to an "honor code" requirement.3 4
Moreover, to counterbalance any tendency to be overly "pro-active" of
an oversized shareholder with his non-entrepreneurial mind set, there are
U.S. rules requiring special disclosures. These disclosures alert citizen-
capitalists that there exists a threat to the prevalence of an entrepreneurial
mind set.3 °5 In contrast, the German model gives the universal bank
301. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
302. Until 1994, notification to a corporation and publication in the Federal Gazette, was
required once a shareholder acquired voting power in excess of twenty-five percent of total
voting power. See LAW OF STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note 264, at § 20. By virtue of
legislation in 1994, that percent was reduced to five percent, a threshold similar to that in
the U.S. See Pfeil, supra note 257, at 154. However, not counted in determining whether
or not this threshold is exceeded, are shares held by a universal bank in a custodial capacity.
This is the case even if the bank has been given full voting discretion by the beneficial
owner of the shares. See Macey, supra note 279, at 890-91 and Baums, supra note 5, at
507-08.
303. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
304. See infra Part XII.C.
305. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
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shareholder a somewhat entrepreneurial mind set. This is consistent with
the principle of giving financial encouragement to institutions of private
law.
306
Finally, to overcome any tendency of a financial aristocrat who is a
counter-entrepreneur to use voting power over a substantial block of share
for short-term purposes, the U.S. employs publicity for acquisition of a
block of as little as five percent of voting power. This is to alert the
citizen-capitalists. 3°7 The U.S. also requires the performance of divided
ministerial duties in the making of public tender offers to purchase stock.
This is to assure fairness in the methodology, whereby the counter-
entrepreneur has acquired his shares.30 8 In addition, the U.S. home state of
the corporation may, among other measures, impose a special fiduciary
duty on the acquirer, to other shareholders in his exercise of his new voting
power. 9
In contrast, consistent with the principle of confidentiality, the German
model until recently has not required public disclosure of an acquisition of
a relatively small block.310 In making of public tender offers, guidance from
an institution of public law would counsel counter-entrepreneurs. The
German model protects the fundamental ownership rights of shareholders
against fraud on the part of the would-be counter-entrepreneur in attempting
to become in "privity of contract" with the shareholders approached.3"
Additionally, the German model imposes no fiduciary duty to other
shareholders that is enforceable in court merely by virtue of owning of
shares in a proprietary capacity over a certain amount. Rather, consistent
with the "honor code" principle, the owner of the block must have
voluntarily taken on fiduciary accountability for a fiduciary duty to occur.312
306. See Part XII.C.
307. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
308. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1994); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 Rule 14d, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d (1998).
309. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
310. Until 1994, the threshold size of a block requiring public disclosure was twenty-five
percent. See supra note 302 and accompanying text.
311. See Haggeney, supra note 277, at 213-14; see infra Part XII.1.
312. For instance, by placing as a representative on the supervisory board. See LAW OF
STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note 264, §§ 117, 93.
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C. Devices
1. The Draft
We have seen that the de Tocqueville concept of the "draft" is that the
public electorate can draft into public service any citizen. This is out of a
largest possible universe regardless of formal education or other attainments
of the draftee beyond being a man-of-the-world. Technically he need not
consent to being drafted. He must serve until the electorate relieves him of
his duties but he is to serve no longer. However, as a restraint on the
electorate, the draftee cannot be forced to work for free.313
This article has argued that the selection of a director of a U.S.
corporation is, in effect, a draft by the shareholders of a management-
proposed nominee. Thus the executive officers are in as a sense, graded on
their ability to suggest nominees out of a widest possible universe for
consideration by the board of directors. There is no governmental
requirement of education or other attainment impeding the proposal process.
There is no requirement of nationality or disclosure of nationality. Any
special understanding relating to a nominee's willingness to serve a director
must be disclosed to the electorate. Since the director is technically not a
volunteer, the assessment of the draftee's performance while a director is
not too rigorous.
We shall see that the German model represents as a contrast. Here, the
"draft", with its emphasis on disclosure to the electorate and its de-
emphasis on pre-screening, is not a concept to be adhered to in the election
of capital members of the supervisory board.3"5 Rather there is little, if any,
disclosure to the shareholders in the course of the drafting process.316 There
is pre-screening to -sqtiqfv both statitor criteria nnd to assur that the
nominees are acceptable to institutions of private law.3t7 The selection is
313. See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 4, at 66. See supra text accompanying note 108.
314. See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 4, at 66. See supra text accompanying note 110.
315. See infra Part XII.E. 1.
316. See infra Part XII.E.1.
317. Supervisory board members are typically executive officers or directors of universal
bank shareholders. See Kubler, supra note 261, at 103; Robert E. Benfield, Note, Curing
American Managerial Myopia. Can the German System of Corporate Governance Help?,
17 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. J. 615, notes 88, 89 and accompanying text; Baums, supra
note 5, at 510.
Also serving in a typical instance is the "independent" professional supervisory
board member that has an "informal relationship" with a particular universal bank and is
elected "again and again" with the votes of that bank. See Baums, supra note 5, at 509-10.
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not out of as a wide a universe as possible. This is because of the
additional reason that relevant institutions of private law are in a position
to dictate who at least the majority of nominees will be by virtue of their
insider positions on the supervisory board and as a creditor.3"' The
objective of the selection is not to find the "undiscovered" citizen capitalist,
but to find individuals who will volunteer to follow the leadership and
honor code principles319 justifying their membership on an institution of
private law.320
2. The Selectman
A de Tocqueville concept is that a certain kind of elected officials called
"selectmen" are given unfettered discretion by an electorate to hire and fire
government officials, as well as determine their compensation. The officials
selected in de Tocqueville's day included grand jurors who made major
township decisions. This article has argued that the board of directors of a
U.S. corporation constitutes a body of selectmen solely for the purpose of
hiring, firing and compensating the corporation's executive officers. All
functions performed by the board are subordinate to this selectman role. For
instance, the board of directors would not itself define the long-term
enterprise objectives of the corporation. Instead, the executive officers'
perception of these objectives would be disclosed to the board. If the board
On the other hand,, the supervisory board, comprised as well of representatives of labor has,
as a whole, members "coming from different walks of life." See Peltzer, supra note 259,
at 34.
318. See Baums, supra note 5, at 514.
319. In one sense, leadership is provided by statutory elaboration of the principle of co-
determination as between not-so-conflicting fundamental rights only of fixed claimants -
employee wage-earners and universal bank creditors. See Macey, supra note 279, at 196.
320. In a sense, the honor code is derived from a "network of mutual monitoring" among
stock corporations and universal banks, to assure that "there are no obvious violations of the
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty." See Kubler, supra note 261, at 109-10. An honor code
aspect is that selection of the managerial board is "the most important task of the
supervisory board," with termination to be only "for cause" since the latter involves a
"matter of honor" and can give the corporation a bad reputation if it occurs. See Baums,
supra note 5, at 514-15 and LAW OF STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note 264, at § 84.
To assure "honorable" conduct, members of the supervisory board of a stock
corporation even though they are also executives or supervisory board members of a
shareholder universal bank are to act independently and are not bound to follow instructions
from that shareholder bank. See Baums, supra note 5, at 514-15. To assure freshness, a
member of the supervisory board is prohibited from serving on more than ten supervisory
boards at one time. See Baums, supra note 5, at 510 and LAW OF STOCK CORPORATIONS,
supra note 264, at § 100.
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does not approve, a course of action is for the board to fire the executive
officers and replace them with new executive officers. Because of this
ability to act precipitously, this article regards the U.S. board of directors
as a part of "management." 32
In contrast under the German model, the supervisory board does not
have a selectman role in the precipitous U.S. sense.322 On the other hand,
reflecting reliance on institutions of private law, Germany gives the
supervisory board, as such an institution, formal authority to make policy
decisions. 323 This is an authority which, this article contends, the U.S.
board of directors does not have if it has appointed executive officers to
operate the company.
3. The Wage
As we have seen, the wage is a de Tocqueville-discerned element of a
government official's compensation. This element is to be determined and
paid only on a piece-work basis after services have been performed, that is,
after a particular period of employment has ended.324 This article has argued
that U.S. corporate executive officers are paid such a "wage" rather than
a salary, at least as a part of their compensation. U.S. corporate governance
rules reflect this concept. They require detailed disclosure to citizen-
capitalists that serves to justify compensation as if the compensation were
a "wage." This disclosure includes analysis of any corporate performance
"add-on" attributable to the efforts of the chief executive officer. This
article urges that as an element of wage, profits to an executive officer
derived from materialization of contingencies in the past year should be
disclosed as well. This would require disclosure of a justification of the
profit accorded to the executive officer. This justification would be in terms
321. See supra Part IV.A.
322. Termination can only be for cause. See LAW OF STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note
264, at § 84 and Kubler, supra note 261, at 504. Regarding termination of employment on
"restructuring of the corporation," as the phrase is used in this article. See Flessner, supra
note 259, at 134-37, 140. Regarding termination of employment on "termination of
enterprise objectives," also a phrase used in this article, see id. at 141-47.
323. Authority to initiate policy decisions is limited to crisis situations such as a
impending insolvency. However, the supervisory board does have on-going authority to
screen and, if called for, veto management plans. See Macey, supra note 279, at 87-88.
According to a commentator, it is the "veto" that creates the most potential for supervisory
board member liability. See Peltzer, supra note 259, at 33.
324. See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 4, at 66. See supra text accompanying note 101.
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of not-yet-compensated-for value added to the corporation, achieved
through the performance of his duties. 5
Under the German model, the compensation to be paid an executive
officer, that is, a member of the managerial board, is, to a large extent,
promised in advance by contract. Therefore, it can be better characterized
as a salary. "Honor" is relied on to assure that the executive, confident in




The de Tocqueville concept that government officials be permitted to
share in special cash recoveries that they have brought about for the benefit
of the government, is used to define the U.S. concept of the "bonus" as a
special form of compensation to executive officers. The bonus has its roots
in this de Tocqueville concept. Payment of a bonus to an executive officer
is proper in the U.S. so long as it is disclosed to the citizen-capitalists, that
is, to the capital markets given the U.S. approach to "transparency." The
bonus is on the basis of interim enterprise objectives being met and interim
cash flow objectives being exceeded. The bonus can be either a cash bonus
or a bonus that materializes from events following the award of a stock
option, or the equivalent, to the executive officer.
3 27
In contrast, we shall see that the German model does not favor cash
bonuses to members of the managerial board. For purpose of the German
model, a bonus is a payment that serves no important governmental interest
beyond a slight degree of entreprenurialism. It raises questions of
interference with the fundamental rights of others, such as rights to own
property328 The situation may be different for profits derived in the future
325. See supra text accompanying note 134.
326. See LAW OF STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note 264, at § 87; Kubler, supra note 261,
at 109-10; and, see generally, Flessner, supra note 259.
327. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 4, at 66. See supra text accompanying note 114.
328. See Kubler, supra note 261, at 109-10. The reason for a lack of bonuses can be
stated as follows. All payments of compensation to members of the managerial board must
have approval of the supervisory board. See LAW OF STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note 264,
at § 87(1). The supervisory board represents, in a sense, two classes of capital, equity
capital or shareholders and "pension" capital or employees, including members of the
managerial board. See Kubler, supra note 261, at 107-08. For the managerial board to
recommend to the supervisory board that one of its members receive a bonus detracts from
both forms of capital. Even if the shareholder component is sympathetic to the idea of
rewarding the entrepreneurial spirit, the labor component is likely not to be. After all, there
is the German tradition of encouraging workers to suppress short-term demands in exchange
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from the granting of stock options to executive officers.32 9 Traditionally,
stock ownership has been regarded as a an important perquisite of German
executives in pursuing their professions. That is, it is a means of
compensating them for their expertise in a manner that does not interfere
with the fundamental rights of others.330
5. "No Work for Free"
We have seen that a de Tocqueville concept is that no government
official is to work for free, that is, work as a volunteer in the employ of the
government.' This article argues that U.S. law applies this concept to
corporate executive officers. The law requires, first, disclosure to citizen-
capitalists regarding the level of compensation paid to high-ranking
executive officers. One purpose, it is submitted, is to assure that the level
is not inordinately low, as well as not inordinately high. U.S. law requires,
second, disclosure as to confluences and conflicts of interest affecting high-
ranking executive officers. One purpose is to enable the citizen capitalist to
assess, given the level of compensation, the degree to which the amount of
any underpayment may reflect motives other than satisfaction of the
corporation's enterprise objectives.332 The German model is that possible
underpayment is a matter of private contract and honor. Given institutional
constraints, voluntarily working for less than an adequate salary, after co-
for a share of longer term benefits of growth See Europe hn't Wn g, T ECONOMIST,
Apr. 5-11, 1997, at 16. Should not members of the managerial board, who themselves are
workers, be included in this tradition? Isn't the managerial board being selfish in
recommending that one of its members receive a bonus?
Conceivably, if sympathetic to a managerial board desire for award of bonuses in
appropriate cases, the shareholders could risk "polarization" by using the second vote of the
chairman of the supervisory board necessarily a shareholder representative to break a tie or
suggest to the managerial board that they present the issue of award of bonuses directly to
the shareholders meeting perhaps for a super-majority vote in favor of awards of bonuses.
See Baums, supra note 5, at 514 and LAW OF STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note 264, at §
119.2. See also Peltzer, supra note 259, at 34 (tendency on the part of shareholders to
reduce the catalogue of transactions requiring supervisory board approval).
329. However, according to one commentator, bonuses in the form of stock options have
not been as prevalent as in the U.S. See Kubler, supra note 261, at 109-10.
330. See Blum, supra note 5, at 515 n.32 and accompanying text.
331. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 4, at 66. See supra text accompanying note 115.
332. See supra notes 118-119 and accompanying text.
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determination has been worked through, is not regarded as a matter
appropriate for disclosure to those who are not in privity of contract with
the corporation.333
6. Compensation Egalitarianism
We have seen that a de Tocqueville concept is that the compensation
gap between high-ranking executive officers and high-ranking government
officials should be comparatively narrow. The U.S. establishes
egalitarianism in terms of compensation between low-ranking executive
officers and lower-ranking white-collar employees, through disclosure of
the compensation level of the higher-ranking executive officers. This is
even if the recipients of the information, the citizen-capitalists and thus the
capital markets, are not in privity of contract with the corporation.334 This
article suggests that a main reason for the current extremely high level of
salaries, in particular of U.S. chief executive officers, is the executive
officer's justifiable exercise of thrift as a de Tocqueville virtue. This means
bargaining for special compensation of a job-security nature in addition to
wages and bonuses because he is subject to the risk of being fired, or
receiving reduced compensation, at the will of the board of directors.335
Further, if one views compensation as including "returns" from the
holding of shares, U.S. "plebe shareholders" enjoy various
"compensations" on an equal basis with citizen-capitalists. One
compensation is the enjoyment of the privilege of giving an opinion on
corporate performance even though the plebe shareholder has not
established investment intent.33 6 Another compensation is the enjoyment of
the privilege of receiving a control premium paid on a buy-out as the result
of a coercive take-over, even though the plebe shareholder has not engaged
in corporate stewardship efforts to the same degree as the citizen
capitalist.
337
333. It is not always the case that the managerial board and the shareholders are on one
side of "structured interactions" and labor on the other. Sometimes it is necessary for
universal banks shareholders to marshal forces to challenge an alliance among members of
the managerial board, other white-collar employees and blue-collar employees. The level
of compensation in general, including but not limited to the level of salaries of members of
the managerial board, would be one obvious scenario. See Roe, supra note 248, at 1945. See
also infra Part XII.D.
334. See supra notes 121-122 and accompanying text.
335. See supra Part V.B.2.
336. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
337. See supra Part X.A.
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In contrast, we shall see that under the German model, issues of
compensation egalitarianism and job-security compensation are handled
institutionally. This is through "co-determination" rather then through
disclosure to the public. 338 Encouraging socially-trusted institutions does not
readily permit sharing of benefits and responsibilities between socially-
trusted universal bank record holders and non-socially-trusted beneficial
owners of shares held of record by these banks. 3
D. Facilitators
1. A Fact-Oriented Press
De Tocqueville discerned reliance on a fact-oriented, rather than issue-
oriented, press in the U.S. This press focused on every day issues to
facilitate the pursuit of their own material interests by men-of-the-world
citizens.34° U.S. corporate governance law relies on the diligence of the
press to make the public aware not only of releases prepared by a
corporation to advance corporate interests, but also filings with the
government. These are the filings that are subject to principles of "full
disclosure" and therefore, are neutral as to advancement of corporate
interests. 341
In contrast, we shall see that under the German model, the press is a
vehicle of free speech relative to public policy issues. Only incidentally to
that role is it encouraged as a vehicle to provide information to the
public.3 42 Less emphasis therefore, is placed on making information
available to the press. This is particularly true of information that would
be of a private nature as a German society norm.343
338. See Kubler, supra note 261, at 109-10 and see infra Part XII.D.
339. See infra Part XII.I.
340. See supra text accompanying note 15.
341. See Meier-Schatz, supra note 265 and Lorenz, supra note 243.
342. According to one commentator, the primary purpose of any rules requiring corporate
disclosure under the German model is to influence corporate behavior in the general public
interest rather than help the natural person investor exercise initiative in his own private
interest. See Meier-Schatz, supra note 265, at 266, 278-79, 281-82, 287, 293-94.
Before passage of a tightened insider trading law in 1994, corporate executives
would often include the press in confidential "fireside chats" to discuss significant corporate
developments before their announcement to the public. Pfeil, supra note 257, at 139.
343. See infra Part XII.A.
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2. The Citizen Sustainer
We have seen that de Tocqueville discerned that every citizen is
expected to guide, support and sustain any government official that is
intervening in his own proper sphere as a U.S. concept .3 " The U.S. expects
that essentially entrepreneurial entities like the New York Stock Exchange
will guide, support and sustain the SEC in their quite aggressive but
"proper" intervention in the sphere of trading in stocks and corporate
governance.' 4 This article contends that in addition, the U.S. expects that
citizen-capitalists as essentially entrepreneurs, will guide, support and
sustain the appropriate efforts of the U.S. government to fulfill the U.S.
Congress policy declaration contained in the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 in favor of "fair and honest markets in stock transactions. "34 An
important example of this sustainment, according to this article, is holding
a public annual meeting opinion on corporate performance.347
In contrast, we shall see that, under the German model, the concept of
a citizen, with instincts that are entrepreneurial, sustaining an assertive
government regulatory effort, is not to be found. This is particularly the
case for a field, like corporate governance, that requires a balancing of
fundamental rights in a wide variety of contexts. This balancing is an
undertaking that can be accomplished only by an institution of private
law-not by an individual expected to act primarily as his own instincts
dictate.34
344. See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 4, at 95. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
345. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
346. According to one comparative law commentator on the German model, an example
of the U.S. citizen sustainer, as the term is used in this article, is the "lobbyist" as a
member of the personal constituency of the individual U.S. legislator. This citizen sustainer,
even though representing his own entrepreneurial interests, still can be said to "guide,
support and sustain" the governmental efforts of the legislator. See Linde, supra note 247,
at 601, 603.
347. See supra Part 1.A.
348. According to a commentator, the German model has rejected citizen sustainership
by the U.S. lobbyist, in favor of a combination of executive branch agencies and the political
party as an institution of public law. See Linde, supra note 247, at 603. See also infra Part
XII.A.
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E. Means of Responding to Crises
1. The Publicized Dissident Faction and the Grand Jury
There is a de Tocqueville concept of reliance on the publicized dissident
faction which is to alert others as to crises and to provide alternatives to a
current "legislature," that is, the board of directors.349 Thus, a pre-
dominant way of addressing a corporate crisis in the U.S. is for outsiders
to marshal forces so they are in a position to challenge management in a
forthcoming election contest. Under this de Tocqueville rubric, secret
societies that seek to overthrow a current legislature by surprise are to be
avoided. U.S. corporate governance rules protect current management from
surprise presentations in favor of an alternative slate of directors in two
ways. First, if the alternative slate has not been presented to the nominating
committee of the board of directors, management is protected against
having to include the alternative slate in management's pleading document.
Rather, the proponent of the alternative slate must provide a pleading
document at his own expense as a "penalty" for late selection of an alternate
slate. Second, management cannot be surprised on annual meeting day by
a secretly-accumulated majority voting block in favor of an alternative slate.
Information about the organizing efforts of the faction, once it amounts to
an "alternative legislature" opposed to management, must be provided to
management. At the same time, management must cooperate with the
faction organizer in disseminating the position of the alternative legislature
to all the shareholders who indicate a desire to vote.35°
We have seen that a related de Tocqueville concept for responding to
crises is that of the grand jury. This body constitutes a recourse to
information in the hands of the general public and a resource of the sene
of the general public on a particular issue which might amount to a crisis.
The existence of a grand jury dispenses with the need for an investigative
staff assigned to a public prosecutor."' This article contends that U.S.
corporate law uses the grand jury concept as recourse to the public to
determine whether the SEC should issue an executive writ, a bill of
impeachment, in response to evidence of interference with the pricing of
shares by insider trading on insider information. Thus, the SEC does not
place reliance on an investigative staff to assist its division of enforcement
349. See DE TOCQUEVu.LE, supra note 4, at 75-77. See also supra text accompanying
note 29.
350. See supra Part VII.
351. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
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as a public prosecutor in arguing before an SEC hearing officer, a grand
jury equivalent. Rather the SEC is willing to pay a bounty to any citizen
who provides information that assists in a successful prosecution." 2
In short, we have seen that the alternative legislature, in the case of an
election contest, and the grand jury, in the case of an executive writ are
peculiarly U.S. ways of responding to crises. Each of these rely on
participation by citizens. An example is the "crisis" of a significant negative
corporate development which is announced to the public at some point. If
insider trading occurred prior to the announcement, employment of the
grand jury addresses any crisis relating to "confidence of the market for the
corporation's shares." If a change in management appears warranted
because of the information in the announcement, employment of the
dissident faction concept addresses this "crisis relating to corporate
performance.""'
We shall see that under the German model, institutions of private and
public law as well as executive branch agencies of government are favored
for the role of addressing an announcement to the public of a negative
development, in particular, a crisis, rather than dissident factions.
3 54
Further, the German model does not provide for a "populist" grandjury to
address a crisis of confidence relating to the market for the corporation's
shares. Rather, the German model is that government agencies initiate
investigations involving possible criminal prosecution or other sanction.
This is only on the petition of German citizens and business enterprises
either seeking to protect their own fundamental rights or admitting that they
may have impaired the fundamental rights of others.355 Alternatively, an
investigation is initiated through guidances on the need for investigation
from the government agencies' own internal staffs or institutions of public
or private law, as expressly required by legislation. 3 56 The government
agencies conduct the investigations by using their own staffs who may
352. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
353. See supra Part VII.
354. See Part XII.F.
355. See Lorenz, supra note 243, at 576-77; see also Eberle, supra note 245, at 75-77,
82. Under the regime designed to curb insider trading before enactment of the current
insider trading law enacted in 1994, an insider who believed he may have violated insider
trading guidelines could himself initiate proceedings. See Blum, supra note 5, at 523.
356. Only individuals whose fundamental rights may be affected and members of
investigatory staffs of the executive agency, may attend executive agency or other
investigatory activities. See Eberle, supra note 245, at 82. As to the use of institutions of
public law, as opposed to executive branch agencies, for investigatory purposes, See infra
Part XII.G.2.
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solicit input from those whose fundamental rights may be involved.
Proceedings are therefore not public unless the public, by virtue of the
specific circumstances, has a "fundamental right" to attend. In the German
model for an administrative agency there is no equivalent of a public
prosecutor akin to the SEC's division of enforcement in the U.S. There is
also no equivalent for payment of a bounty to a citizen purportedly
providing information "in the public interest" to the agency, that leads to
a successful prosecution.
5 7
2. Limited Intra-Government Competition as Facilitator
We have seen that a de Tocqueville concept is that, to a limited degree,
government agencies compete with each other for "territory" in a collegial
manner. This prevents any one agency from having a despotic dominance.
Such competition, for one thing, promotes experimentation as a means of
enhancing quality of regulation.358 As background, the U.S. constitutional
scheme is based on the concept of powers enumerated in the Constitution. 35 9
For instance, the federal government can enact laws with a primary purpose
of governing interstate commerce even if a state's jurisdiction over police
power issues within its boundaries may also be affected." A state
government can enact laws with a primary purpose of governing police
policy matters within its boundaries, even if (1) interstate commerce may
be affected so long as the affecting is only secondary, 361 and (2) the same
subject may be covered by a federal law so long as the state addresses the
subject only secondarily.362 In general, the federal government cannot co-
opt state personnel against the will of the state in the implementation of
federal law.363 The federal government does not make its personnel
available to a state to implement state law, unless a federal interest ic served
357. See infra Part XII.G.2.
358. See supra Part III.A.
359. Relevant constitutional provisions include: the "commerce clause" U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 3; the "full faith and credit" provision U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; the reservation-
of-powers-to-the-states provision U.S. CONST. amend. X; and the "due process" clauses
U.S. CONST. amend. V, amend. XIV.
360. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
361. See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
362. See H.P. Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79 (1939).
363. Compare National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 849-50 (1976) and
Carroll v. Finch, 326 F. Supp. 891 (D. Alaska, 1971) with U.S. v. Ohio Department of
Highway Safety, 635 F.2d 1195 (6 1 Cir. 1980), cert. den. 451 U.S. 949 (1980).
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involving the implementation of federal law. 36 A state law that has the
primary purpose of governing police policy matters within the state may
also have a primary effect on police policy matters within another state as
long as the cumulative effect on the regulatee is not unreasonable .365 All of
the above permits independent action by all players, without the need to
coordinate among themselves.
Specifically in relation to U.S. corporate governance, one agency,
consistent with principles of comity, may add to the impact of rules
established by a tangential agency. An example mentioned in this article is
the SEC rules that strengthen annual meeting requirements of a
corporation's home state, that is, "hearing rules," by virtue of exclusive
SEC jurisdiction over interstate commerce and thus "pleading rules".
Alternatively, an agency, by virtue of its own particular contacts with a
situation, may be able to lessen the impact of rules applicable to the
situation imposed by a tangential agency. One example of this is the
corporate governance rules of a state with which a corporation has
substantial contacts adding to the otherwise too low corporate governance
requirements imposed by the corporation's home state. Another example
is the corporate governance rules of the U.S., through the SEC, that add
to the impact of otherwise too low corporate governance requirements
imposed by a foreign domicile of a corporation whose shares are traded in
the U.S.
36
In contrast, we shall see that, under the German model, fundamental
rights of the federal government and the states preclude the above fluidity
of tangential government. As a background, the federal government and
the states are separate entities. Theoretically each has the fundamental right
under the basic law to enact laws within its jurisdiction even if it cuts across
the jurisdiction of the other entity. The jurisdiction of the federal
government theoretically extends to the entire nation, even to the most local
of matters. However these laws are subject to the state government entities'
fundamental rights.367 It is the federal legislature that resolves these
fundamental rights in a structured interaction on the particular subject. This
is done on an ad hoc basis and takes place in the Federal Council, the rough
364. This would be pursuant to a principle of "cooperative federalism" in which the
integrity of the federal government as an entity separate and distinct from the state
government, is maintained. See generally, Carroll, 326 F. Supp. 891.
365. See American Rockwool, Inc. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 640 F. Supp.
1411, 1426-28 (E.D.N.C. 1986).
366. See supra Part III.A.
367. See Lorenz, supra note 243, at 552-53, 562-63. For a review of the genesis of the
federal system under the German model, see Partsch, supra note 243, at 3-6.
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equivalent of the U.S. Senate. 3 6 This resolution of fundamental rights can
result in the states' implementation of federal laws.3 69 The interaction of the
Federal Council assures that there is state input on the implementations and
state interests are kept in mind. On the other hand, once the Federal
Council has permitted structured interaction, the state is subservient to a
common goal under the leadership principle and there is no competition as
the U.S. sense. Moreover, even in areas where the Federal Council has not
acted, there is reluctance on the part of states to act too independently of
each other or of the federal government on a subject of common interest.
If they do, the result is likely to be a structured interaction of some sort,
probably in the Federal Council, to resolve the differences. Hence, in areas
of a common concern, the states may well act independently only as a
parochial statement. 370 The federal government and the state governments
have strictly separate jurisdictions. Any coordination is achieved through
the leadership of the federal government after a process that requires a
careful and detailed balancing of the fundamental rights of the states as
against those of the federal government.37'
F. Protocol
1. Participatory Democracy Sessions
A participatory democracy session, that is, a free-ranging discussion at
a town meeting in which subjects to be discussed have been announced in
368. Germany's federal legislature consists of two bodies, (1) the Federal Diet, members
of which are elected by the people and (2) the Federal Council, members of which are
appointed by the governments of the various states. See Lorenz, supra note 243, at 547. The
basic law requires that statutes of the Federal Diet and regulations of any federal executive
agency, be approved by the Federal Council, if the fundamental rights of one or more states
are at issue. See id. at 562-63.
The regulation of Germany's stock exchanges constitutes a careful balancing of
federal and state roles, with a key arbiter assuring this balancing being the Federal Council.
See Pfeil, supra note 257.
369. Implementation of federal law by a state could be done through the state's
administrative agencies and/or through the state's courts. See Lorenz, supra note 243, at
552-53; see also DROSTE ET AL., supra note 258, at 463.
An example of state implementation of federal law is the execution by the states of
a plan devised by the federal interior minister to ship back Bosnians living in Germany. See
Who is a German?, supra note 243, at 547.
370. See Pfeil, supra note 257, at 177-84 and Bernadette Surya, Germany - Modernising
and Rationalising the Securities Market, 7 THE COMPANY LAW. 38 (1986).
371. See Lorenz, supra note 243, at 547.
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advance is a de Tocqueville concept.3 The U.S. regulatory scheme
encourages such free-ranging discussion between management and citizen
capitalist shareholders exemplified by the question and answer sessions that
occur after detailed exchange of papers at the physical holding of the annual
meeting. Even shareholders who hold their shares beneficially and not of
record, are permitted by law to attend these meetings and ask questions.373
An occasion for free-ranging discussion between management and citizen-
capitalists is also provided by the SEC rules encouraging the narrowing of
issues between these two parties in the event of a shareholder request that
his proposal, opposed by management, be included in management's proxy
statement for an annual meeting. 7
We have seen that as a further example, U.S. corporate law encourages
participatory democracy among executive officers in advance of noticed
board of director meetings by permitting more than one executive officer
to be a member of the board. This encourages free-ranging discussion
among executive officers as equals as to board agenda items in advance of
board meetings.375 Another example is that the U.S. enhances the value of
participatory democracy between the executive officers, on the one hand,
and the board of directors, on the other. This is through a requirement that
the executive officers not merely make reports to the board but also must
also initiate proposals and provide detailed information in support of them
in advance of any board meetings.376
As still another example, an attempt is made in the U.S. to cause board
of directors meetings to amount to productive participatory democracy
between the directors. This is by a requirement that the board membership
include at least two "independent" directors who will be catalytic to free-
ranging discussion. 377 Finally, it is argued in this article that U.S. law
presents the opportunity for pre-annual meeting free-ranging discussion
between any "politically-ambitious" citizen capitalist and other citizen-
capitalists that indicate their availability to give input on the issues of
interest to their politically ambitious compatriot. We shall see that, in
contrast, the German model provides for a meet and confer which differs
from a participatory democracy. The German approach is one of
372. See DETOCQUEVILLE, supra note 4, at 44, 64-65. See supra text accompanying note
146.
373. See supra Part VI. B.
374. See supra notes 224-228 and accompanying text.
375. See supra Part IX.A.
376. See supra Part IX.A.
377. See supra Part IX.A.
1999]
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
"structured interaction," within an institution of private law. This approach
puts opposing parties in the same room to resolve differences relating to
fundamental rights, so that common social objectives can be achieved.
3 71
2. Divided Ministerial Duties
We have seen that a de Tocqueville concept is public performance of
divided ministerial duties by different individuals whose offices are
specifically disclosed to the public. A failure, by any of these individuals
to perform his function is civilly actionable."' The theory is that each
function is viewed by an electorate which can judge whether the functions
are in fact being performed and within the prescribed limits. Otherwise
individual elected officials may have too much power and there would be
despotism as to both the parts and the sum of the parts. This U.S. approach
is regarded as a an exaltation of process over short-term efficiency. The
German model in contrast can be regarded as an exaltation of efficiency
over process.
With respect to performance of ministerial duties as a requirement, this
article has discussed how various U.S. "corporate officials" perform
separate ministerial duties. This is done to assure that the process of
physically holding an annual meeting has integrity.3"' Also, various
corporate officials and members of the SEC staff, perform separate
ministerial duties to assure that accurate and prompt financial information
is furnished to the capital markets.' In contrast, consistent with honor code
principles, the German model is that administrative functions be performed
non-publicly but efficiently by appointed officials whose offices are not
necessarily disclosed to the public.382 The officials are employed either by
378. See Lorenz, supra note 243, at 557-59. See also infra Part XII.H. According to a
U.S. commentator, a justice of the Oregon Supreme Court, "structured interaction" might
have useful applications in certain situations in the U.S. For example, the German model
might be used to enable partisan and other interest groups to structurally interact on the
board of directors of broadcast stations deciding on programming that is consistent with
freedom of speech. The model might also be used for university boards that seek to
administer affirmative action consistent with equal protection. See Linde, supra note 247,
at 607-08.
379. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
380. See supra Part VI. C.
381. See supra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
382. A follower of the honor code principle has "dependency on the confidence" of a
superior rather than direct answerability to the public. See Lorenz, supra note 243, at
557-59.
According to one commentator, there is a German focus on the "law of
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German executive branch agencies or by institutions of public or private
law. As seen above, the performance of functions is disciplined by the
requirement that the legislative balancing of fundamental rights be strictly
adhered to.383
As to performance of ministerial duties as a safe harbor, each director
and executive officer of a U.S. corporation who decides to make a
"forward-looking statement" about the corporation's enterprise objectives
and long-term operating performances, can avoid liability for a decision so
long as he has exercised judgment in good faith and has performed
individual ministerial duties, depending on the situation presented, in the
course of exercising that judgment."s This is true for each individual who
wishes to address the subject of a coercive tender offer made to the
corporation's shareholders.8 5 In contrast, the German model relies on
honor code principles with accountability. However there is also the ability




De Tocqueville's concept that even legislative and executive
proceedings be given judicial form387 is in the interest, at least in part, of
understatedness to assure public acceptance. This article has argued that the
concept is reflected in the U.S. separation of the annual meeting into
typically judicial-form "pleading" and "hearing" phases for regulatory
purposes. 38 It is also demonstrated in the procedures of the SEC as it
performs its rule-making, legislative, and enforcement or executive
activities by issuing writs of mandamus or prohibition." 9 Again, the U.S.
approach is one of exalting process over near-term efficiency.
administration", that is, the law pertaining the internal code of conduct of executive agency
administrators. In contrast, according to this commentator, there is a U.S. focus on the "law
of administrative procedure," that is the law pertaining to professional representation of
private clients before administrative agencies. See Linde, supra note 247, at 604.
383. See Lorenz, supra note 243, at 570-72, 574-76. This fundamental rights gloss on
the leadership principle creates the issue: how does one prevent judicial control from
stultifying decision-making by executive agencies? See id. at 545-46, 576.
384. See text accompanying note 177.
385. See supra Part X.
386. See infra Part XII.H.
387. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
388. See supra Part II.A.
389. See supra Part VIII.
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In contrast, the German model for action by agencies of the executive
branch is that judicial-form procedures need not be followed except as a
expedient for proper balancing of fundamental rights through structured
interaction.3" This does not require a pleading phase. The focus of the
German model is the necessity for procedures to develop full information
for protection of national rights or fundamental rights of private parties.
The model uses informality "whenever possible."39" ' Even if hearings are
held, judicial form is not strictly adhered to if non-adherence assures
protection of fundamental rights. For instance, an executive agency
typically makes informal adjustments to "final" decisions if fundamental
rights are not violated by doing this." It typically assists uninformed
participants at a hearing to assure that their fundamental rights are
protected, as long as a fundamental rights of others are not impinged upon
in the process.3 93 Further, if there is any general public interest in the
proceeding, the German model asks the public to trust the agency's
judgment as to what the public interest may be in as a particular case. This
is consistent with confidentiality. In contrast to the U.S. approach, the
German model can be called an exaltation of near-term efficiency over
process.
G. Tools of Government
1. The Writ Issued by a Court of General Sessions
We have seen that a de Tocqueville concept is that elected officials in
the U.S. can still be subject to broad direction by a higher governing body
in the form of writs, even though mainly responsible to their electorate.3 4
An example of this higher body is a court of general sessions as it was in
de Tocqueville's day. In the field of U.S. corporate governance, the SEC
by issuing a legislative writ of mandamus commands the elected board of
directors of a corporation, on pain of civil penalty, to make sure that certain
procedures are adopted. These procedures must assure that accurate and
up-to-date information is provided to the securities markets in order to
390. See Lorenz, supra note 243, at 552, 562-63. See also Eberle, supra note 245, at
74-75 (referring to a fundamental right to participate in an administrative hearing so long
as one's other fundamental rights are involved.).
391. See Lorenz, supra note 243, at 552, 562-63. See also Eberle, supra note 245, at
76-77.
392. See Eberle, supra note 245, at 76-78.
393. See id. at 76.
394. See DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 4, at 78-79 and text accompanying note 178.
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protect against undue volatility resulting from insider trading or rumors of
such an activity.3 95 Also, by issuing a legislative writ of both mandamus and
prohibition, the SEC commands the elected board of directors of a
corporation not to engage in insider trading and, in addition, to take steps
to assure that insider trading is not engaged in by executive officers and
other insiders of the corporation.
3 96
The German model provides a contrast. In light of the pre-eminence of
the judiciary in the protection of fundamental rights, the German model
does not lend itself to the issuance of legislative or executive writs, that is,
directives issued at the discretion of agencies in the executive branch in
sensitive areas. This lack of issuance prevails even if the agency is guided
by institutions of public or private law. This is because of the threat of de
novo review of the writs by German administrative courts if there is a
fundamental rights issue.3" To be free of this threat, directives affecting
fundamental rights are typically the province only of the specific wording
of statutes issued by democratically-elected legislatures. The German
model envisions no agency, along the lines of the SEC in the U.S., that has
reasonably broad discretion to issue writs that affect fundamental rights.
As a result of this hesitancy to issue writs, the German model, that is
agencies in the executive branch, provide only "guidance" on legislative
writs or "rules"3 9 if there could be any question of inconsistency of a rule
395. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
396. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
397. See Lorenz, supra note 243, at 574-76. For a critique of this de novo review as
threatening to turn Germany into a "judge's republic," see id. at 581-82. For possible limits
on an administrative court's ability to overturn a "writ" issued by an executive
administrative agency, see Eberle, supra note 245, at 104-06.
398. These guidances are described as a form of divulgence of the contents of internal
codes of conduct of the administrative agency personnel to those whose behavior the agency
seeks to influence. These instances of guidance are not regarded as "ordinances" which are
reviewable in court. Lorenz, supra note 243, at 574-76.
An example of the providing of guidance, rather than the issuing of writs, in the field
of corporate governance is provided by the scheme of insider trading "regulation" under the
German model as it existed before passage of Germany's insider trading statute in 1994. Up
to that point, reliance was placed on "Rules of Procedure" adopted in 1968 by a
"Commission of Stock Exchange Experts." These Rules constituted a "voluntary code to
educate corporate executives as to the harms and immorality of insider trading." The
voluntary code was intended as a basis (1) for insiders to refrain from insider trading, (2)
for insiders, in addition, to bind themselves contractually with their corporate employers to
refrain from insider trading, and (3) for national stock exchanges to establish boards of
inquiries to investigate allegations by complainants of insider trading on the part of those
bound "morally," or contractually, not to engage in that practice. See Blum, supra note 5,
at 515-21.
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with fundamental rights. For instance, if a corporation's supervisory board
fails to heed this guidance, such a failure may still be (1) civilly actionable
on the theory that the supervisory board, unheedful of guidance, did in fact
interfere with fundamental rights of others or (2) criminally prosecutable on
the theory that the board, unheedful of guidance, interfered with the right
of the nation to pursue a legislatively-enacted government policy."
Similarly, the German model is that executive branch agencies provide only
guidance regarding executive writs or enforceable decisions in specific
cases. This is particularly if a fundamental right, such as that of "equal
treatment" from government agencies, may be involved.'
2. Administrative Impeachment
"Administrative impeachment" is a de Tocqueville concept. This is a
form of executive writ, issued by one administrative agency after a public
proceeding. The basis is a bill of impeachment previously issued by a
separate administrative agency. Impeachment is an administrative remedy
enforceable by a court if disobeyed but it is not issued by a court. It is a
remedy that is effective because it is highly embarrassing to be the subject
of the writ. n" This article contends that the SEC makes use of this concept,
at least partially. The SEC issues a bill of impeachment but, rather than
resort to a second administrative agency to do the final impeaching, the
SEC resorts to the courts. This article urges that, particularly in the case of
an elected board of directors, a second administrative agency should do the
final impeaching.'
In contrast, the German model does not make use of the concept of
administrative impeachment. Rather, consistent with protection of
fundamental rights, immediate resort is to a prosecutor and to the criminal
courts as the definitive balancer of fundamental rights in order to cause
removal from office. 3 Consistent with principles of the honor code, a
sanction that the courts provide is permanent ineligibility to hold any
For other instances of the providing of governmental "guidance" to business
enterprises, see Germany - Bismarck's Steed, TIHE ECONOMIST, Mar. 29-Apr. 4, 1997, at
57 and Auf Wiedershewn, Shareholders, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 29-Apr. 4, 1997, at 68.
399. See Lorenz, supra note 243, at 570.
400. See id. at 574-76.
401. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
402. See supra notes 211-212 and accompanying text.
403. Enforcement of a law prohibiting trading in shares of a corporation on the basis of
inside information, is totally criminal. See Pfeil, supra note 257, at 164-75.
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corporate office.' If this is not the case, the German model provides for
a mild, face-saving form of "removal" from office. This removal process
can be instituted by an administrative agency or by an institution of public
or private law. It is usually used informally. The removal institution
consists of a "vote of no confidence."' It is typically given in secret.
40 6
3. The Private Litigant in the Public Interest
Finally, we have seen that a de Tocqueville concept is that of the
"private litigant in the public interest." The private citizen litigant is given
some form of advantage for promoting government policy.' This concept
is most apt if the thwarters of government policy are considered public
officials or "quasi-government" officials."08 One controversial aspect of
such a concept is the statutory bounty for providing information to a
government agency charged with policing the activities of officials.'
Another example is various benefits given to the private litigant in a civil
action that he instituted against a government official or quasi-government
official. Such benefits include: (1) an ability to pay one's lawyer a fee
contingent on success rather than an up-front cash fee; (2) not having to pay
the target's attorney fees if one loses; (3) being able to bring the action as
a "class action" representing others similarly situated as well as oneself; (4)
being able to cause the action to be arbitrated rather than tried in a court;
(5) being able to have a jury of one's peers decide the case rather than a
judge; and (6) being able to recover punitive damages from the government,
404. See LAW OF STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note 264, at § 76(3) and Peltzer, supra
note 259, at 33.
405. If as a coalition desires to remove from office the federal Chancellor who is the
approximate equivalent of the U.S. President, the minority party in the federal legislature
assumes the role of institution of public law. It initiates a "constructive vote of no
confidence" before the legislature. See Lorenz, supra note 243, at 547-48.
406. Prior to passage of the new insider trading law in 1994, if a board of inquiry of a
national stock exchange found after an investigation, that an insider had violated the insider
trading guidelines established by the Commission of Stock Exchange Experts, it would do
the following. First, it would charge the cost of the proceedings to the violator. Second, it
would report its findings to the corporation and to the federal Minister of Economics. The
decision would not be published (a) unless the violator consented or (b) the violation was
"considered extreme." See Blum, supra note 5, at 513, 520-21; see also infra Part XII.G.2.
407. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 4, at 80.
408. See id.; see also supra Part VIII.C.
409. See supra Part VIII.C.
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or quasi-government, official if he is found liable and his conduct has been
particularly egregious.41
Once again, the German model provides a contrast. The German model
limits itself to protecting the fundamental rights only of the particular
litigants by ordinary civil action instituted by these private litigants. The
protection is for rights derived from stock ownership and privity of
contract.41' The German model does not foster any private litigant in the
public interest.4"2 It does not countenance the payment of statutory bounties
to informant citizens.413
XH. How THE GERMAN MODEL WORKS IN PRACTICE
A. Overview of the German System of Corporate Governance
1. Primary Purpose of Regulation
The scheme of regulation of corporate governance of publicly-traded
stock corporations is to assure the position of the nation as an industrial
power. This is consistent with principles of co-determination.414 The
German model is, first, based on the preservation of certain traditional
German approaches such as the leadership and honor code principles.
Second, it is supplemented by a post-World War II special emphasis that
accounts for the fundamental rights of citizens who are natural persons.41 5
The German model does not emphasize assuring the ability of industry to
raise capital in the German securities markets. 416 Rather, it focuses on the
fundamental rights of creditors and the raising of capital by German
industry in the form of borrowing from universal banks.417 The focus,
410. See supra notes 204-207 and accompanying text.
411. According to a commentator, a civil proceeding before the judiciary concerns itself
only with protection of the fundamental rights of private individuals or entities, although the
rights of the community are also, incidentally vindicated. Class actions have been argued
for as a special way of achieving these dual objectives but have been legislatively
disapproved so far. See Lorenz, supra note 243, at 577.
412. See infra Part XII.G.2.
413. See infra Part XII.G.2.
414. See Goedan, supra note 243, at 119.
415. See Lorenz, supra note 243, at 545 and Partsch, supra note 243, at 6-7.
416. See Meier-Schatz, supra note 265, at 276. See also Blum, supra note 5, at 507-10.
417. See Benfield, supra note 317, at 62. A perception is that German corporations are
able to borrow from universal banks more cheaply than if they were to raise capital in the
equity markets. This is because of the special on-going ability of the banks, as creditors, to
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therefore, has been not so much protection of the fundamental rights of
shareholders as protection of those of creditors, who are perceived to have
the stronger fundamental rights.418
In recent years distinct downsides to the German model have been
noted. One downside relates to tax and other policy that encourages the
holding and voting of shares only by German universal banks.419 In
"control the moral hazard" of improvident decisions of management. See Macey, supra note
279, at 207.
The German model has so far rejected the formation of German money market funds
as a substitute for universal banks as a source of credit to German corporations. It has also
restricted the ability of German investment funds to invest in foreign money market funds
as an indirect way of extending credit to German corporations. See Carl Graf Hardenberg,
Amendment of German Investment Fund Laws, 18 INT'L Bus. LAW. 224 (1990).
418. According to a commentator, the purpose of the prototype German law requiring
public disclosures by corporations was to protect not so much shareholders, as creditors.
See Meier-Schatz, supra note 265, at 276, 279, 283.
In contrast to the U.S., creditors are given special standing to sue directors and
executive officers of a corporation for mismanagement whereas shareholders are not. The
German model does not provide for shareholder derivative or class actions against directors
and officers. See Eberle, supra note 245, at 92-93. On the other hand, the German model
does provide for creditor actions (sounding in tort against executive officers and directors.
See Peltzer, supra note 259, at 35-36.
In the above tort actions brought by creditors, the burden of proof to show non-
negligence, particularly if the corporation is insolvent, is on the executive officer or
director. Id.; but see Schwanke, supra note 259, at 13. If there is insolvency and the
executive officer or director has performed a specified type of negligent act, the offence is
criminally prosecutable. See Peltzer, supra note 259, at 34.
There are special reasons for the above strong protection given the fundamental
rights of ordinary unsecured creditors. First, the fundamental rights of secured creditors,
even if the security interests are not recorded, are stronger vis-a-vis unsecured creditors than
is the case in the U.S. Secured credit has been very prevalent under the German model.
There is apparently no system of recordation of security interests in moveable property as
in the U.S. See Flessner, supra note 259, at 125. This makes bankruptcy proceedings
impracticable because of the lack of available assets to satisfy the claims of ordinary
creditors. The impracticability of bankruptcy proceedings equals lack of a bankruptcy
administrator, which equals a weakening of the all-important fundamental rights of
employees to pursue a profession or trade. See id. at 124-26. To avoid this domino effect,
the ordinary creditors need special protection against improvident action by the executive
officers and directors of a stock corporation.
Further, the employees, as creditors of the corporation with respect to their promised
pensions, compete with the other ordinary creditors if there is insolvency. The claims of
ordinary creditors, in the event of insolvency, are inferior to the "social plan claims" of
employees that have been dismissed because of insolvency. See id. at 131-35 and Kubler,
supra note 261, at 101.
419. With respect to the holding of shares, see supra note 283 and accompanying text.
With respect to the voting of shares, see Benfield, supra note 317, at 628. See also Baums,
1999]
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
following this policy, Germany has discouraged the holding and voting of
shares by other individuals and entities in a variety of ways. Among the
latter investors have been individual German citizens4 20 and foreign
investment funds.42 This may well have discouraged needed investment in
the German stock market.422 Further, approximately half of the population
of Germany is advocating a more populist approach to corporate
governance. There is particular criticism of the perceived domination of
corporations by the universal banks.423 The balance of this article analyzes
how the German model works in practice.
2. The Annual Meeting as Centerpiece
The German annual meeting is not a centerpiece in the U.S. sense.
Rather, the uncontested annual meeting has two main functions. One is to
protect the primacy of capital as a big picture matter. The other is to
protect, in a rather pro forma manner, fundamental property ownership
rights of shareholders to vote on issues at annual meetings.
First we examine assuring the primacy of capital. A peculiarity of the
supra note 5, at 505, 507-08, 514 (universal banks dominate the voting process).
420. See supra note 277.
421. Foreign investment funds are discouraged from the holding and voting of shares in
German stock corporations in two respects. First, if they are organized outside of the
European Economic Community [hereinafter EEC] and purport to represent the interests of
German investors, they are treated as other than institutions of private law. They are saddled
with tax and other disincentives for having sold shares to German investors. See
Hardenberg, supra note 417, at 225-26; see also DROSTE ET AL., supra note 258, at 224-25.
These two commentaries refer to two facets of the discrimination against foreign,
that is non-EEC, investment funds: (1) an EEC directive regarding distribution of foreign
mutual funds within the territory of an EEC member and (2) a specifically German
retaliation against the U.S. SEC for the latter's reluctance to open up the U.S to the
distribution of shares of German mutual funds in the U.S. See Kraus, supra note 261, at 116
describing the situation in the early 1980s before these two facets came into play.
Second, the German model favors corporate activism on the part of a shareowner
only if it in "privity of contract" with the corporation, that is, itself holds shares in bearer
form that are "on deposit" with the corporation or the equivalent. U.S. law, for one,
impedes the ability of U.S. investment companies to hold shares, if in bearer form, in
countries that are foreign to the U.S. See infra Part XII.C.3.
422. See Benfield, supra note 317, at 628-29 (lack of liquidity in secondary market); see
also Kubler, supra note 261, at 102-03 (reform proposals). On the other hand, there is a
trend to more foreign investment in member states, such as Germany, of the European
Economic Community. See generally, Edward Carr, A Survey of Business in Europe: A
Fortress Against Change, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 23-29, 1996, at 62.
423. See Macey, supra note 279, at 76. See also Benfield, supra note 317, at 629.
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German model is that the shareholder's right to own property is deemed to
include a right to examine the financial statements. This is done at an
annual meeting to see if there is a surplus out of which dividends can be
paid.424 If so, there is the right to declare dividends at the annual meeting.
It is at the annual meeting that capital has the "big stick" of being able to
declare dividends to undergird its "soft speaking" at meetings of the
supervisory board.4" As discussed below, 426 the membership of the
supervisory board is divided 50-50 between capital and labor. Dividends
necessarily restrict the pool of cash out of which wages can be paid and
affect the fundamental right of labor to earn a living.427
Second, the protection of shareholder voting rights, within the ambit of
the Universal Banks is examined. The shareholder of "record" with the
corporation is usually a universal bank.42" The beneficial shareholders are
those shareholders whose interests are not of record with the corporation
except through the universal bank's record ownership. These shareholders,
at least theoretically, have their rights of beneficial ownership protected by
the universal banks as record-holders.4 29 These beneficial holders include
first, the universal bank itself as extender of credit to,430 and as investment
banker for, the corporation in its proprietary capacity. 431 Second, the
beneficial holders are investment funds that the universal bank is sponsor
and custodian for, and investment manager of, which reflects a quasi-
proprietary capacity of the universal bank.432
424. See LAW OF STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note 264, at § 119.1(2).
425. See id.
426. See infra Part XII.H. 1.
427. Labor's countervailing "big stick" is more indirect. This stick relates to the stiffness
of the union stance in negotiation of regionwide collective bargaining agreements between
unions and employer associations. See Flessner, supra note 259, at 137.
428. Shares, typically in bearer form, are purchased and sold through universal banks as
brokers. The shares are typically left on deposit with these banks. See Haggeney, supra note
277, at 211; see also Baums, supra note 5, at 517. For statistics showing universal bank
primacy with respect to record ownership, see Baums, supra note 5, at 507.
429. See Benfield, supra note 317, at 629; see also Kubler, supra note 261, at 103.
430. See Macey, supra note 279, at 89; see also Benfield, supra note 317, at 627-28 and
Kubler, supra note 261, at 103.
431. See Baums, supra note 5, at 518 and Kubler, supra note 261, at 103.
432. See Benfield, supra note 317, at 631 n.91 and accompanying text. The "quasi-
proprietary" relationship between a universal bank and its investment fund can be described
as follows. The bank is primarily acting in a purely proprietary capacity insofar as it earns
fees as sponsor of the fund and provider of administrative services to the fund other than
acting as custodian of assets. It is primarily acting in a fiduciary capacity, vis-a-vis
unitholders in the fund, insofar as it is acting as custodian of assets of the fund other than
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Reflecting a strictly non-proprietary capacity of the universal bank are
various beneficial shareholders who have their shares in the custody of the
universal bank as the broker-dealer with which they place securities
trades.433 Hereinafter these last beneficial shareholders are referred to as
"ward shareholders." The voting rights of these shareowners are rather
paternalistically protected through efforts of the universal bank. As we shall
see, there is little statutory encouragement given to assertive exercise of
voting rights by these beneficial shareowners.
4 34
Third, there are shareholder voting rights outside of the ambit of the
Universal Banks. This "independent" shareholder is disfavored from tax
and other standpoints under the German model.4 35 Thus, without having
been "pre-qualified" as an institution of private law, he has the "effrontery"
to have the right to participate directly in corporate governance without
guidance from a universal bank. It is the management of the corporation
who has the function of protecting the voting rights of the independent
shareholders. Management also protects the voting rights of the
representatives of independent shareholders, that is, the "shareholder
associations. "436
The German annual meeting disregards the U.S. values that we have
reviewed which make the annual meeting a centerpiece of corporate
governance.437 Under the German model, the annual meeting is a
in a voting capacity. In voting shares held in custody, the bank can therefore be said to be
acting in a capacity that is a combination of these two capacities, that is, in a "quasi-
proprietary" capacity.
433. See Roe, supra note 248, at 1982.
434. See infra Part XII.D.F.H.
435. If the independent shareholder holds his shares in bearer form, there is a tax and a
brokerage commission, for each purchase and each sale of stock if, in the process, there is
a change in custody of the stock. See Roe, supra note 248, at 1942. There are certificate
fees. See Baums, supra note 5, at 506; see also Pfeil, supra note 257, at 184-85. If the
independent shareholder holds his shares in registered form, there are the disadvantages of
high registration fees. See Roe, supra note 248, at 1982. There is also the ability of other
shareholders to amend the corporate charter to restrict his ability to transfer his shares. See
Haggeney, supra note 277, at 211-12 and LAW OF STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note 264,
at § 24. In short, the independent shareholder can be regarded as the equivalent of the
investment company, that is not an "accredited investment company" and therefore not a
favored institution of private law. See supra note 261.
436. See Law OF STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note 264, at §§ 121-137.
437. First, any German equivalent of the U.S. performance of ministerial duties as an
independent justification for the annual meeting does not apply. Thus, the intra-entity
following of the leadership principle and the observing of an honors code, all in such a way
as to protect fundamental rights, does not constitute a significant enough public statement
for there to be special value in such a statement. The same is the case for the employment
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centerpiece only in the case of an unusual situation, that is, a crisis. A main
example is when the rights of unsecured creditors are threatened. In that
case, the annual meeting itself becomes an institution of private law in
which structured interaction occurs. In short, absent a crisis, the German
annual meeting takes second place to the work of the supervisory board.
In fact, the "political ambition" of the universal bank as shareholder
participant in annual meetings is rather fettered absent a crisis. Unless the
pre-eminence of entrepreneurship is threatened the bank is discouraged from
succumbing to feelings of political ambition in favor of private enterprise
or capital. At almost all costs, the policy of the German model is to avoid
"polarization" between capital and labor.43
3. Critique
The annual meeting could profitably be made more of a centerpiece.
One purpose is to attract investment from German citizen investors and
of judicial-form procedures to protect fundamental rights.
Similarly, the uncontested annual meeting, under the German model, is only
secondarily a vehicle for an opinion on how well the corporation is performing in light of
enterprise objectives. Absent a crisis, the supervisory board, and the managerial board, have
the primary role for this subject. See infra Part XII.I. Absent a crisis, the annual meeting
is not an occasion for a possible election contest to replace management. See infra
Part XII.F.
Further, the satisfaction of giving a report card on corporate performance as a
counterbalance to a tendency to sell shares if one is dissatisfied with management
performance, has, at least up until recently. been unimportant. Until recently, there has been
a national lack of concern about the liquidity and price continuity of shares traded in German
stock markets. See supra notes 416-421 and accompanying text. An important factor in this
lack of concern has been a perceived absence of fundamental rights issues where purchasers
and sellers of shares are not in strict privity of contract with each other or with an issuer in
the stock market. See supra note 279 and accompanying text. In any event, the German
model has not encouraged any investment decision on the part of an individual "citizen" or
entity. See supra notes 277, 280 and accompanying text.
Also, found unimportant have been (1) the U.S.-supposed annual meeting
opportunity for the citizen to exercise instincts of thrift according to his own judgment, and
(2) the U.S.-supposed opportunity for a citizen to exercise "man-of-the-world"
sophistication on corporate governance matters. Again, a decision by a layman is not seen
to be necessarily in the nation's interest under the German model. See supra Part XI.B. 1.
Finally, a chance to give the press full rein is not, under the German model, a
justification for an uncontested annual meeting. Instead, the annual meeting is treated as
largely a private affair with just enough information and advance notice to protect
fundamental rights of the press to conduct reasonably unfettered investigation and to publish
the results. See supra Part XI.D. 1.
438. See Krupp & Thyssen, Exaggerated Rumours of a Death, THE ECONOMIST, Mar.
22, 1997, at 79-80; see also Bismarck's Steed, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 29, 1997, at 57-58.
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foreign investment funds. A second purpose is to counter the populist
reaction against the perceived domination by universal banks. From the
perspective of these two purposes, the declaration of dividends opportunity
as a counter-balancing "big stick" facet of co-determination is of little
relevance.
Greater attention could be paid to the fundamental right of the
"disenfranchised" investors to equal treatment from government.43 9 The
"bogey," for comparison purposes is the treatment currently accorded the
universal bank record shareholders insofar as they represent their own
proprietary, or quasi-proprietary, interests.
B. Overlap of Statutory Schemes
There is little German overlap of statutory schemes as among the states
or between the federal government and the states. Virtually, all the details
of the operation of the stock corporation are enacted in the form of federal
"home state" law."' This imposes specific legislative constraints on stock
corporations that are more rigorous than those imposed by U.S. home state
laws. The purpose is to protect against bankruptcy. 441 The states
theoretically have rights to provide additional legislation from two
perspectives. The first is that of being a "home state" of the corporation.
Under the German model, this home state is the state in which the
corporation is registered under federal law. However, the federal
government has pre-empted the area of home state law. A state court
monitors corporate governance compliance with federal law. 442 The states
are involved only peripherally from a substantive "home state"
perspective. 443
The second perspective is that of the state as the location of a national
stock exchange on which shares of the corporation are traded. The states in
which a national stock exchange is located, regulate the operation of the
stock exchanges in the areas of trade clearance, trade settlement and
securities custody mechanisms through regional exchange supervisory
authorities. This is, of course, insofar as it is outside the following five
439. LAW OF STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note 264, at § 119.1(2).
440. See generally Blum, supra note 5, and accompanying text; See also Kraus, supra
note 261, at 109-10.
441. See supra notes 292-94.
442. See LAW OF STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note 264, at §§ 14, 38, 104, 132. See also
DROSTE ET AL., supra note 258, at 463.
443. See LAW OF STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note 264, at § 12.
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areas of federal pre-emption. 4 There are currently eight national stock
exchanges in Germany.'" The five areas of federal pre-emption are: (1)
criteria for listing of shares for trading on them," 6 (2) criteria for coercive
tender offers for shares traded on them," 7 (3) criteria for membership on
the exchanges, 8 (4) general conduct of business by exchange members,"49
and (5) criteria for dissemination of issuer information relative to trading
on the exchanges.45
The states have chosen not to regulate the subject of corporate
governance. Perhaps they could well have been chosen to regulate. This
would be from the standpoint of the conceptual closeness of "voting of
shares" to "clearance, settlement and custody." Thus, the states, as well as
the federal government, have chosen to ignore the consideration that
corporations traded on the national stock exchanges may include foreign
stock corporations whose home state laws on corporate governance may be
less rigorous than those for German corporations. 51
A second reason for total state non-regulation of corporate governance
may be that any regulation would, in any event, impinge upon fundamental
rights of property and contract that are traditionally paramount vis-a-vis
operation of the exchanges.45 2 The exchanges, and therefore "their" states,
have been in intense competition with each other. 453 Therefore, they
understandably have awaited federal regulation of the issue of corporate
governance after a structured interaction among the states within the Federal
Council.'
Eight different laws on the subject of corporate governance for
exchange mechanism purposes may be impracticable. It is suggested that
444. See Pfeil, supra note 257, at 177-84 and Surya, supra note 370, at 38.
445. See Pfeil, supra note 257, at 173.
446. See Blum, supra note 5, at 510-12.
447. See Haggeney, supra note 277, at 213.
448. See DROSTE Er AL., supra note 258, at 221.
449. See Kraus, supra note 261, at 110-13.
450. See Pfeil, supra note 257, at 168-70 and Kraus, supra note 261, at 110-13.
451. Germany does not regulate the foreign corporation whose shares trade in Germany,
under its "home state law" (the Stock Corporation Act). See Kraus, supra note 261, at 113.
For a summary relating to the exceptional rigor of that Act as Germany's home state law,
see Kubler, supra note 261, at 98.
452. See Meier-Schatz, supra note 265, at 282 (referring to a German model tradition of
not regulating market mechanisms).
453. See Pfeil, supra note 257, at 177-84 and Surya, supra note 370, at 38.
454. Id.
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the federal government is in a position to enact improvements in the
German model of corporate governance. This is mainly because of the
federal government's exclusive authority over universal banks who are the
only broker-dealers permitted to be members of national stock exchanges.
No change is suggested on an opportunity-for-experimentation theory. The
German model has an adequate substitute for the lack opportunity that it
provides for experimentation vis-a-vis the concept of limited intra-
government competition. German federal government agencies in particular,
are able to hire and promote civil servants of the highest caliber.45 This
assures a quality of regulation that is arguably as high as the quality
promoted by the U.S. approach of opportunity for experimentation.
C. The Annual Meeting Participants under the German Model
1. The Participants
At least from a U.S. perspective, the universal banks are very strong
participants in the annual meeting process. They cannot be totally trusted.
The other participants trail behind in a number of respects. There is no
favored citizen capitalist. The only favored "capitalists" are institutions of
private law, and these are the universal banks and their investment funds.
We have seen that there are three main classes of annual meeting
participants under the German model. One class consists of the universal
bank in its proprietary and quasi-proprietary capacities including its
investment fund capacity. In these capacities and for fundamental rights
purposes, the universal bank is in privity of contract with the corporation.
This is because of an arrangement whereby the shares on deposit with the
universal bank are regarded as on deposit with the corporation.456 The
second class of participant is the shareholder, other than the universal
banks, who hold their shares in registered form on the books of the
corporation or, if shares are in bearer form, the shareholder has them on
deposit, for annual meeting purposes, either directly with the corporation
455. See Linde, supra note 247, at 603.
456. The mechanism whereby privity of contract is achieved can be said to work as
follows: (1) the universal bank is "known" as a shareholder by the corporation; see LAW OF
STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note 264, at § 121; (2) as an institution of private law, which
is therefore socially trusted, it requests annual meeting information; see id. at § 125; (3) it
has deposited a "certificate of deposit" for the bearer shares that it owns (and therefore
typically has on deposit with itself) with a notary public or "securities deposit bank"; see
id. at § 135.4; and (4) insofar as acting in a quasi-proprietary capacity such as an investment
fund capacity, it has provided the corporation with an "authorization certificate" showing
its authority to vote the investment fund shares; see id.
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or through a notary public or "security deposit bank." These "independent
shareholders" are also regarded as in privity of contract with the
corporation.457 The third class of participant consists of shareholders that
own bearer-form shares beneficially. However, these shares are on the
books of the corporation in the name of a universal bank record holder.
These, the "ward shareholders," are not in privity of contract with the
corporation.45 8
A theoretical "citizen capitalist" under the German model can be
defined as an independent shareholder, or ward shareholder, that is
(1) neither an "oversized investor" nor "counter-entrepreneur, " (2) has held
shares, amounting to a threshold for at least a threshold period, and (3) has
not fallen into passivity so as to constitute any sort of "plebe shareholder."
First, if the ward shareholder or independent shareholder fulfilled these
requirements of a capitalist, he would still not be favored. As shown
below, 459 a status as "ward shareholder" prevents him from receiving full
information directly from management of the corporation in advance of the
annual meeting. Nor would he necessarily be in a position to demand full
information directly from his main contact, his record holder universal
bank. He might well not be able to demand that his universal bank submit
a shareholder proposal on his behalf" or be able to attend the annual
meeting in person. 461
In contrast, even though the "independent shareholder" is disfavored
because he is subject to extra tax and other disadvantages, he has certain
advantages over the ward shareholder as a "citizen capitalist. " 2 First, he
457. See id. at §§ 123, 125. These statutory provisions imply that registration, with the
corporation, of registered shares creates privity of contract, but, as seen earlier in this
article, there is the disadvantage that the charter of the corporation may link any transfer of
registered shares to approval of the supervisory board and/or the shareholders meeting. See
Haggeney, supra note 277, at 212.
As to an independent shareholder that holds bearer shares, he may well rely on a
"shareholders' association" to represent his interests at annual meetings. The shareholders
association is in privity of contract with the corporation along the same lines as the above
mechanism for privity of contract on the part of a universal bank. See LAW OF STOCK
CORPORATIONS, supra note 264, at §§ 125, 135. But being represented by a shareholders'
association does not cause the independent shareholder to lose the tax and brokerage
commission disadvantages of being an independent shareholder and therefore, unaccredited.
See supra note 435 and accompanying text.
458. See LAW OF STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note 264, at § 123.
459. See discussion infra Part XII.D.
460. See discussion infra Part XII.D.
461. See LAW OF STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note 264, at § 123.
462. See infra Part XII.D.
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is entitled to receive information directly from management, even though
this information is of a rather bare-bones sort compared to the U.S., in
advance of the annual meeting. He gets this information as a matter of
course if his shares are on deposit "with the corporation. 463 He gets it on
demand once he has deposited his shares with a notary public or security
deposit bank in time to participate in the annual meeting. 61 Second, he is
entitled to submit his own shareholder proposals to management for
inclusion in a management document provided to shareholders "of record"
in advance of the meeting.'65 Third, he would be entitled to attend the
annual meeting in person. 466 We shall see that this would give him the right
to demand at the meeting a wide scope of information. 6 7 Fourth, he is
entitled to view a record of shareowners present at the meeting as well as
a record of ward shareholders on the day of the meeting. The ward
shareholders must be willing to be disclosed as beneficial owners and are
represented at the meeting by universal banks and other proxy-holders. 8
There is also a plebe shareholder, but he is different than in the U.S.
Whereas the U.S. plebe is one by circumstance, that is, he has held his
shares in less than a threshold amount or for less than a threshold period, 9
the German plebe is one by choice. The German model "plebe
shareholder" 470 is a ward shareholder who bows to pressure to "serve the
nation" by being inactive. In other words, he volunteers, influenced perhaps
by a "rational" apathy, 47' to give a 15-month proxy to his universal bank
without indicating how the universal bank is to vote. 472 This absence of
direction gives the bank an obligation of sorts, to vote in favor of its own
proposals as conveyed to this ward shareholder.473
463. See LAW OF STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note 264, at § 125.2(1).
464. See id. at §§ 125.2(2), 23.
465. See id. at §§ 125-127.
466. See id. at § 131.
467. Id.
468. See id. at § 129.
469. See supra Part XII.B.
470. Applying the method of analysis this article uses for the U.S. approach, another
"plebe" under the German model would be an independent shareholder whose holding
period is too short for him to have viewed the register of shareholders, including disclosed
beneficial shareowners, open at the last annual meeting. See LAW OF STOCK CORPORATIONS,
supra note 264, §§ 129, 135.
471. See Roe, supra note 248, at 1941-42.
472. See LAW OF STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note 264, at §§ 135, 128.3.
473. See id.
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There is, in a sense, a favored citizen shareholder. Citizen shareholders
who are natural persons are favored over foreign oversized investors. They
are particularly favored over U.S. investment companies. If a citizen
shareholder chooses and is willing to weather tax and other disadvantages,
he can always become an "independent shareholder." However, the U.S.
investment company registered with the SEC probably cannot become one.
If its shares are held in bearer form the U.S. law may preclude the
investment company from depositing the shares in order to vote, either with
the corporation or with a notary public or security deposit bank, unless that
institution is a U.S. bank.474
Of potential financial aristocrats, an obvious subject of scrutiny is the
universal bank because of its overriding strength as an annual meeting
participant.475 Subject to co-determination limitations, the universal bank is
given full rein to express not only its "fiduciary" but also its "proprietary"
and "quasi-proprietary" personalities. 76 The universal banks may act as
abdicating shareholders. For co-determination reasons discussed below, the
federal government and institutions of public law are in continuous contact
with the universal banks as "oversized investors" to assure that they do not
"abdicate" from their role as voters at annual meetings.477 Universal Banks
may also act as delegating shareholders. As suggested above, and for co-
determination reasons discussed below, universal banks, as oversized
investors, are encouraged to observe a "Wall Street rule" so long as there
is no crisis.478 The universal bank is indeed a potential reactive oversized
investor. If cash that is on hand or available is plentiful, the managerial
board of a stock corporation is in a position to exert pressure on a universal
bank in is record shareholder capacity, to vote its shares as the managerial
board wishes. This reactiveness may, of course, go against the best interests
474. Investment Companies Act of 1940 Rule 17f-5, 17 C.F.R. § 270.17f-5(1998). A
debatable issue is whether the German model's lack of deference, on corporate governance
issues, to U.S. investment companies, as opposed to accredited German investment funds,
would violate the basic right of equal treatment from the German government. See
Hardenberg, supra note 417, at 425.
475. See Roe, supra note 248, at 1939.The universal bank, of course, also derives
strength in the corporate governance process just by being a creditor. See Baums, supra note
5.
476. See Macey, supra note 279, at 76, 89 and Benfield, supra note 317 at 627-28
("personality" as creditor of corporation); Baums, supra note 5, at 518 (personality as
investment banker for corporation), and Kubler, supra note 261, at 103 (personality as
"house bank" for corporation). But see Roe supra, note 248, at 1939 ("fading," at least for
large corporations, of house bank function).
477. See Roe, supra note 248, at 1971.
478. See id. See Macey, supra note 279, at 514-15.
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of the ward shareholder. This is particularly if one is of a "plebe" variety
that depends on the universal bank for objectivity.479 The investment fund
managed by the universal bank is protected, to a degree, from this
reactiveness. German law requires that the investment fund, to protect its
interests, have its "own" representative present at the physical holding of
the annual meeting. 4 °
Finally, the universal banks may act as pro-active shareholders. The
German model does curtail the universal bank as pro-active oversized
investor. The model enables the other shareholders to deny the bank voting
power to the extent that its own proprietary ownership of shares typically
exceeds five to fifteen percent of total voting power.48 1 On the other hand,
depending on economic conditions, the universal bank might well assume
an oversized investor's conservative mind-set which unduly constrains the
entrepreneurial spirit of management. For example, on capital structure
issues, the universal bank shareholder might assume the mind-set of a
super-cautious extender of credit if the universal bank believes itself to be
too highly leveraged.482 In the meantime, already influenced by the pressure
of this conservative element in its corporate deliberations, management is
attempting to negotiate with the universal bank regarding the extension of
credit. Creative tension in the negotiating process may therefore be lacking
because of the universal bank's strong position as an annual meeting
participant.
2. Curtailment of Any Counter-entrepreneur
Again, depending on economic conditions, the universal bank might
assume a short-term speculative orientation as a sort of "counter-
entrepreneur." Similar to the creditor orientation discussed earlier, this
might be in opposition to the more long-term entrepreneurial orientation of
the managerial board. Thus, the bank record shareholder with the
substantial voting power at its disposal might be a lead investment banker
for the corporation.483 As such, the universal bank, no matter how
controlled and sophisticated it may be in fulfilling its role, is nevertheless
a speculator. The bank, both a major voter of shares and an investment
479. See Baums, supra note 5, at 519.
480. See id. at 505 n. 16.
481. See Macey, supra note 279, at 88-89 and Baums, supra note 5, at 507-08.
482. See Macey, supra note 279, at 76, 94.
483. See Baums, supra note 5, at 518 and Kubler, supra note 261, at 103. But see Roe,
supra note 248, at 1939.
[Vol. 19120
USE OF YANKEE CONCEPTS
banker, is in a position to enhance its equity investment in the corporation.
It is also in a position to enhance its voting power. Thus, it might require
the corporation to give it "rights of first refusal" or "pre-emptive rights"
in connection with any offering of shares to the public.48"
The German model curtails the role of the universal bank as counter-
entrepreneur by enabling the other shareholders to limit the universal banks
voting power once its proprietary interest voting power exceeds a
threshold.485 However, a significant level of ownership, such as five
percent, does not subject the counter-entrepreneur to a standard of care in
exercising its voting power. Rather, there must have been an "honor code
principle" undertaking on the part of the universal bank. Such an
undertaking could be in the form of willingness to send a representative to
serve on the supervisory board.
3. Critique
Certain specific statutory rights of ward shareholders, in relation to
their dealings with universal bank record shareholders, could be spelled out
by statute enacted by the federal legislature. 4" This could be in the interest
of equal treatment of those willing to take on the duties and limitations of
"institutions of private law" by the government. 11 These rights could
pertain to a variety of subjects including (1) information in advance of the
annual meeting,4 8' (2) getting together with other ward shareholders in
advance of the meeting regarding such subjects as shareholder proposals and
alternative slates of supervisory board members, 48 9 and (3) presence at the
physical holding of the meeting.'
D. Disclosure Leading to an Annual Meeting
The universal banks have significant advantages from a disclosure
standpoint. The independent shareholder does not have them. There are
484. See Baums, supra note 5, at 516-17 and Kubler, supra note 261, at 98.
485. See Macey, supra note 279, at 890-91 and Baums, supra note 5, at 507-08.
486. For a commentator who is also of the opinion that universal bank holdings in
commercial corporations should somehow be "limited," see Kubler, supra note 261, at 108.
487. "Shareholders" are given a statutory right to be treated in the same manner as other
"shareholders." See LAW OF STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note 264, at § 53(a).
488. See infra Part XII.D.
489. See infra Part XII.F.H.
490. See infra Part XII.E.
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scant statutory assurances that the advantages will be shared with the ward
shareholders. The capitalist catered to under the German model is the
universal bank. It is the universal banks that are typically lenders to stock
corporations and are therefore in privity of contract with them. The German
model has permitted the use of insider information derived from a non-
securitized lending relationship by a universal bank. 491 This includes use by
the investment funds as long as the inside information is not material for
purposes of Germany's insider trading law. 492 In addition, there are
informational advantages to the universal banks by virtue of their
representation on the supervisory board. However, these are strictly
circumscribed .as compared to the advantages from the lending
relationship.4 93
The universal bank is clearly preferred over the ward shareholder in
other respects as well. However, they are not preferred over the
independent shareholder. The three main constituencies of shareholder, the
universal bank, the ward shareholders and the independent shareholder,
491. See Benfield, supra, note 317, at 633-34 and Baums, supra note 5, at 517. Even
after the passage of an insider trading law in 1994, use by universal banks of potentially
market-moving information that has not yet been disclosed to the public, is permitted if use
is restricted to voting at the annual meeting. And, since the universal bank, in its credit-
extending capacity, is not a "stockholder," it is not a highly accountable "primary insider"
for purposes of the German model's insider trading law but, rather, a somewhat less
accountable "secondary insider." As a "secondary insider," the universal bank may not
trade on inside potentially market-moving information for itself or for others. However, as
such a less accountable insider, it is not precluded from providing others, such as its
sufficiently separate investment funds, with potentially market-moving information. Thus,
the universal bank representative on the corporation's supervisory board may not be at risk
of liability under the insider trading law for any violation by the bank's investment funds so
long as they adhere to "honor code" principles of separateness. The German model takes
steps to assure that the investment fund, as managed by a universal bank, is separate and
distinct from the bank in its other record stockholder capacities, particularly on the floor of
the annual meeting. See Pfeil, supra note 257, at 162-64.
492. The investment fund, once it receives the inside credit information, becomes a
secondary insider such that its use of the information cannot include trading on the basis of
the information but can include voting on that basis. See Pfeil, supra note 257, at 162-64.
493. As to the circumscribing of the informational advantages of membership on the
supervisory board, if a universal bank representative on the board informs his principal (in
its shareholder capacity) of confidential information that he has received as a member of that
board, there is a statutory requirement that the information also be made available to any
shareholder requesting it on the floor of the annual meeting. See LAW OF STOCK
CORPORATIONS, supra note 264, at § 131.
As to the greater informational advantages of a credit relationship, see Baums, supra
note 5, at 512-13, 517. See also Macey, supra note 279, at 87-88 (deposit-taking, as well
as other lender functions, as a source of inside information).
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receive the following information relative to corporate performance in
advance of the physical holding of the annual meeting:
1. Procedural information. All three constituencies will receive
the call of the meeting, any special circumstances of the meeting
if this information is demanded, and the agenda items as prepared
by the managerial board.4"
2. Recommendations of management. All three constituencies
will receive the recommendations of the managerial board and
those of the supervisory board. Reasons for the management
recommendations need not be given except in the case of a
shareholder proposal opposed by management.495
3. Information regarding shareholder proposals. All three
constituencies will receive these proposals. As seen above, these
can be made only by independent shareholders or the universal
bank.496
4. Information mainly relating to long-term operating
performance. The universal bank record holders and the
independent shareholders are in a position to receive or demand
various additional items of financial information directly from
management, in advance of the meeting. One is the corporation's
annual financial statements as prepared by the managerial board.
Another is the supervisory board's "report" on its "audit" of the
financial statements. A further item is the managerial board's
recommendation as to "appropriation" of "unappropriated
earnings." Finally there is the "business report" prepared by the
managerial board relating to the corporation's capital structure,
provided that there may be the omission of information necessary
for the well-being of the "nation or one of its states.",9
No statutory provision specifies how the ward shareholder is to receive
this conglomeration of reports. Rather, he typically receives the information
only to the extent that his universal bank record-holder, influenced by the
494. See LAW OF STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note 264, at §§ 124, 125, 127, 128.
495. See id. at §§ 124.3, 126, 128.
496. See id. at §§ 123, 126.
497. See id. at § 175.
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ward shareholder's fundamental right of stock ownership, chooses to pass
it on to him perhaps in accordance with an internal code of conduct.498 In
short, under the German model, only the universal bank record holder is
given by management in advance of the annual meeting by virtue of lending
relationships. This information is routinely given by management in the
U.S. to the citizen capitalist: business and services, enterprise objectives,
short-term share price performance, comparing performances with
objectives, comparing results with the competition, and personnel policies
and compensation.
499
There are other sources of information as well. This is not to say that
the independent shareholders and ward shareholders are totally in the dark.
First, there are a variety of sources of information accessible to a hard-
digging press although they are not readily available to the public. 5"
However, a corporate spokesman is discouraged from talking by the threat
of criminal prosecution if he reveals "confidential" information as broadly
defined by statute.5° . Second, full information is available if the
corporation is in the midst of or has just completed a public offering of
shares that have been newly listed on a stock exchange. In this case, even
a ward shareholder can readily get information. 5° However, the
information on file with the exchange for this offering need not, under the
German model, be updated for purposes of trading in the "secondary
market. "503 Third, material developments in the corporation's fortunes will
likely be timely in front of the public. Under Germany's new insider
498. The law, as translated into English, merely provides that the reports relating to long-
term operating performance "shall be exhibited for inspection by shareholders (sic) in the
omnanv nffie-P" ant i rnpy nf the reports "ehall h c;upn withnOit Aelay, tA n
shareholder (sic) who so requests." See id. However, the law does not specify how a ward
shareholder is to prove to the corporation that he is indeed a "shareholder" if he approaches
the corporation directly. It can only be assumed, therefore, that at least as a practical matter,
the ward shareholder can "approach" the corporation only through his universal bank, to get
the reports relating to long-term operating performance. See id.
499. See supra Part V.A.
500. Main sources of information to the hard-digging press would be (1) the "Commercial
Register," (2) the "Federal Gazette," (3) "company newspapers," and (4) notices at
establishments of the corporation. See LAW OF STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note 264, at
§§ 20(6), 106, 124, 125. See also DROSTE ET AL., supra note 258, at 192.
As to the necessity for a digging press, "practically no investor ever reads (the
Federal Gazette)," according to one commentator. See Hardenberg, supra note 417, at 226.
501. See Kraus, supra note 261, at 110-13 and Blum, supra note 5, at 511-12.
502. See Kraus, supra note 261, at 110-13. See also Blum, supra note 5, at 511-12;
DROSTE ET AL., supra note 259, at 608.
503. See Kraus, supra note 261, at 110-13. See also Blum, supra note 5, at 511-12.
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trading law which was enacted in 1994, corporations are statutorily required
to "immediately" announce new corporate developments publicly. This
information must be "capable of considerably influencing the value of a
security" once announced. However, this would probably not go beyond
information that is considered material to an "average" prudent investor in
buying or selling the shares. Therefore, the information might well not
make up for the detailed information that the universal bank has,
particularly as extender of credit."°'
Usually, there is no disclosure of compensation to the independent
shareholders or ward shareholders in advance of the annual meeting under
the German model. Compensation involves the right to choose one's
occupation and therefore is confidential unless there is a crisis requiring
resolution of fundamental rights. Then, the subject of compensation is
therefore an agenda item for the annual meeting."05 This is not to say that
compensation is unimportant under the German model. It is simply not a
subject disclosed for the record shareholders before the annual meeting. As
for "job-security compensation," in theory this form of compensation is not
necessary. A German executive officer, that is, an "executive" member of
the managerial board, cannot be fired at will but rather only for a
statutorily specified cause .50 From the point that the executive was
appointed by a two-thirds vote of the supervisory board,5" the executive's
contract is for a five-year term. 08
Additionally, compensation of a wage nature does not exist for
executives under the German model. The terms of the contract are regarded
as assuring that an executive will provide the corporation with the value that
504. See Pfeil, supra note 257, at 168-69. A commentator has argued that such a
disclosure, addressed to the "average" investor, is of value only for the purpose of
determining price in organized capital markets, and not for sophisticated analysis by an
individual investor. See Meier-Schatz, supra note 265, at 290-91.
505. See LAW OF STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note 264, at § 124.4. Even if the subject
of compensation is not an agenda item for the annual meeting and is confidential,
management, in the interest of equal treatment, must reveal compensation information on
the floor of the meeting, at the request of a shareholder, if the managerial board or
supervisorial board has given information on compensation to another "shareholder" in
advance of the meeting. See id. at § 131.4.
506. See LAW OF STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note 264, at § 84. See also Baums, supra
note 5, at 504.
507. There are permutations to the two-thirds vote to assure the slight pre-dominance of
the capital half of the supervisory board referred to earlier in this article. See Kolvenbach,
supra note 265, at 165.
508. See LAW OF STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note 264, at § 84 and Baums, supra note
5, at 504.
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the latter has bargained for. Only if there is a statutorily prescribed degree
of diminution in the financial fortunes of the corporation is a reduction of
compensation permissible. 509 As for the U.S. approach that materialization
of conflicts of interest constitutes a "wage," the German model provides for
court supervision of the issue instead of disclosure to the shareholders.
Further, compensation in the form of a cash "bonus" is rare under the
German model. "Extra" compensation is regarded as inappropriate for
doing one's duty. Any recommendation that executives be paid cash
bonuses by the managerial board to the supervisory board is subject to an
accusation of selfishness. 511 Constituencies innately hostile to a cash bonus
would be both labor, employee wages, and capital, dividends.5 1 2 However,
if the bonus is "an equity participation bonus," as defined earlier in this
article, the labor and capital hostility may not exist. The traditional view is
that stock ownership is a "perquisite of management. "513 Under normal
circumstances, principles of confidentiality would preclude disclosure of the
equity participation bonus to shareholders in advance of an annual
meeting.514 The "volunteer" who works for free or for a salary that is too
low by community standards is viewed as sufficiently counterbalanced by
application of the honor code principle in the German model. Palpable
conflicts of interest would be subject to judicial scrutiny. 5
Lastly, compensation egalitarianism is already handled by the
supervisory board. In fact, it is a main function of this overseeing body to
fix an appropriate relationship among (1) compensation to capital in the
form of dividends, (2) compensation to managerial board members and
other white collar workers in the form of salaries, and (3) compensation to
blue collar workers in the form of wages.5" 6 A crisis requiring disclosure
regarding compensation issues exists once there has been a public
announcement of uinfavorable material deveopnments in the corporation's
fortunes. This may prompt management to put compensation issues on the
agenda to essentially obtain a release from responsibility from the annual
meeting.5"7 Even if there is a crisis relating to compensation issues and the
509. See id.
510. See id. at §§ 88, 117.
511. See supra note 328 and accompanying text.
512. See supra note 328 and accompanying text.
513. See supra note 330 and accompanying text.
514. See LAW OF STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note 264, at §§ 93, 116, 117, 131.
515. Seeid. at §§ 88, 117.
516. See Kubler, supra note 261, at 109-10.
517. See LAW OF STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note 264, at § 117.2.
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matter is on the agenda, even the independent shareholders are accorded
little opportunity to get meaningful information in advance of the annual
meeting unless management provides it. Perhaps they may do so in
accordance with an internal code of conduct sensitive to fundamental rights.
A tool needs to be devised whereby ward shareholders can receive the
same information in advance of annual meetings as German investment
funds. The device could apply to either German citizen shareholders or
foreign investment fund shareholders."1 8 One possibility arises from the
honor code methodology that applies to German investment funds under the
German model. The methodology is that individual officers of the universal
banks are deemed to represent the interests of the investment fund. Under
internal codes of conduct, they are to receive information rigidly conveyed
to them by the universal bank as fiduciaries answerable only to the
investment fund.
Similarly, individual officers of the universal bank could receive
information from the universal bank as fiduciaries answerable only to the
ward shareholder. The advantage of this approach is that confidential
information would not have to actually be conveyed to individuals outside
the employment of the universal bank. A disadvantage is that the ward
shareholders may well represent a variety of interests and perspectives.
Therefore, too many separate employees of the universal bank would have
to follow "honor code" principles if such ward shareholders are to be
represented. Alternatively, the ward shareholders could become
contractually bound to the universal banks to observe principles of
confidentiality themselves and undertake certain other obligations. This
would be an "institution of private law" obligation imposed upon them if
they are to receive the same information in advance of an annual meeting
as is given to the German investment funds.5 19
E. Assurance of Integrity of Any "Grade" Given Management
Giving a grade on the performance of management is not a main
purpose of the annual meeting under the German model. Unlike the case in
the U.S., the annual shareholders meeting is not characterized by judicial-
518. The desirability of involving foreign investment fund shareholders in corporate
governance, in particular, encouraging personal attendance at annual meetings has been the
subject of a German study group investigation. See Kubler, supra note 261, at 106.
519. This would give the ward shareholder insider information that he may be precluded
from trading on, as a "primary insider," until the information is divulged (on a statutorily-
mandated immediate basis) to the trading markets See Pfeil, supra note 257, at 156-58; see
also Roe, supra note 248, at 1987 n.189.
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form procedures. Moreover, there is no "drafting" of directors as in the
U.S. There is no drawn out process for digestion of information as a basis
for a participatory democracy session at the annual meeting. There is also
no specific statutory assurance of dependable voting protocol as in the U.S.
1. Citizen-as-master Dynamism
There is no citizen-as-master "dynamism," under the German model.
The core U.S. -type purpose of a draft of directors out of a legally unlimited
universe is not to be found. Rather, the effort is to elect members of a
supervisory board that are acceptable as members of that institution of
private law .520 As for initiation of the process of selecting nominees for the
capital half of the supervisory board, the managerial board is not to
recommend nominees out 'of an unlimited universe. It recommends
nominees that will satisfy statutory requirements of Germany's co-
determination law.5 2 This mandate militates against the recommendation of
any "independent" director who would not assuredly represent the interests
of the "capital" half of the supervisory board. The model encourages the
managerial board to rely on suggestions from current "capital" members of
the supervisory board, that is, from the current shareholders, primarily the
universal banks.522
Absent an election contest, there is no statutory requirement to disclose
any conflicts or confluences of interest of the nominees, to ward or
independent shareholders. All that is required in an uncontested setting for
the process of voting on the nominees for the capital half as recommended
by management, are management's recommendations and the "names,
addresses and occupations" of the nominees. 23 Once the nominees assume
office, their performance of duties in the event of a crisis situation is judged
in the courts more rigorously than it would be the case for "drafted"
directors in the U.S. courts. 524
520. See supra notes 315-320 and accompanying text.
521. See Baums, supra note 5, at 505; Kolvenbach, supra note 265, at 164; and Peltzer,
supra note 259, at 34. The universal bank shareholder component of the supervisory board
(an institution of private law, expert on the subject of co-determination) is regarded as
particularly knowledgeable about the "management market" and therefore in a position to
appoint "the right people to the supervisory board" See Baums, supra note 5, at 513.
522. According to one commentator, it is very common for "nominees of banks" to sit
on supervisory boards, and these nominees "are often directors and officers of the banks at
the same time." See Blum, supra note 5, at 519 n.65.
523. See LAW OF STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note 264, at § 124.3.
524. See Peltzer, supra note 259, at 34-35. See also Schwanke, supra note 259, at 13.
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2. Participatory Democracy Vigor
There is vigor as it exists in the U.S., only if there is a crisis. Even
then, there is an absence of the vigor that exists in a participatory
democracy of free-ranging discussion with participants, including citizens,
armed with advance information and with the expectation that creative ideas
will emanate from the citizens. Rather, under the German model, the vigor
is exercised mainly at the annual meeting itself in a structured interaction
where matters discussed are kept reasonably confidential." z The structured
interaction is largely among the managerial board, socially-obligated
capital, and independent shareholders. There is little, if any, substantive
involvement of the supervisory board. This interaction, however, is
monitored by labor since any member of the supervisory board, including
a labor member, may be present.
It is at this physical holding that detailed information is for the first
time given to the shareholders present. The information must be relevant to
an agenda item, unless previously disclosed in advance of the meeting to
one of the shareholders present.526 If requested information is withheld by
management, the German judiciary is given a statutory mandate to
immediately adjudicate the issues.527 In other words, the German model
emphasizes structured interaction at the physical holding of the meeting.
The U.S. approach, in contrast, emphasizes not so much what occurs at the
annual meeting but rather the whole "judicial-form" process, including the
pleading phase in advance of the meeting.
The "vigor" of the structured interaction at the physical meeting is
tempered under the German model. With one significant exception, 28
management is not required to give requested information if: (1) "on the
basis good business judgment, divulgence is apt to cause considerable
damage to the corporation;" (2) the request would require disclosure of
"trade and operational secrets and other confidential information," learned
through membership on the managerial or supervisory board; or (3) unless
the annual meeting is itself performing an "audit," the request would
require divulgence of financial statement-related information.529 Moreover,
the "vigor" is not enhanced, as it is in the U.S., by any presence of the
press at the annual meeting. For one thing, there is no central governmental
525. See LAW OF STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note 264, at § 131.
526. Id.
527. See id. at § 132.
528. See id. at §§ 131.4, 131.5, 132.
529. See id. at §131.
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repository of information for corporate objectives and performance like the
SEC. Rather, the relevant governmental repositories under the German
model are scattered, requiring particularly diligent investigation by the press
if it wishes to be knowledgeable.530 Moreover, the press may not be
permitted to attend the annual meeting since it is generally a crime for a
member of management to divulge to the public information that may harm
the corporation under the German model.5 3'
3. Ministerial Duties Dependability
There is a dependability of ministerial duties of some sort which is
predicated on internal codes of conduct such as the honor code principle but
dependability is not sought as in the U.S. It is questionable whether this
dependability is enough if the proprietary interests of the universal bank,
largely responsible for discharge of internal codes of conduct, create a
conflict of interest.532
There is protection from the more unconstrained of fellow shareholders.
The approach of the German code is that a discipline of ministerial duties
is not necessary to counter any large and untested electorate. Thus, it is not
considered necessary to give management relatively unfettered discretion to
select the time and place of the annual meeting. The electorate is tested
under the German model rather than "untested," as is arguably the case in
the U.S. Besides the unlikely-to-be disruptive universal banks record
holders and investment funds, the independent shareholders and the
shareholders' associations that represent them, must go through the trouble
of depositing their shares with the corporation or with a notary public or
security deposit bank. 533 Rather, the German model is more interested in
assuring attendance of the responsible institutions of private law, as well as
protecting fundamental rights. Therefore, there is a predictable location for
the annual meeting. In general, the meeting must occur in either the "home
state" of the corporation or in the state of one of the national stock
exchanges on which its shares are traded. 34
530. See supra note 500.
531. See LAW OFSTOCKCORPORATIONS, supra note 264, at §§ 93, 117 and Peltzer, supra
note 259, at 34-35.
532. For elaboration on the existence of conflict, see Roe, supra note 248, at 383. See
also, Macey, supra note 279, at 80.
533. See supra Part XII.D.
534. See LAW OF STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note 264, at § 129.4.
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There is no statutory listing of procedures to assure that proxies are
exercised strictly in accordance with the directions of the proxy-giver. The
only statutory requirement is that a proxy holder have provided his
beneficiary with a "form" to indicate his instructions.535 There is no specific
statutory requirement that a beneficiary state whether or how instructions
to his proxy holder may be revoked.536 Further, German statute permits a
proxy holder to deviate from an express or implied directive of a beneficial
owner, provided he tells the latter about the deviation and the reasons for
it, after voting. 37 A proxy holder is, by statute, permitted to deviate from
its own proposals disclosed to a beneficiary and deemed accepted by him if,
on further reflection, the proxy-holder has reason to believe that the
shareholder would not approve of the proposal. 38
The German model has no provision for election inspectors who are
independent of management to oversee discharge of internal codes of
conduct. Rather, by statutory requirement, the corporate charter is to
specify how the right to vote is to be "exercised. 
539
Protection of "co-determination" is more important under the German
model than protection against corporate uncertainty. The term of a "capital"
member of the supervisory board ends when the next annual meeting is
held. Unlike the U.S., there is no additional requirement that a successor
to a member shall have been elected and qualified on that day." 4 The
problem faced by the German model is that there has to be equality between
the process for the capital vote and the one for the labor vote.541 For this
reason, on petition of the managerial board, a court is statutorily given
discretion to appoint a "capital" member to fill any vacancy because of a
failure to elect one at the annual meeting. The purpose of involving the
court is so that the fifty-fifty split that co-determination requires between
capital and labor, is not disturbed.542 In addition, floor nominations for
535. See id. at § 121.
536. See id. at §§ 123, 125.
537. See id. at § 135.4.
538. See id. at § 135.8.
539. There is no express statutory requirement that the corporation specify how a proxy
may be revoked as an aspect of the exercise of the right to vote. See id. at § 134.4.
540. See id. at § 102.
541. Cf. Kubler, supra note 261, at 106.
542. See LAW OF STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note 264, at § 104.
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directors are permitted to counterbalance any such failure. However, they
are subject to a statutory rule that a director elected in this manner is subject
to recall on a vote by three-fourths of the shareholders. 
43
4. Critique
From the perspective of the ward shareholder, there could be
strengthening of the role of dynamism in the selection of capital members
of the supervisory board. This could be achieved by statutory provisions
requiring that a universal bank's record shareholders have a special
nominating committee of honor-code-bound officers of the bank. It is this
nominating committee to whom ward shareholders could convey
suggestions for nominees. In addition, the universal banks could be
statutorily required to give their ward shareholders information bearing on
possible conflicts and confluences of interest of their representatives on the
supervisory board with the particular corporation.
Like German investment funds, the ward shareholders could, by statute,
have the right to have a separate officer of the universal bank personally
present at the annual meeting to represent their interests only.
544
Alternatively, by statutory provision, the ward shareholder could have the
right to have his own representatives present at the meeting as a special
"invitee" of his universal bank. He would be subject to all the contractual
and "institution of private law" obligations of his universal bank.
An argument can be made that universal bank internal codes of conduct
are sufficient to protect rights to voting procedures that have integrity.
However, more assured protection could be provided by a statutory listing
that is in greater detail. For example, areas where greater statutory detail
could occur are those of (1) revocation of proxies and (2) deviation from
instructions of the proxy-giver, by the proxy-holder.
F. Assured Integrity for any Election Contest
Except in the case of universal banks, the German model discourages
the formation of dissident factions in advance of an annual meeting. The
universal banks, on the other hand, are encouraged to "test the waters" in
advance of the meeting, so they may form a faction that can take vigorous
part on the floor of the meeting. However, there are no statutory provisions
specifically directed to the right of ward shareholders to test the waters for
543. See id. at § 103.
544. See Kubler, supra note 261, at 106.
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election contests, whether or not through the universal banks. Independent
shareholders have only a very limited ability to test the waters and are
therefore discouraged from attempting to form a dissident faction.
The German model recognizes a right to propose a slate of capital
nominees for supervisory board membership as involving a fundamental
right to associate as well as a fundamental right of stock ownership. In
contrast to the U.S. approach, the model does not provide for the existence
of a channel of communication between a nominating committee of the
supervisory board and "citizen shareholders. "'45 On the other hand, unlike
the U.S., the German stock corporation is required to include all slates of
capital members in a corporation information statement relating to the
meeting. This is true whether the slates are proposed by management,
separately by universal banks, or are proposed separately by independent
shareholders." 4
1. Initial Testing of the Waters by a Contestant
Initial testing is encouraged if the contestant is a universal bank record-
holder through the representatives of universal banks sitting together on the
supervisory board. The universal banks are also in a position to test the
waters with those of its ward shareholders who are assertive enough to
become involved by invitation from their universal bank. However, in
contrast to the U.S., there is little, if any, ability on the part of the ward
shareholders to get in touch with each other.
The position of the ward and independent shareholders to test the
waters with each other is potentially improved by virtue of Germany's new
insider trading law. 547 Now even they will be aware of potential crises.
They will be alerted to the possible advisability of instituting election
contests. The obvious effort on the part of an independent shareholder is to
attempt to quickly form shareholder associations to hold the shares and
place them on deposit with the corporation, a notary public or a "security
deposit bank." The association would then inform corporate management
of its alternative slate so that it would be included in the management
545. There can be no nominating committee consisting of only part of the supervisory
board, that is, a nominating committee that does not include labor members of the board.
See LAW OF STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note 264, at § 107.3.
546. See id. at §§ 125, 126. This is in contrast to the U.S. where the management proxy
statement need not include alternative director slates proposed by outsiders. In the U.S. any
such slate must appear in a separate proxy statement prepared at the expense of the
alternative slate proponents.
547. For a description of this law, enacted in 1994, see Pfeil, supra note 257.
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information statement. By then, the association will have hopefully learned
the identities of independent shareholders present at the previous annual
meeting. They will also have learned the identities of ward shareholders
who were assertive for purposes of that annual meeting by directing "their"
universal bank record holder to disclose their identities in the registration
book for that previous meeting. 41
2. Existence of Any Favoring of "Citizen Organizers"
Only in a very narrow sense and only in a publicly-announced crisis are
citizen organizers of factions favored. The German model can accomplish
the equivalent of the U.S. "vigor of the publicized dissident faction" only
in that the German model makes the annual meeting an institution of private
law in the event of a crisis.5 49 Still, this vigor, exerted behind essentially
closed doors, is designed more to protect fundamental rights than to favor
citizen organizers as protectors of the public interest. There is likely no
press present to appreciate the efforts of independent shareholders on the
meeting floor.
3. Curtailment of Organizers
As seen above, curtailment of counter entrepreneur organizers who are
independent shareholders is not achieved by publicity in advance of the
annual meeting. Thus, alternate slates of supervisory board members may
be proposed for the first time from the floor of the meeting as long as the
election of such directors is announced in advance as an agenda item.55°
However, any such slate of board members actually elected is subject to
later recall on the vote of three-quarters of the shareholders. The universal
record holders, if disenchanted with the slate as elected, may well be able
to muster such a voting block.
Once factions are organized, only bare-boned information is required
about the faction in advance of the annual meeting. Thus, there is no
statutory requirement that a universal bank give U.S.-type detailed
information to its ward shareholders relating to an alternative slate of capital
members of the supervisory board.55 No information, for example, is
548. See LAW OF STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note 264, at §§ 129, 135.
549. See id. at § 119.
550. See id. at § 124.4
551. See id. at § 128.2.
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statutorily required bearing on all conceivable confluences or conflicts of
interest on the part of the members of the slate, with the corporation, as
required in the U.S. 52
4. Critique
Admittedly, internal codes of conduct instituted by some universal bank
shareholders of record could, in fact, have the effect of promoting the
testing of the waters by ward shareholders who would be faction organizers.
However, whatever internal codes of conduct exist, they are private.
Prospective investors in German stock markets, such as German citizen
investors and foreign investment funds, could well need up-front assurances
of protection of their rights to institute election contests. Such assurances
could be provided by an explicit statutory framework. The first level of the
framework could be a statutorily-prescribed structured interaction among
ward shareholders and "their" universal bank record holders. The
interaction entity for this purpose (hereinafter "the first level shareholder
board") could be organized along the lines of the supervisory board. Its
membership could consist of both representatives of the universal bank as
record owner in a fiduciary capacity, and ward shareholder representatives.
The chairman, with a tie-breaking vote, could be a universal bank
representative. This is because of the institution-of-private-law importance
of the universal bank under the German model.
In a meeting of the shareholder board involving the universal bank that
is record shareholder in a particular corporation, there would be a "second
level structured interaction" among all the universal bank record holders at
a meeting of a "second-level shareholder board." This meeting follows the
"first-level structured interaction." The goal is to ultimately arrive at a final
position on the part of that corporation's "capital." This final position
could, as one alternative, be conveyed to management by a universal bank
spokesman as a suggestion for management's slate of supervisory board. As
another alternative, the final position could be an opposition slate proposed
by the universal bank for final instructions from its respective ward
shareholders.
Under this proposed statutory rubric, the universal banks in their
investment fund and strictly proprietary capacities, as well as the
"independent shareholders, " will not have been contacted in advance of the
annual meeting for purposes of structural interaction in meetings of the
shareholder board. This is not to say that a mechanism could not be devised
552. See Baums, supra note 5, at 521. See also supra Part XII.D.
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that includes these constituencies. This will, however, require cooperation
of corporate management. The need for this cooperation might move the
project partially away from the universal banks in their clearance,
settlement and custody capacities. The project could well involve corporate
"home state" law under the German model and limit the prospects of
applicability to foreign corporations whose shares trade on German national
stock exchanges.
To sum up, the German model's main protection against undesirable
surprise at the physical holding of the annual meeting is still not publicity.
Rather, it is the involvement of the universal banks in a "primary
responsibility capacity" as institutions of private law in any election contest.
To assure that assertive ward shareholders are socially-responsible, they
could be required to take on an institutional coloring. Statutory provisions
could require a common goal of "social capitalism" at meetings of the
above two levels of shareholder board. This common goal would be
analogous to "co-determination" for meetings of the supervisory board. The
deliberations of the shareholder board would include the tie-breaking vote
of universal bank chairmen. A disagreeing assertive ward shareholder could
have immediate access to the judiciary branch to resolve issues of balancing
the fundamental rights which is not to ignore his right to stock ownership.
G. Underpinning of an Assured Minimum Level
of Short-term Share Price Performance
The German model provides less statutory and regulatory assurance of
dissemination of accurate financial information to the market place than
does the U.S. In addition, the German model's "pragmatic" definition of
material iniri infnrmntiOn fnr nurnnesc '%f Ac terrng ;nider t'dng"
requires guidance from institutions of public and private law before a
development becomes material. As a result of this, the German model has
distaste for the abstractly worded writ issued by a regulatory agency and
corporate officials with an "anti-social" mind-set are still able to take
advantage of the traditional stock ownership prerogative of trading on
important inside information which has not yet been deemed material by
institutions.
Since the insider trading law of 1994 was enacted, the German citizen
capitalist can have a modicum of confidence that patently self-interested
interference by insiders with the market price of shares has been avoided.
This is the case even though, as we have seen above, the German model
requires only one-time disclosure of a detailed nature as found in the U.S.
This occurs when the shares are first registered with an exchange for
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trading on it.553 Thereafter, such disclosure is updated by disclosure of
material developments as required, for instance, by the insider trading
law.554
1. Dissemination of Accurate Information
We start with this first aspect of an assured level of short-term share
price performance. The nature of ministerial duties must be considered.
The German stock corporation, in connection with its accounting for its
operations, has not been subject to a writ setting forth objective standards
for the maintaining of objectively-defined internal accounting controls.
There is no statutory provision broadly defining such controls to assure the
accuracy of financial information whether it is used internally or conveyed
to the public.555 On the other hand, strong responsibility is placed on the
managerial board to assure that specific preventive actions are taken if
internal financial information gives statutorily-defined warning signals. 
556
The supervisory board cannot rely on financial information conveyed by the
managerial board regarding the lack of any such signals. Rather it must
perform or be involved in an "audit" of the corporation's financial
disclosure documents.557 The supervisory board may, for this purpose,
inspect the corporation's books and records. This is a precaution that is
typically unnecessary because the supervisory board or the annual meeting
appoints an "accounting auditor" to perform that function.558 In a sense, the
auditor is an institution of private law guiding other institutions of private
law, primarily the supervisory board and the annual meeting.559
The sanctions are severe if mistakes are made and they lead to the
corporation's declaration of bankruptcy. Thus, the members of the
managerial and supervisory boards, on pain of criminal prosecution or civil
action for damages based on privity of contract, must be able to prove that
553. See Kraus, supra note 261, at 110-13.
554. See Pfeil, supra note 257, at 168-69.
555. The only statutory provision is that financial statements "answer the conditions of
a true and conscientious accounting." See LAW OF STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note 264,
at § 131.2.
556. See Peltzer, supra note 259, at 34-35 (criminal liability for failure to inform
shareholders if half of capital is lost or failure to initiate insolvency proceedings in case of
"overindebtedness").
557. See LAw OF STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note 264, at §§ 11, 171.
558. See id. at §§ 119, 142. See also Arlene G. Wenig and Godehard H. Puckler, Public
Accounting in West Germany: an Overview, J. OF ACCT. 82 (1982).
559. See Wenig, supra note 558.
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they "applied the care of an orderly and prudent man of business." If an
auditor is appointed he must be able to prove he has "performed his audit
conscientiously and impartially." 5"
Next, those performing ministerial duties must be considered. In
response to these non-objective accountability standards, the managerial and
supervisory boards are not statutorily given a publicized list of officers to
assign public ministerial responsibilities as in the U.S. Statutory provision
is made only for a "president" of the supervisory board, a president of the
managerial board, an auditor as selected by the supervisory board or annual
meeting, and a special auditor as selected by the annual meeting. 6' These
officials are not public in the U.S. sense. Rather, they can be regarded as
representatives of the boards as institutions of private law who are
constrained by principles of confidentiality.562 Otherwise, provision is
made for company administrators expected to follow an honor code in
fulfillment of the leadership principle. Thus, the managerial board, with
guidance from the supervisory board, "sets up its own rules."563 The
supervisory board, to a limited degree, may but they need not establish
committees of its own members.
5 64
In short, there is no legislative mandate for any U.S.-type officials
whose prescribed duties have public implications, including: (1) a corporate
secretary; (2) a compliance official; (3) a principal accounting officer; (4)
a current "independent public" accountant; (5) a former independent public
accountant who is publicly accountable as in the U.S.; (6) any director who,
if he has resigned, has the right to bring financial-statement-related
disagreements he has had with the other directors to the attention of the
citizen-capitalists and thus, the public markets; or (7) officials of a
government agency, such as the SEC, who are publicly accountable for
expeditious monitoring of financial information.565
Let us consider the likely process of corporate preparation of the
financial disclosure documents required by law to be made available to
universal bank and independent shareholders. In considering this process,
let us assume that the previous annual meeting has selected an accounting
auditor for purposes of auditing the annual financial statements. The
procedure of an individual corporation is likely to be as follows. First, the
560. See LAW OF STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note 264, at §§ 93, 116, 144.
561. See id. at §§ 107, 84, 119.
562. See id. at §§ 93, 116, 117, 144.
563. See id. at §§ 77, 111, 107.
564. See id. at § 107.3.
565. See supra Part VIII.A.
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auditor inspects and audits the books and records of the corporation as kept
by an undisclosed administrative employee assigned to the task by the
managerial board pursuant to an internal code of conduct. The auditor
performs his functions taking into account auditing guidances of an
"institute of auditors," an institution of private law. The latter will have not
made a determination that the standards are objectively "generally-
accepted." Rather it will have made the judgment that the guidance is
consistent with a "true and conscientious accounting."" The above
administrative employee who has kept the records will, like the above
auditor, have had in mind these accounting guidelines.
In performing his audit, the auditor tests any internal accounting
controls monitored by an administrative employee privately designated by
the managerial board to perform internal audits. The latter relies on
guidance of the above institute of auditors regarding internal audits.
Another undisclosed administrative employee prepares the annual financial
statements for the managerial board. He, and that board, perform their
duties in accordance with the above accounting guidance promulgated by
the institute of auditors. The auditor, as one of his duties, offers his
comments on these statements to the supervisory board in plenary session
to include labor members. He will not have had a definitive pre-screening
with any audit committee composed of part, but not all, of the supervisory
board members before doing this. The events that transpired in this plenary
session of the supervisory board will be reflected in minutes signed by the
chairman of the supervisory board. The minutes are statutorily required to
set forth only "essential" contents of the proceeding.
If the supervisory board approves the annual financial statements, the
managerial board assigns an undisclosed administrative employee to assure
that the required information is made available to the universal bank and
independent shareholders in accordance with legal requirements. No
government agency assists or monitors the dissemination of information
relevant to the annual meeting, as the SEC does in the U.S.
2. Dissemination of Timely Information to the Market Place
We now consider this second aspect of an assured level of short-term
share price performance. There is no reliance on legislative or executive
writs issued by an administrative agency to deter undue volatility in the
price of shares, as in the U.S. There is a specific directive promulgated by
a democratically-elected legislature which requires a managerial board to
566. See Pfeil, supra note 257, at 168-70.
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cause the corporation to immediately disclose all potentially market-moving
information to the "investing public" via exchange newspapers and
electronic information systems.567 At the same time, it is by specific
directive promulgated by the same legislature, that insiders are prohibited
from, and criminally prosecuted for, trading on this information before it
is publicized.568
There is also no reliance on a grand jury to uncover and initiate
proceedings against an offending trader on the basis of inside information
as there is in the U.S. Thus, there is no "convening" of the general public
in the form of a publicized hearing by an administrative agency hearing
officer. There is no supplementing of this process by the payment of
statutory bounties to members of the public who provide information
culminating in a successful prosecution. Instead, as seen below, the German
model relies on institutions of private and public law. It is these institutions
that assure federal prosecutors become aware of insider trading
violations. 69
Reliance is not placed on administrative impeachment as a remedy to
remove offending inside traders from office as in the U.S. Rather, the
criminal prosecutors seek removal from office as a criminal sanction
provided by the courts. Instead of a bifurcated process with a bill of
impeachment issued by one agency and a decision to impeach issued by
another agency, the German model, as seen below, only allows prosecution
in the criminal courts.5 7° The German model's equivalent of the U.S.-type
grand jury and impeachment processes works as follows. As the result of
its receipt of information regarding securities trades from credit institutions,
as institutions of private law, the Federal Supervisory Authority, an
institution of federal public law, concludes that further investigation is
warranted. It then issues a "warning" to the applicable state Regional
Exchange Supervisory Office, an institution of state public law. This state
authority then issues a warning to the applicable exchange operating
authority which operates largely under state authority. The latter funnels
the results of its investigation up to the state regional authority. It then
funnel its conclusions up to the Federal Supervisory Authority. If it feels
criminal prosecution is warranted, the conclusions are funneled to the
federal criminal prosecutor.5 7' The German model has no concept of a
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"private litigant in the public interest" as seen in the U.S. Absent traditional
relationships giving rise to private causes of action 72 such as privity of
contract, there is no private right of action for violation of the insider




There could be a more specific statutory break-down of functions. This
breakdown would be to assure that fundamental rights of the German nation
as a financial center will be protected. This, in turn, may ensure that the
German citizen shareholder and the foreign investment fund shareholder
will have more assurances against a stock market that is unduly volatile
because of a lack of reliable basic information. The German model of
reliance solely on criminal prosecution to deter corporate officials
contributing to volatility by trading on insider information is arguably not
as effective as the U.S. multi-pronged reliance on (1) the grand jury, (2) the
statutory bounty, (3) administrative impeachment, and (4) the private
litigant in the public interest. This reliance solely on criminal prosecution
may detract from the confidence of any citizen shareholder or foreign
investment fund that there has been a sanction-type underpinning serving to
limit undue stock market volatility from insider trading.
The German scheme could be slightly modified to better achieve the
anti-volatility objective, while still retaining its sole reliance on criminal
prosecution. The change would be to have a definition of material
information for purposes of criminal prosecution of insider trading, that is
different from the one used for purposes of immediate corporate
dissemination of the information into the market place. Currently, the
definition is the same for both purposes under the German model. This
definition is "information capable of considerably moving the price of the
security if it were publicized. "17' A corporation need not, and in some cases
is required not to, disseminate such information until after advice from
institutions of private and public law.5 75 This need to consult gives insiders
who are intent on insider trading a window of opportunity to trade on
572. See id.
573. See id.
574. It is assumed that a commentator's phrases (1) "capable of considerably influencing
the value of an insider security if (the information) were publicized;" Pfeil, supra note 257,
at 160 n. 129 and accompanying text, and (2) "potentially market-moving;" id. at 168 n. 173
and accompanying text; have the same meaning.
575. See Pfeil, supra note 257, at 170 nn. 180 & 181 and accompanying text.
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significant developments that have not yet become public576 while
management and the various institutions are making up their minds. This
in turn, puts an undue strain on the criminal prosecution mechanism, which
in any event, is not as aggressive as the above U.S.-type four-pronged
mechanism.
5 77
A solution is that there could be an explicit statutory definition of
material inside information for criminal prosecution purposes which is more
abstract, narrow and comprehensible. It would not need expert guidance.
The definition would be information that would cause a reasonable man
modestly familiar with the corporation's operations and capable of financial
or other analysis to buy or sell shares in the corporation whether he is a
conservative investor, a speculator or a chartist. The short-term purpose of
this definition, which reflects the definition employed in the U.S.,578 would
eliminate windows of opportunity perceived by insiders derived from
information that has not yet been cleared by institutions for announcment
to the marketplace. The long-term purpose of the definition protects the
"fundamental right" of the German nation to a leading position as a
financial market.579
H. Underpinning of an Assured Minimum Level
of Long-term Operating Performance
As the annual meeting approaches, there will have been no "outsiders"
in meet and confer proceedings among components of the German model's
nation-as-master trinity to give entrepreneurial and community perspective
and assure a minimum level of long-term operating performance. Rather the
model will have relied on institutions of private and public law to give a
nation-conscinus ner naetive A urinr.e of "entrpnrPnPurinl dvnnmism"
will have come from the vaunted German work ethic, derived from the two
underpinnings of leadership, and honor code, principles. On the other
hand, the German model's structured interactions will have been conducted
with informality without too much concern for "process." In contrast, in the
U.S., participatory democracy sessions will have been conducted, at least
in part, with a process-focused attention to performance of "ministerial
duties."
576. See id. at 164-75.
577. See id.
578. See Sec. Exch. Comm. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (1968), cert.
den. 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
579. See Pfeil, supra note 257, at 144-52.
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1. Use Made of Participatory Democracy Sessions
Under the German model, executive officers will have been constrained
by a legal requirement that they make day-to-day operating decisions only
within the context of a meeting of a managerial board. This institution of
private law includes all of the executive officers plus one labor member.8 0
The executive officers are also constrained by a requirement that they
implement operating decisions only after consultation with a workers'
council. This institution of private law consists of labor representatives plus
one representative of the executive officers.5"' In addition, the executive
officers, through the managerial board, are statutorily encouraged to
consult directly with the annual meeting of shareholders, an institution of
private law, before the making of crucial operating decisions in crisis
situations. 582 As seen above, this institution is in a position to lay the
foundation for absolving the executives of personal liability for actions that
they may have in mind to resolve a crisis.53
The U.S.-type "big stick" of the threat of a disruptive board of
directors meeting if a meet and confer is not held, does not exist. At
supervisory board meetings, there is to be only one "speaker" for the
managerial board. 584 No other executive officers can even be present at
meetings of that board unless they qualify as "experts" or "specialists. "585
The leadership and honor code principles are deemed sufficient to assure
collegiality among executive officers and the one labor member in the
course of preparatory meetings of the managerial board.
Absent a crisis, the supervisory board will not have received reports
that it specifically requests from the managerial board so much as it receives
reports required by statute.586 Therefore, in the usual situation, executive
officers under the German model are relatively free from close monitoring
by the supervisory board. 587 The real power of the supervisory board
580. See Kubler, supra note 261, at 98 and Peltzer, supra note 259, at 33. The German
name for the managerial board is "Vorstand." See Kolvenbach, supra note 265, at 165.
581. See Kubler, supra note 261, at 98. The German word for workers' council is
"Betriebsrat." Id.
582. See LAw OF STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note 264, at § 119.2.
583. See id. at § 117.2.
584. See id. at § 105.
585. See id. at § 109.1.
586. See id. at § 90.
587. See id. at § 97. See also Macey, supra note 279, at 87-88; Benfield, supra note 317,
at 631-32 and Peltzer, supra note 259, at 33, 35-36.
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comes in defining enterprise objectives.588 This board is, by statute,
specifically given the power to assume limited direct responsibility for the
making of operational decisions, particularly in crisis situations. Unlike the
U.S. situation, it derives this power primarily, rather than secondarily
through an ability to fire the chief executive officer on the spot. 89
Reflective of the German model's reliance on structured interaction to
achieve co-determination," the supervisory board of the typical stock
corporation consists fifty percent of individuals elected by the shareholders
at their annual meeting and fifty percent of individuals elected by employees
of the corporation and relevant labor unions at an annual meeting of
labor.59" ' Therefore, before the capital half can make any operational
decisions, it must consult with the labor half. To insure that the labor
element cannot itself make decisions against the will of the capital half, the
chairman of the supervisory board is to be a member of the capital half."9
In the event of a tie vote, he is to have a second vote. 5 Reflective of the
German penchant toward informality, personal attendance by members is
not required for the supervisory board to make decisions as it is in the U.S.
Written votes are permitted such as a member giving a proxy to another
individual to represent him at meetings of the board. 5"
There is no statutory assurance of independent directors to serve as
catalysts to debate on the supervisory board. The focus of statutory
requirements has been to assure only that no member has any ties
whatsoever to the executive officers." Partial assurance that a member of
the capital half is not captive to a universal bank shareholder and lender is
588. See Baums, supra note 5, at 510. According to a commentator, the supervisory
board is "the classic representation of shareholder interests in Germany." See Peltzer, supra
,nte 25, -a 3*4.CmaeteUSaprchs udisusT1V erier.. SCee supra rt ti
589. See LAW OF STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note 264, at § 111. This is not to say that,
given the honor code principle, the selection and de-selection of managerial board members
is secondary in importance. See Baums, supra note 5, at 514 (selection of members of the
managerial board as the "most important task" of the supervisory board)
590. In contrast to the approach favored for U.S. board meetings, and in order not to
place undue strain on the structured interaction, there is a lack of a "searching agenda" at
a typical meeting of the supervisory board. See Roe, supra note 248, at 1980.
591. See Kolvenbach, supra note 265, at 164-65. The German word for supervisory
board is "Aufsichsraft." Id.
592. See Roe, supra note 248, at 1942-43. The chairman (who by statute must have been
shareholder-elected) maintains a close, informal relationship with the managerial board. See
Baums, supra note 5, at 510.
593. See Roe, supra note 249, at 1942-43.
594. See LAW OF STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note 264, at §§ 108, 109.
595. See id. at § 105.
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that a member of the capital half of the board cannot "be subject to a
consent reservation. "596 In other words, he must himself be an executive
officer capable of resisting any pressure from his employer against his
observance of a degree of independence. Otherwise, there is a statutory bias
against "outsider" membership on the supervisory board. Directors
independent of the universal banks, in the sense of having no business
relationship with them, have rarely been elected at shareholder meetings.
597
The statutory bias is that, as a practical matter, both the managerial board
and the supervisory board with its labor membership are expected to agree
on each capital nominee. 598 Any member of the supervisory board,
including a labor member, has the right to be present as an observer at the
physical holding of the annual meeting.5" He is therefore in a position to
make sure that the universal banks, as prime participants on the floor of the
meeting, oppose any nomination of a slate of capital members believed to
be unsympathetic to co-determination that comes from the floor.
Although the process by which labor members are elected is beyond the
scope of this article, it would appear that independent directors as found in
the U.S., are unlikely to be found on this side either. The statutory bias is
that labor members be accountable to the current employees of the
corporation and to the unions as representative of these current
employees.' There is a lack of representation of the unemployed who
engage in trades relevant to the corporation."U
596. See id. at § 100.1.
597. See supra note 317 and accompanying text.
598. To assure agreement, the universal bank shareholders, "prefer(ring) to take their
chances" first with the managerial board rather than deal directly with the supervisory
board; see Roe, supra note 248, at 1942, 1970; typically would suggest their respective
"capital"nominees to the managerial board. The managerial board then presents as its own
a slate of capital nominees to the supervisory board as a whole (including to the labor half).
See id. at 1942.
599. See LAW OF STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note 264, at § 125.3
600. See Kolvenbach, supra note 265, at 164-65.
601. Whether or not there is a lack of representation apparently depends on whether a
union can be said to represent the interests of a trade, members of which may or may not
be employed either by the particular corporation or, for that matter, by any other employer.
Assuming that a union representative does, in part, technically represent the unemployed as
one of his constituencies, the question is whether he indeed can be said to have a broad
enough mindset to actively represent the unemployed in deliberations with the shareholder
component on the supervisory board (not to mention in deliberations with management on
the workers' councils and on the managerial board).
Two factors say "no" to this question. They are, first, that union representatives are
outnumbered by representatives of current employees on the supervisory board. A majority
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The universal banks are given a preferred position when it comes to
meet and confers between management and any capitalists regarding
shareholder proposals. The "politically-ambitious" independent shareholder
is indeed statutorily given a right to have a proposal of his which bears on
enterprise objectives included in a management information statement in
advance of the annual meeting. This right is subject to much the same
disciplines against overweening ambition as they exist in the U.S.' °2
However, this independent shareholder has little bargaining power in
attempting to meet and confer with management as a prelude to his
submitting a proposal, in comparison to the U.S. citizen capitalist. The
independent shareholder will have had little ability to get in touch with
other independent shareholders in advance of the annual meeting except
through his membership in a "shareholders' association" which is in privity
of contract with the corporation, or through his personal recollection of
other independent shareholders that were registered as personally present
at the previous annual meeting. 3 Only his personal recollection of the
ward shareholders disclosed by universal banks as having given proxies to
them at the previous annual meeting will enable him to get in touch with the
ward shareholders.' °
The identity of other independent shareholders who are not part of his
shareholders' association but will assuredly be present at the meeting, will
of the labor members must be current blue-collar employees; the other two categories of
labor representative (added together numbering less than the blue-collar employees) are the
union representatives and white-collar workers (the German word for the latter is "Leitender
Angestellter"). A second factor against a broad mindset is that only the current employees
actully havte the r;,vh o n. .. ".. U.. ts--• cu union... . ... ,. ,, Ln .,,t ,t L baor represei-taiivest~ un o.. . ...
6
A SJVIU- qiI1dvs/iiiun
representatives) on the supervisory board.
One factor can be said to say "yes" to the question of whether the union
representative can have a sufficiently broad enough mindset to make a difference in favor
of the unemployed. This is that elections can be either direct or indirect. The statutory bias
is in favor of indirect election in the case of the larger stock corporation. Indirect election
involves election of a limited number of electors to an electoral college. The college then
exercises discretion in selecting the actual labor representatives on the supervisory board.
A union electioneering goal has been election of a heavy union component to the electoral
college. See generally, Kolvenbach, supra note 265, at 164-65.
There is certainly a perception that the interests of the unemployed are under-
represented within labor components of corporate supervisory boards. See Europe Isn't
Working, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 5-11, 1997, at 16 and Europe Hits a Brick Wall, THE
ECONOMIST, Apr. 5-11, 1997, at 21-23.
602. See LAW OF STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note 264, at § 126.2
603. See id. at §§ 129.1, 135.4.
604. See id.
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not become available until the actual day of the annual meeting. Io This is
in contrast with the U.S. where states typically require the opening-to-
inspection of a register of all shareholders of record at least ten days prior
to the meeting.' °6 Even if the independent shareholder could galvanize a
coalition on the floor of the meeting, he is denied the right to make a
proposal from the floor of the meeting, by statute, if the subject matter was
not previously announced as an agenda item when notice of the meeting was
given by management.' °
There is no express statutory provision for inclusion of any proposal the
politically-ambitious ward shareholder may have in the management
information document. It is always possible that a universal bank will
establish an internal code of conduct to assure that management takes
cognizance of any proposal a ward shareholder may have. However, this
possibility rests on an "internal code of conduct" judgment call by the
universal bank."0 Similarly, the holding of any meet and confers between
the universal banks and ward shareholders and among ward shareholders
themselves, regarding proposals of the more politically ambitious ward
shareholders will have to depend on an internal codes of conduct judgment
call by the relevant universal bank. Again there are no statutory provisions
that delineate the participation rights of these assertive ward shareholders.
2. Critique
The same two levels of shareholder board that this article suggests for
alternative slates of directors in connection with election contests, could be
used to consider shareholder proposals drafted by ward shareholders. The
use of such two levels would assure that the assertive ward shareholder will
be able to volunteer to participate in the process of fine-tuning enterprise
objectives by means of shareholder proposals. This participation would be
on the basis that the shareholder will voluntarily take on the coloring of an
institution of private law. As in the case of election contests, the universal
banks would be assured a slightly pre-eminent position by virtue of their
being an especially important institution of private law under the German
model.
Further, granted that the U.S. concept of an "independent director"
runs directly counter the German model, there is still a need to lessen the
605. See id. at § 129.4.
606. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
607. See LAW OF STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note 264, at § 124.4.
608. See supra note 259 and accompanying text.
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pre-eminence of the universal banks and employed labor on the supervisory
board. To assure that this lessening occurs, the federal legislature could
modify its statutes regulating the national stock exchanges to provide that
a minimum number of members of the capital half of the supervisory board
must be answerable under the honor code principle solely to statutorily-
defined "broad" interests of the capital community. This requirement would
be a condition of listing shares on an exchange. The federal legislature
could similarly amend its statutes on the subject of co-determination to
require that at least a minimum number in the labor half be answerable
solely to defined broad interests of the labor community. This would also
be under the honor code principle.
L Underpinning of an Assured Minimum Attention
to Enterprise Objectives
As an annual meeting approaches, the assurance of at least a minimum
level of attention to enterprise objectives, will have come principally from
regular monitoring of the supervisory board under the German model. 609
Principal assurance will not have come, as in the U.S., from ad hoc express
scrutiny only when there is a threat of a coercive takeover. We have seen
how the German model gives the supervisory board a special mandate to
assure that enterprise objectives are always capable of further fulfillment.
If, at any point, the supervisory board should find that enterprise objectives
are not fulfilled, as in the case of insolvency, it is responsible for assuring
that the corporation acknowledges this fact and files for a declaration of
bankruptcy.
610
The supervisory board has greater on-going power than the U.S. board
of directors to assure further fulfillment of the business plan. Further,
capital structure aspects of enterprise objectives are still a likelihood. The
U.S. board of directors has the greater on-going power in the identity of
executive officers used to continue to pursue the objectives. As a result of
the exclusiveness of the role of the supervisory board in the area of
enterprise objectives, the independent and ward shareholder can currently
only have assurance that the continued operation of the corporation is on no
more than a solid foundation. These shareholder types will have had little
assurance that counter-entrepreneurs will likely have arisen as
"environmentally-useful" predators if the pursuit of enterprise objectives
609. See Roe, supra note 248, at 1971.
610. See supra note 588 and accompanying text.
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has been sub-optimal because of a need, for example, to restructure the
corporation.
No special recognition is given to any right of independent shareholders
and ward shareholders to the providing of opportunities to sell their shares
at a premium in a takeover attempt that constitutes a "buy-out" if
performance is sub-optimal. These shareholders are not regarded as having
a fundamental right to any reward for their stewardship efforts. Thus, they
never voluntarily undertook to perform any stewardship efforts on an honor
code basis. Moreover, the rights of independent and ward shareholders
would not seem very important in the case of proposed buy-outs since any
prospective control premium opportunity is diminished as a right to be
availed of by the right of the shareholders to declare dividends to
themselves.
Neither the federal or state government, nor any institution of public
law will have enacted guidelines for corporate responses to the coercive
tender offers. One reason for this is that the "fundamental rights" of the
counter-entrepreneur are not believed sufficiently noteworthy.61' There is
little incentive for any counter-entrepreneur to emerge. His rights to use of
cash that he owns, to acquire and enjoy a controlling block of shares in the
corporation are only marginal.6"2 Additionally, only recently has the
German nation's right to a world-class stock market been fleshed out to give
any special standing to counter-entrepreneur attempts to achieve coercive
takeovers on German national exchanges.6"3
Arrayed against these "rights" of the counter-entrepreneur and the
German nation have been the following "fundamental rights in opposition":
(a) a right of labor not to be fired precipitously on consummation of a
611. See Peltzer, supra note 259, at 36. There are no legal principles, as in the U.S., that
control the conduct of corporate management in addressing coercive tender offers. See
Haggeney, supra note 277, at 212-13.
612. There are, however, anti-trust constraints on the acquisition of shares by the counter-
entrepreneur as well as voluntary guidelines for him to follow in the making coercive tender
offers. Moreover, the counter-entrepreneur must notify the corporation as soon as his voting
power in a proprietary capacity exceeds a five percent threshold. See Haggeney, supra note
277, at 212. The shareholders have the right to enact a provision in the corporate charter to
block voting rights, if exercised in a proprietary capacity, beyond a certain threshold that
they have determined. See LAw OF STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note 264, at § 136.
Typically the shareholders use this right to block voting rights, if exercised in a proprietary
capacity, beyond a five to fifteen percent threshold. See Macey, supra note 279, at 88-89.
613. See Pfeil, supra note 257, at 145-47. There has been debate in Germany as to
whether the perceived difficulty of achieving "hostile takeovers" is warranted. See Kubler,
supra note 261, at 103. And universal banks have been criticized for supporting anti-
takeover amendments to corporate charters. See Baums, supra note 5, at 521.
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takeover,6"4 (b) a right of other unsecured creditors that any takeover not
impair their property rights by adding to debt-load,615 (c) a past right of
current "capital" to payment of dividends as it saw fit thereby reducing
available cash to pay off debt to accomplish any takeover incurred by the
counter-entrepreneur, 6 6 (d) a statutorily-prescribed right of current capital
to deny the vote to the counter-entrepreneur to the extent his holdings
exceed a threshold amount, 6 7 and (e) the "right" of the German nation to
use universal banks as an institution-of-private law which are believed to be
the optimal representative of "socially-obligated capital" to provide
guidance to the corporation.6 8 This last "counter-fundamental" right
currently has no statutory proscription against supervisory board members
who represent the universal banks from meeting and conferring with each
other as representatives of shareholders. This is the case even if the meet
and confers have the express purpose of defeating any attempt at a
restructuring of the corporation by an outsider. Additionally, meet and
confers are primarily had on the basis that any takeover is inimical to the
proprietary interests of the universal banks. This is the case even if the
restructuring proposed by the counter-entrepreneur would be advantageous
to independent and ward shareholders.6 9
Furthermore, there are no statutory provisions setting forth duties of
management to protect and balance fundamental rights, as it addresses the
issue of a bid to restructure the corporation or terminate enterprise
objectives. In short, although a German institution of public law has issued
guidelines for the making of coercive tender offers, 620 any counter-
entrepreneur envisioning a tender offer will have been entering into legally
614. See Fiessner, supra note 259, at i3i-47. See also Auf Wiedersehen, Shareholders,
THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 29-Apr. 4, 1997, at 68. See generally, Roe, supra note 248, at
1970.
615. See Peltzer, supra note 259, at 33-35.
616. LAW OF STOCK CORPORATIONS, supra note 264, at § 119.1(2).
617. See Macey, supra note 279, at 890-91 and Baums, supra note 5, at 507-08.
618. See Roe, supra note 248, at 1964-65 (stating that cross-holdings among universal
banks, insurance companies and major German industrial corporations are a defense against
takeovers); Kubler, supra note 261, at 109 (stating that the supervisory board is a
mechanism linking universal banks, industrial corporations and major unions); Baums, supra
note 5, at 505 (stating that the German model relies on "institutional precautions" rather
than the "takeover market for corporate control"); and Baums, supra note 5, at 519 (stating
that through the efforts of universal banks, charter amendments are typically passed to
protect the larger stock corporation from takeover).
619. See Baums, supra note 5, at 519. See also Benfield, supra note 317, at 629-30.
620. See Haggeney, supra note 277, at 213-14.
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uncharted territory regarding what response to expect from management and
shareholders of the target corporation. He is dependent on any internal
codes of conduct purporting to resolve conflicting fundamental rights, that
the managerial and supervisory boards may have in place. For the above
reasons, the successful coercive tender offer has been a rare occurrence
under the German model.62'
The German model does not give importance to the conflict that a U.S.
executive officer would have, that is, the protection of his job versus
pursuing the best interests of shareholders. As to the latter, one of the
"capital" parties, the universal banks, would typically have more to lose
than gain from a successful takeover by an outsider counter-entrepreneur.
Therefore, they are typically in favor of management on the job protection
issues.622 For another thing, an elaborate statutory scheme under the
German model is either in place or suggested for protecting the rights of
wage-earners and salary-earners, including those of members of the
managerial board in the case of coercive takeovers. This is particularly the
case for takeover of a corporation in financial straits.623 In such crisis
situations, the German model "covers all the bases" The model would
employ the device of structured interaction rather than the U.S. -type device
of observance of minutely-detailed ministerial duties. The structured
interaction would occur within a special "standby committee." Members
of the committee could be representatives of the counter-entrepreneur,
management, labor, current capital, and the creditors of the corporation.
624
The German model could be improved in the case of coercive tender
offers to restructure the corporation. Two measures could improve the
assurances that the independent and ward shareholders will receive optimal
"enterprise objective" performances in this respect. First, the reforms
suggested above for election contests and membership on the supervisory
board should assure that at least a minimum number of the supervisory
board members will be sensitive to the interests of the independent and
ward shareholders as the board addresses the offer to restructure. Second,
the German legislature could specify the procedures to be followed in
addressing the offer, thereby avoiding any need of the independent and
621. See Baums, supra note 5, at 505 (statement, in article published in 1992, that "no
hostile takeover bid has been successful") and Macey, supra note 279, at 98 (statement in
article published in 1995, that there have been "four recorded cases of hostile takeovers in
Germany since World War 11").
622. See Baums, supra note 5, at 519, 521.
623. See Flessner, supra note 259, at 138, 146.
624. See id.
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ward shareholders to rely solely on undisclosed internal codes of conduct
that may or may not have been followed by management.
J. Conclusion as the German Model
The German concepts of due process, which are quite different in
theory from the de Tocqueville concepts that we have discussed,
nevertheless provide a coherent and balanced framework for enacting
corporate governance rules. We have seen that the main criticisms of the
German model, from the U.S. perspective, are pragmatic ones. These are
that (1) the model, in different ways, gives too much power to the universal
banks and current employees of a corporation, (2) it unduly discourages the
"independent shareholder" and the "ward shareholder" from attempting to
protect their investments by participating in corporate governance, and (3) it
gives scant opportunity for expression of broad community interests. The
above critiques suggest ways in which experts on the German model might
address the criticisms by drawing on U.S. tools as described in this article.
All the while, none of the U.S. tools need be actually imported into the
German model by these German experts. Rather tools of the German model
would still be used.625
625. According to a German commentator, the universal banks have repeatedly
announced that "they are not particularly interested in retaining the present system." Kubler,
supra note 261, at 104 n.45 and accompanying text and Roe, supra note 248, at 1968-69
(the universal banks say that they will not fight curbs on their domination of proxy
machinery). However, according to Kubler, "no-one has come forward with a plausible
concept for a system of proxy voting that could operate without the assistance of the banking
sector." Kubler, supra note 261,
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APPENDIX A
I. DIFFERING VIEWS ON PURPOSES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGULATION IN THE U.S.
One viewpoint has been that the primary purpose of an annual meeting
is to protect the rights of shareholders as a whole. This has been expressed
by T. Boone Pickens and the United Shareholders Association, an
organization he founded. A second view, expressed by the National
Association of Investors Association, has been that the primary purpose is
to protect the rights of shareholders who are natural persons. In contrast,
a third viewpoint is that the primary purpose of the annual meeting is to
nurture the rights of institutional shareholders. This theory holds that these
shareholders are in a position to be the most influential. A fourth view is
that the primary purpose is to provide formal procedures to legitimize the
stewardship of management. Entities tending to espouse this viewpoint
which is reflective of the well-known "Berle-Means" model of the U.S.
corporation, have been the Business Roundtable and the American Society
of Corporate Secretaries. A fifth view is that the primary purpose of the
annual meeting is to assure adherence to the principles of participatory
democracy. Espousers of this viewpoint have been Ralph Nader and
Americans Concerned About Corporate Power.'
The sixth view is that the primary purpose is to enable government, that
is, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") to influence corporate
decision-making. Some people contended that this is the case with other
industrialized countries, and should be in the U.S., to an even greater
extent than it is now.2 A seventh viewpoint is that the primary purpose of
the annual meeting is to help enhance the ability of U.S. industry to raise
capital in various securities markets. Insofar as regulation does not fulfill
this objective, inductive reasoning or the scientific method is to be used in
determining changes to the method of regulation. "First principles," that is,
the protection of any specific constituency, are to take second-place. 3
1. See The Case for a Corporate Democracy Act, Bus. & Soc'Y REV. 55 (1980).
2. Such a position has been espoused by H. Ross Perot. See reference to a speech by him
in Other Developments-Enhancing Corporate Competitiveness, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
No. 1495 (Apr. 1992). For a commentary on the efforts of government to induce
management to pursue social policy objectives, see Charles Hansen, Other Constituency
Statutes: A Search for Perspective, 46 Bus. LAW. 1355 (1991).
3. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Zen and the Art of Securities Regulation, 5 CONTINENTAL
BANK J. OF APPLIED CORP. FIN. 4 (1993).
APPENDIX B
I. MANIFESTATIONS REGARDING PERCEIVED
POLITICAL IMMATURITY OF THE GERMAN MIDDLE CLASS
A. From the Enlightenment on:
1. The German middle class, in general but not in every case, has a stifled
sense of frustration and upheaval. Within the middle class, a cult of
opposition to "progress" and thus, to "financiers," has developed. This cult
typically has taken the form of "utopianism."'
2. The German citizen had a tendency to be anti-state but pro-nation at the
same time.2
3. At least up until World War II, there has been a cult of opposition to
democracy because it is a byproduct of the Enlightenment. Even since the
end of the war, voting in political elections has commonly been regarded
merely as a "duty." There has been a dearth of energetic and dedicated
citizens in the political sphere.3
4. There has been a belief in work as "worship" which is a concept of
Martin Luther. This is rather than work as manifestation of being in charge
of one's own destiny.4
5. German male students have a reputation of mindless and typically
violent rambunctiousness within university towns.'
6. The secular authorities have sought to provide institutional guidance to
dhe hurhes .4Ltiit ...a.A..... In a.aa1 tn ; hrialy, U113 was to
"protect against subjectivity in biblical interpretation." 6 In the meantime,
1. GoRDoN A. CRAIG, THE GERMANS, 22-26, 63-67, 119-42, 163-84, 196-97, 241,
264-67, 275-76, 289-96, 316-19, 328-32 (1982).
2. Id. at 30-34, 49-50, 248-60.
3. Id. at 29-30, 84-96, 163-64, 240-42, 290-94, 310-11.
4. Id. at 112-13.
5. Id. at 180-84, 41-44. This tradition might be a root cause of the current "German
dread of disorderly legions in the street." See Germany-Bismarck's Steed, THE
ECONOMIST, Mar.29-Apr. 4, 1997, at 57.
6. CRAIG, supra note 1, at 85-90, 98-99.
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the other major confession in Germany, the Roman Catholic Church, has
developed a tradition of providing institutional guidance to the state. 7 A
third denomination, the Calvinists, has introduced a tradition in Germany,
through Henry IV, the King of France and Prussia, of "active obedience
and service to the state." 8
7. Particularly in the early stages of industrialization in Germany, there
was particularly strong reliance on the banks for the raising of capital.9
B. Since the End of World War II:
1. The large political party, in a sense, an institution, rather than the
individual candidate or the small ad hoc party, has played the major role in
German politics. In particular, there is a current bias against the individual
that is a "strong" political executive."
2. Co-determination has in a sense been substituted for militarism as a
vehicle to "control" blue collar and lower-level white collar employees of
German business enterprises."
3. A major effort of the German nation has been to "control" its "bad"
institutions, for instance, the German military. Control of such institutions
has been largely achieved through a "collaboration of elites" seeking to
effectuate a compromise that preserves and takes advantage of "good"
traditions of these discredited institutions. '
2
4. the concept of "social polarization" has arisen as a highly undesirable
condition to be avoided at all costs. 1
3
7. Id. at 94-99.
8. Id. at 86.
9. Id. at 107-08.
10. Id. at 39-44.
11. Id. at 41-44, 180-84, 239-41.
12. Id. at 49, 170-74, 244-52, 298.
13. Id. at 295-96. This motivation can be said to be a cause of the opposition to plebicites
of those currently in power in Germany. The view is that these threaten parliamentariansim.
The preference is therefore for exclusive reliance on representative, rather than direct,
democracy. See Christoph J. Partsch, Constitutions and Revolutions: The Impact of
Unification and the Constitutions of the Five New German States on the Amendment of the




I. LISTING OF MINISTERIAL DUTIES (A U.S. TOOL OF DUE PROCESS)
IN THE EVENT OF AN OUTSIDE PROPOSAL TO RESTRUCTURE OR
TERMINATE CORPORATE ENTERPRISE OBJECTIVES
1. Management has a duty to have in mind enterprise objectives for the
corporation, both in terms of long-term operating performance and in terms
of short-term share price performance. The objectives must fulfill
"average" investment objectives of the citizen-capitalists.'
2. Management has a duty to place the corporation in a position to oppose
coercive and uneconomic proposals by counter-entrepreneurs only if undue
volatility in the price of the corporation's shares presents coercion-oriented
counter-entrepreneurs with opportunities to fulfill an intent to realize short-
term profits.2
3. Management has a duty to make a decision either to act or not act when
faced with a proposal by a counter-entrepreneur.3
4. Management has a duty to abstain from action that is expressly
forbidden by the corporate charter or otherwise by the citizen-capitalists. 4
5. Management has a duty to be fully informed when faced with a counter-
entrepreneur proposal or the prospect of one. The board, as required by the
magisterial role of the "citizen," has the duty to insist on due diligence and
full disclosure from the executive officers on the issues of relevance to the
citizen-capitalists.5
6. The brr ha A I ty rwnlxr mlra dei-iOlrnc that e nnnc-urred 14,,ith b%,
1. See City Capital Assoc. Partnership Ltd. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 795-96 (Del.
Ch. 1988) (uses test of a "reasonable shareholder" given "differing liquidity preferences and
different expectations").
2. See Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc.,
500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
3. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984); Smith, 488 A.2d 858.
4. Moran, 500 A.2d 1346.
5. Aronson, 473 A.2d 805; Moran, 500 A.2d 1346; In re J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc.
Shareholder Litig., 542 A.2d 770 (Del. Ch. 1988); Smith, 488 A.2d 858; City Capital
Assoc. Partnership Ltd., 551 A.2d 787 ; Robert M. Bass Group v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227
(Del. Ch. 1988).
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the executive officers. Thus, the board functions only as a body of
selectmen elected by the citizen-capitalists judging the performance of the
executive officers. If the board does not have confidence in a
recommendation, it is to inform the executive officers where they have
fallen short and require a new recommendation. Otherwise, they must select
new executive officers.6
7. In the event of a counter-entrepreneur's proposal for a termination of
enterprise objectives or a restructuring of the corporation, management has
the duty, by action or inaction, to refrain from a coercive restructuring of
the corporation in response unless the counter-entrepreneur's proposal is
itself coercive.7
8. Management's response, if coercive, must have a definite proper goal
in mind. This goal must be documented in minutes. One goal could be
preserve the enterprise objectives currently in place, a goal effectuated by
"just saying no" to the counter-entrepreneur proposal to terminate the
enterprise objectives. Another goal could be to restructure the corporation
to provide a viable alternative to a disadvantageous termination or
restructuring. Another could be to assure the best available restructuring out
of multiple possibilities. Finally another goal could be to assure the "best
price and execution" of a termination so as to assure that the citizen-
capitalists receive an appropriate control premium over fair market value.'
9. No coercive response by management is to involve the destruction of
corporate assets. 9
10. A majority of independent directors must approve any decision to
thwart a coercive termination or restructuring instituted by a counter-
entrepreneur. 10
11. Management has a duty to assure that any coercive restructuring that it
proposes to shareholders resulting from negotiations with counter-
6. See Smith, 488 A.2d 858.
7. See id.
8. See Revlon v. McAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
9. See Moran v. Household, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
10. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Corp., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. Ch. 1985); Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984); Moran, 500 A.2d 1346; Robert M. Bass Group, 552
A.2d 1227.
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entrepreneurs, includes a provision that dissenting a minority shareholders
will receive fair market value for their shares.
1
12. If a coercive termination is found by the board to be inevitable
enterprise objectives are deemed to be not susceptible to further
fulfillment.' 2
13. In the case of a total or "partial" termination of enterprise objectives
calling for a cashing out of the citizen-capitalists, management has the duty
to adhere to a prescribed public auction process to assure that there is best
price and execution of the cashing-out. If this duty is fulfilled, the law
deems that an appropriate control premium over fair market value has been
achieved. 
13
11. Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. Ch. 1985).
12. See Panter v. Marshall Field Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981).
13. For a total cashing out, see In re J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. Shareholder Litig., 542
A.2d 770 (Del. Ch. 1988); Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); City Capital
Assoc. Ltd. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988); Revlon, 506 A.2d 173 (1986).
For a partial cashing out (sale of a division), see Robert M. Bass Group, 552 A.2d 1227.
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APPENDIX D
I. SUMMARY OF SUGGESTED CHANGES TO
U.S. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGULATION
PROPOSED IN THIS ARTICLE
A. Information
1. Corporate operating performance should be disclosed over a full
business cycle of ten years. Operating results should also receive a non-
technical analysis. Enterprise objectives should be more expressly alluded
to. Finally, share price performance should be discussed more in terms of
avoiding short-term share price volatility and less in terms of its being an
indication of long-term operating performance.
2. There should be analysis of compensation in terms of each of the three
relevant components, the wage, the provision for security, and the bonus.
Less detail and precision should be required as to the provision of an
entrepreneurial stake that does not amount to compensation in the fullest
sense. Wages and corporate performance should be set forth over
comparable periods. There should be a description of any "wage" brought
about by the materialization of a conflict of interest. A comparison of the
compensation of the chief executive officer with executive officers as a
group should be made.
3. There should be disclosure of compensation paid to legal and financial
advisers in an annual meeting contest.
4. There should be disclosure of management efforts to deter counter-
entrepreneur proposals to terminate enterprise objectives, that is, cash out
the citizen-capitalists and counter-entrepreneur proposals to otherwise
restructure the corporation. There should be disclosure of compensation
paid to legal and financial advisers for this purpose as well.
5. Management should discuss and analyze any unusual proportion
between independent and "dependent" directors. Stock exchanges should
have a hand in assuring a pool of qualified "independent" directors.
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B. Role for the Citizen-capitalist
1. For foreign corporations whose shares are traded in the U.S. but not on
a U.S. stock exchange, there should be U.S. style pleading phase
regulations to provide intra-government competition to the foreign "home
state" hearing phase regulation.
2. If an institution's ownership exceeds one percent of voting securities,
any important compromise of management with the institution should be
disclosed as well as the institution's policy on voting its shares so that
citizen-capitalists can prepare.
3. The definition of "citizen capitalist," for various purposes should be
changed to require that he was a shareholder for at least two years. There
should be disclosure as to which, if any, of the directors comprise citizen-
capitalists and of opportunities that they have to meet and confer in advance
of an annual meeting on subjects appropriate to the citizen capitalist. In the
absence of such meet-and-confer opportunities, there should be disclosure
regarding the other opportunities that should be given for citizen-capitalists
to meet and confer.
4. The definition of "corporately ambitious" citizen capitalist should be
made more rigorous; his financial stake should be at least $5,000 rather
than the current $1,000.
5. Greater leeway should be given to certain "financial aristocrats" to
meet and confer in private with other shareholders than is presently
available. This is namely to counter-entrepreneurs seeking to organize a
dissident faction for an election contest and certain large shareowners.
C. Underpinnings
1. Consideration should be given to making members of the SEC staff, as
members of government, personally liable for money damages for failure
to perform minutely-divided ministerial duties relevant to the providing
information to the marketplace for a corporation's shares.
2. The SEC should no longer be able to extract court consent decrees for
violation of the insider trading laws from insider trading defendants where
removal from office is an objective. The SEC should be required to bring
administrative bills of impeachment before another "political agency" such
as a stock exchange, rather than before a court proceeding for this purpose.
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3. The jury list for complex insider trading cases should be pre-cleared by
an elected selectman. Arbitrators in these cases should uniformly be able to
award punitive damages.

